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OCCUPATIONS, A DIASPORA, AND THE DESIGN OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
FOR A PALESTINIAN STATE 
WASIM AL-HABIL 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
The forces that shape administrative structures include the goals and objectives of 
minority and majority groups, modern management principles, and a legacy or history in 
which domestic political factions have gradually accepted rules and roles for mutual 
tolerance and inclusion. However, this process can be muted or redefined in societies 
where centuries of occupation and dispersion “short-circuit” maturation processes and 
introduce non-indigenous systems externally imposed without any level of popular 
acceptance or active citizenship participation.  In these environments, as new states 
emerge, their task of building local government institutions requires a clear understanding 
of indigenous systems and institutions. What must also be understood are systems and 
institutions resulting from (1) externally imposed systems, (2) ideas from returning 
expatriates who seek to implement systems from the countries in which they lived, 
learned, and (3) modern management science and accepted principles of civil service.  
Unifying and untangling these threads to create administrative structures for internal 
governance explains the difficulty emerging new states can face as they seek to 
implement stable and modern governments in “contested spaces.”   
This theoretical framework or perspective guides this dissertation and its effort to 
proscribe appropriate local government institutions for Palestine. Palestine – in the 
 vi
modern era – emerges from centuries of externally imposed governance systems used by 
the Ottoman Empire, the British government, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel. In addition, many 
of Palestine’s leaders came to maturity as part of a Diaspora in Western and Islamic 
countries. As a result, it will be argued that the usual dichotomy between politics and 
administration has never been applicable at any point in Palestine’s recent history. 
Administrative systems have never been a product of Palestinian politics but emerged to 
serve the interests of foreign governments. The Palestinian people have been subjected to 
top-down administrative systems that ignored the voice, needs, and rights of people. Yet, 
on the precipice of the establishment of a state, what is needed are recommendations 
from this history for a local governance system that embraces modernity, history, and 
local culture, and that will be presented in the dissertation’s final chapter. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
            Local governments assume critical roles in establishing and maintaining the 
quality of life for residents of any country. Public safety, education, environmental 
protection, recreation, and commerce each require effective delivery-level management 
systems even in unitary systems where a national government has primary responsibility 
for all public services and for enhancing economic development. In countries with more 
decentralized governance systems the responsibilities of local governments can be even 
more extensive for insuring a community’s quality of life and the conditions of the 
physical and social environment and for local economic development. 
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Students of public administration have long-recognized the contributions of local 
government systems for social, economic, and environmental stability and the long-term 
development of any region or country. For developing or emerging countries, Thomas 
“Tip” O’Neill’s advice that “all politics is local” may be more profound than some 
realize. The local government and governance systems that emerge in any country are the 
product of political maturation processes where rules and conventions emerge to achieve 
concurrence and the protection and incorporation of minority perspectives.  Where and 
when minority perspectives are not effectively included in governing processes the 
potential for conflict exists. There is also the possibility that when majority/minority 
perspectives are not incorporated into the formation of governing process that the ability 
of effective, efficient, and modern administration systems to develop will be 
compromised. Attention regarding majority/minority issues is frequently part of the 
assessment of national systems. However, if Tip O’Neill is correct attention must also be 
directed to understand if local governments and governing systems have evolved to 
incorporate minority positions and encourage participation.    
The creation and recognition of any country is a function of international treaties, 
the resolution of socio-cultural conflicts, and the ensuing recognition of boundaries and 
authority. However, if any newly established country is to have a measure of internal 
stability and development effective local government systems must exist. It is through the 
effective systems of local governments and governance that domestic stresses and 
conflicts are resolved through the provision of services and the creation of a social and 
physical environment that allows for development. Regardless of the level of 
decentralization or centralization in any governance systems, without reliable, 
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professional, and trusted local government systems, the needed development for stable 
economic and social systems will be less likely to occur. 
The need for professionalized local governments in areas where colonial or 
occupying powers created geopolitical borders and governance systems to further their 
interests is even more severe. In these regions it is likely that social and cultural groups 
without common interests were placed in the same geographic space – creating the 
potential for “contested” space – and the usual social compacts and contracts between 
these groups never evolved or were forged. Instead, colonial and occupying forces 
created layers of their own bureaucracy to administer and control an area for their own 
benefit and frequently were quite willing to maintain or even advance conflicts or 
conflictual positions between domestic factions to facilitate social control. As a result, 
colonial systems and those used by occupying military forces were frequently not 
designed to focus upon building social contract and compacts among indigenous 
populations who may have had a series of historical differences and conflicts. When the 
occupying forces leave an area or country the absence of institutionalized systems of 
governance among different cultural and ethnic groups can lead to conflicts as each side 
seeks to maximize its political control. 
There are few examples of societies forged from the absence of colonial 
occupying forces that have avoided civil strife when occupying cultures or nations left a 
country. Ireland and India offer 20th century examples where severe civil wars or civil 
conflict followed independence (or separation as in India’s case), but even the United 
States where leaders tried for decades to avoid internal conflict was the site for one of 
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history’s most destructive domestic wars within its first century as an independent state.  
Further in the early years of the American republic there were several violent civil 
skirmishes and threats for secession from the new republic. Today’s events would direct 
attention to Iraq and Palestine where groups vie for control in the absence of the building 
of social institutions at the local level to mediate the conflict between groups by external 
governments and military forces. A longer view of recent history would focus on the 
Balkans where civil strife required the presence of external troops but there is still the 
threat of conflict with only Croatia and Slovenia having achieved a level of internal 
stability that has fostered a decade of increasing social and economic development. 
Palestine will be among the next nation states to emerge while in the throes of 
frequent civilian and military occupation and conflicts between Palestinian political 
factions. Unlike many other areas such as the Balkans and the Baltic States, Palestine has 
no independent history and as a result its local government institutions are an 
amalgamation produced by hundreds of years of successive domination and occupation 
by the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain (the British Mandate years), Egypt and Jordan, and 
Israel. Its geographic boundaries were created and recreated by external forces and 
powers whose interests seldom included understanding the differences in local cultures 
and indigenous preferences regarding unification, union, or association with other local 
groups and cultures. Indeed the lack of agreed to or recognized borders lies at the heart of 
the conflict with Israel in which both sides to the conflict seek to impose alternative 
boundary sets on the other given their self-interests and their prejudicial views of what 
was intended at different points in history   
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The particular stress points for Palestine include divisions within the Islamic faith, 
potential differences with Palestinians who are Christians, and conflicts with the other 
minority groups within the areas usually identified as “Palestinian.” These other minority 
groups include, but are not limited to, other ethnic and cultural groups including the 
Bedouin, Islamists and secularists, conservatives and liberals. Local government 
institutions if they are to establish a framework to avoid domestic conflict and create 
social institutions that sustain development must benefit from past experiences and be 
rooted in the social and political preferences of local constituents. 
The object of this dissertation is to propose a set of local government and 
governance structures for the Palestinian leadership to consider, evaluate, and implement 
in efforts to professionalize and modernize local public administration and governance 
systems.  The means to this end involve several distinct tasks. First, the work is rooted in 
the classical literature of administration and governance that has guided the development 
of systems of local government and the administrative system in emerging nations. From 
such classical works as John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations 
on Representative Government, (1972), Woodrow Wilson’s The Study of Public 
Administration (1887), Frank Goodnow’s Politics and Administration (1900), Fesler’s 
Area and Administration, Dwight Waldo’s The Administrative State (1948), and 
Ostrom’s Theory of a Compound Republic (1961). Careful consideration is also directed 
towards the issues of changing from clan-based patronage systems – a prominent 
characteristic of Palestinian society, to meritocracies. The reasons for the rise and 
longevity of clan-based systems is discussed and a theoretical framework is presented to 
frame the discussion of creating local government systems designed to be inclusive and 
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professional while encouraging the evolution from familial-based systems to ones that 
can include in areas with competing social and cultural groups.   
This theoretical overview is followed by an assessment of the impact of each of 
the occupying powers on the structure and institution of local government systems 
beginning with the Ottoman Empire and then continuing through the British mandate, the 
period of conjoint Egyptian/Jordanian Administration of the two parts of Palestine 
separated by Israel, the Israeli military occupation of both Gaza and the West Bank. 
Third, a detailed history of the development of local governance will be assessed 
since the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 1994. This part of 
the history presents an analysis of how the new local governance system deals with 
political factions’ and the effects of Palestine’s diaspora on the evolution of new local 
government systems. When the PNA was created several leaders returned from long 
periods of exile in other Middle and Western states. They brought with them ideas and 
influences, and these two were then grafted into the structures that had devolved under 
occupation. The continued Israeli occupation has thwarted the evolution of new systems 
and that too is considered. 
Fourth, the results of a survey of Palestinian leaders in the public, private, and 
nonprofit sectors are presented to understand the realities of the current local governance 
under the PNA. This local history will help frame the recommendations based on theory 
and practice and insure that what is proposed is rooted in what has developed and can be 
strengthened, while also illustrating what changes are required and what structures may 
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need to be completed altered. The final section of the dissertation presents a set of 
recommended local government structures. 
The framework guiding this work posits that politics is a reflection of the socio 
political characteristics of any community. Palestinian society was deprived from 
exercising its socio political characteristics throughout frequent occupations. Many public 
administration theorists, including Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow, and W. F. 
Willoughby have argued that is difficult to separate politics from administration. Others, 
including Dwight Waldo, Paul Appleby, and Robert Dahl, argue that administration is 
politics. Therefore, the Palestinians are still exercising administration and governance 
that is not generated from the Palestinian socio political characteristics emerging from 
public participation. In other words, Palestine has not been able to establish local 
governments with indigenous roots. This is the biggest challenge facing the reform of the 
local governance and bureaucracy in the coming Palestinian State.  
1.1 Problem Statement 
The Oslo Accord or Agreement was signed between the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) and Israel on May 4, 1994 and led to the creation of and recognition 
by the international community of the PNA. This was the first indigenous Palestinian 
government in the modern era and perhaps the first in more than 500 years. On May 20th, 
1994, President Yasser Arafat issued presidential decree No. 1 stating the laws, 
regulations and orders that were applied before June 5th, 1967, would continue to be valid 
in the West Bank and Gaza until they were modified, cancelled or unified by the PNA. 
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The PNA inherited municipalities and local councils that suffered from severe 
obstacles and difficulties resulting from frequent military and civil occupying powers that 
tried to shape the local governance system to serve their external political agendas rather 
than indigenous issues related to economic and social development. For example, Israel 
did not establish during the period of its occupation any kind of infrastructure or system 
to assist in the transformation of local leaders into individuals who could be political 
leaders in negotiations to change the role of the PLO inside the Gaza Strip and West 
Bank from a revolutionary to a governing force. (This is discussed in detail in chapter 
four.) The occupation also made the Palestinian economy virtually dependent on Israel.  
Both parts of Palestine drew their supplies of energy and currency from Israel. The 
Palestinian municipalities and the other forms of local governance were subjected to a 
strong central authority and dominance by the Israeli military forces which controlled the 
process of decision making, appointing mayors and city councils, and cancelled the entity 
of local council members by confiscating their roles and duties in the Palestinian 
community. Indeed, as the Israeli army was the primary ruling authority the role of 
civilian-based institutions in governance and governments was neither developed nor 
emphasized. Civil laws and procedures were subject to military rules and laws subverting 
the ability of Palestinian entrepreneurs to enjoy the benefits accorded Arab and Israeli 
investors in Israel (to say nothing of the rights of entrepreneurs in Jordan or Egypt). 
Intrusion into the local maturation processes was not limited to occupying 
military forces and their governance systems. After the establishment of the PNA, 
Palestinian citizens expected indigenous leadership would unify laws, regulations, and 
rules and implement a healthy local governance system. However, the PNA imposed 
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another form of centralized control through the creation of a strong central government 
that dominated and controlled local governance and governments. Many of those put into 
leadership positions had spent numerous years abroad and so they brought with them the 
beliefs and values that may have been formed in other countries (Jarbawi, 1996). In many 
instances this lead to a virtual absence of democracy at the local level combined with a 
lack of funding, transparency and professionalism. In this environment it was not 
surprising to find high levels of corruption combined with an inability to collect revenues 
and taxes especially after Second Intifada and the deterioration of the economic situation 
(World Bank, 2007). The Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) proposed several 
reform plans including the appointment of municipal judges, organizing the relations with 
donors, and organizing the financial policies and urban planning to serve citizens but 
little things were achieved because of the interference of politics (World Bank, 2007).    
There are then two levels of politics that negatively influenced the development of 
local governance. Israeli politics is articulated through its occupation of the West Bank 
(and its on-going control of economic and social space affecting Gaza) leaving 
Palestinians without any ability to maintain and deliver the essential functions of local 
governance including urban planning, constructions and other similar important duties.  
Political events in Israel dictate the level of restrictions and control exercised by the 
Israeli military (Drori, 1975). In addition, some political factions in Gaza have been more 
interested in military and paramilitary actions against Israel than in forming stable 
governance systems to serve the economic and social needs of residents.  
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Domestic Palestinian politics have been defined by the political struggle between 
the two largest political factions, Fatah and Hamas, especially after Hamas’s victory in 
the 2006 legislative elections. Thus local politics disrupted or changed the development 
of the local governance system but given the international community’s intervention to 
support Fatah while classifying Hamas as a terrorist organization, Hamas’s contribution 
or impact has been muted. This meant that the civilian arm of Hamas and local 
governments where Hamas’ representatives secured a majority of the votes has been 
ignored and their possible contribution to indigenous systems produced through 
negotiations for mutual recognition or recognition of needed changes has not taken place.  
Non-domestic politics interfered or controlled the extent to which local political forces 
and processes could or would resolve the conflict between two political parties. Here, 
again, then, is an example of external forces still controlling the evolution of local 
governance systems making Palestine’s case and history unique. What is not unique are 
differences between parties; what is unusual is the predominance of international forces 
in usurping indigenous evolution to allow local politics to define local institutions and 
their maturation. Those citizens living in areas controlled by Hamas have endured 
substantial hardships as the international community has supported Fatah and depleted 
resources available to local governments and their citizens in Gaza where Hamas has 
assumed power.   
1.2 Research Questions 
(1) How have non-indigenous local government institutions in Palestine interfered 
with the political maturation of administrative systems? 
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(2) What differences, if any, in changes imposed on Palestine’s institutions are 
related to the two periods of civilian-imposed external systems (Ottoman 
Empire and Jordanian/Egyptian rule) and the military occupation rules (the 
British Mandate period and the Israeli occupation)? 
(3) How has the PNA’s politics shaped and formulated local government systems 
to serve limited political factions’ interests ignoring the establishment of 
indigenous local government institutions? 
1.3 Research Hypothesis 
Orthodox public administration theories state that politics can be separated from 
administration for achieving effectiveness, efficiency, and reform while the new public 
administration theorists state that politics cannot be separated completely from 
administration because “it is ‘a science with principles of universal validity,’ it operated 
on the basis of ‘political theories’” (Stivers, 2000: 124). Reflecting this observation, this 
dissertation addresses two specific hypotheses: 
(1) Politics have never been separated from administration throughout the history of 
the Palestinian local governance, but has been essentially non-indigenous in 
character retarding the formation of indigenous institutions and systems. 
(2) PNA politics –itself dominated by Diaspora experiences and the constant 
interference of the international community – has led to the establishment of local 
government institutions serving non-indigenous political interests further 
retarding the development of systems based on compacts and compromises 
between local parties and groups.   
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(3) The political factors have led to an absence of any reform movement capable of 
producing indigenous systems. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Local governance in Palestine has been formulated and influenced sharply by the 
political agenda and needs of the occupying powers and also the conflicts within 
Palestinian society and the politics of the PNA. The role each of these political 
dimensions assumed in the shaping of local governance systems often relegated the needs 
of the indigenous population to a tertiary position. Moreover, the satisfaction of the needs 
of external forces short-circuited the establishment of institutions or mechanisms to 
address or ameliorate the normal and naturally occurring conflicts within Palestinian 
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Society. As a result not only were needs unmet but a political maturation process never 
was never fully engaged. It is therefore hardly surprising that when new governance 
institutions were created by the PNA there were suspicions of corruption and a perceived 
lack of transparency. To be sure, with no professionally trained administrative class the 
expertise needed was in short supply and the resulting systems had substantial and often 
insurmountable challenges in meeting the needs of the residents. These shortcomings 
negatively influenced the development and performance of local governance systems 
(World Bank, 2007).   
Noting that there are political issues shaping the administrative structures in the 
PNA and that politics in general affects administration is hardly a new perspective.  
Scholars in the field of public administration have long debated the politics-
administration dichotomy, especially in the discipline’s early years. Initially many 
prominent theorists including Woodrow Wilson, Frank Goodnow, Frederick Taylor, and 
Luther Urwick, argued that the politics-administration dichotomy was the way to reach 
the instrumental rationality of modernity. That modernity could achieve efficiency, 
municipal reform, expertise, and professionalism in field of public administration but 
only after the resolution of the politics-administration tension. However their debates 
were in the context of indigenous systems free from foreign control. There was also little 
attention directed to the role of a governing diaspora returned to power after long periods 
abroad. Their discussions also did not need to treat this phenomenon in the context of the 
United States. Yet that is a pertinent part of the evolution and politics that leads to the 
formation of administrative structures for the Palestinian people. Before exploring those 
issues, the first part of this chapter reviews the classical literature in public administration 
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reflecting upon the politics-administration dichotomy and its resolution for institution 
building and the creation of modern structures and systems. That literature is then placed 
in the context of the experience of the Palestinian people to identify some of the 
limitations that the research performed as part of this dissertation seeks to address. 
This should be the lead into the section half emphasizing some of the points 
emphasized earlier. The Palestinian people have been subjected to top-down 
administrative systems that ignored the voice, needs, and rights of people (Jarbawi, 
1996). Since Palestinian local governance has been subjected to centralized system 
applied by the previous occupying powers and the current PNA (Jarbawi, 1996), the 
second part of the literature review outlines the principles of governmental centralization 
and decentralization reflecting the advantages and disadvantages of the two systems.  
To learn from the experiences of other peoples it is necessary to review the 
context and cases of other developing and developed countries. Therefore, the third part 
of the literature review sheds light on the nation-state model in local governance that 
integrates citizens, private sector, and non-profit organizations in planning, formulating 
and implementing the policies of local governance. While some countries have applied 
this model successfully in operating their administrative systems, other countries have 
encountered difficulties in implementing this model.  
2.2 Politics-Administration Dichotomy 
Guy Adams (1994: 26) defined modernity in a way that characterizes the world 
by “secularization, the universalistic claims of instrumental rationality, the differentiation 
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of the various spheres of the life-world, [and] the bureaucratization of economics.”  
Through this definition, it is essential to note the universalistic claims of instrumental 
rationality that is an important element to define modernity. Instrumental rationality is 
portrayed as a technical “way of thinking and living that emphasizes the scientific-
analytical mind-set and the belief in technological process” (Adam, 1994: 26). 
These ideas are not new ones as they came from the 17th century Enlightenment to 
emerge in the United States during the Progressive Era when the field of public 
administration (PA) was founded. These ideas have prevailed during the founding period 
of PA as an independent field of study during or just before the Progressive Era (Marini 
& Pugh, 1983; Adams, 1994). Adams (1994) adds that these ideas are still dominant in 
contemporary PA that is studied in universities.  
With the strong shape of instrumental rationality, Adams (1994) argued that the 
foundation of PA as a field of study has actually led to a particular framework. The level 
of scientific methodology that scholars utilize to reach its ends represents this framework. 
However, this particular framework created the trajectory of the field of PA that shaped 
its evolution and new paradigms.  
The politics-administration dichotomy is an example of the influence of the 
scientific framework of positivism. However, being outside this framework, other 
concepts and theories found themselves in conflict and endless debate with the scientific 
approach. The theoretical and practical conflicts in the field can be categorized and 
understood based on their logic or on what is well known in PA as the politics-
administration dichotomy. This dichotomy reflects the conflict between the value-driven 
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political logic and the neutral scientific logic of handling administration. The 
instrumental rationality of modernity presented the concepts of efficiency, effectiveness, 
expertise, professionalism, accountability, and democracy and other issues in PA. 
In Woodrow Wilson’s 1887 essay “A Study of Administration,” he asks what 
government can do and how can it execute its tasks or perform its work with the utmost 
efficiency and economy. As a political scientist he posed the right normative questions 
but diverted into a discussion of two spheres of government: politics and administration.  
Politics is the sphere that makes the choices regarding what government should do based 
upon a majority of elected representatives, while the administration carries out the will of 
these representatives through efficient procedures, free of political influence. But if the 
policy implemented is a product of politics, then, by extension is the administration 
inherently political? Public administration, according to Wilson, should be based upon a 
science of management. It is worth noting that Wilson was writing at a time of corruption 
and scandal within government, a result of a spoils system controlled by partisan 
politicians. A need for civil service reform existed that would place government workers 
with the skills, knowledge and experience of administration into the public service, 
because, “there is no Republican way to build a road.” Mosher (1981) described Wilson’s 
idea that if each sphere worked best without the other, functioning in isolation without 
interference or meddling from the other side, there would be a clean division between 
those responsible for determining policy and those responsible for carrying it out. In 
addition to reforms within the personnel system, other reforms could be made to public 
organization and management as well as demonstrated by initiatives of the Progressive 
era. 
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It was Frank Goodnow’s Politics and Administration (1900) that most clearly 
articulated the desire to separate politics from administration. Citing the “expression of 
the will of the state (politics) and the execution of that will (technical, scientific and 
commercial activities)”, Goodnow formalized the politics-administration dichotomy. 
Goodnow reacted to the unchallenged power given to political parties, cautioning that 
they could upset the popular will if they were unchallenged in their leadership roles.  
Parties could also threaten the sovereignty of local government, and escalate inefficiency 
within the administrative state. In fact, the circumstances that Goodnow described aptly 
apply to the Palestinian administrative setting. For Goodnow, political parties do not 
reflect the will of the people, and threaten the separation of powers function established 
by the Constitution or the basic laws. While politics was necessary for the establishment 
of public policy, administration must be expert and professional in the administration of 
its duties. Goodnow placed faith in the efforts of science to improve the functions of 
administration. 
While Wilson’s essay went unnoticed until the 1940s, efforts at reform did take 
place including the founding of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research in the early 
1900s, implementation of the city-manager form of government, the formation of an 
executive budget at the Federal level in 1921, and other efforts at reform within federal, 
state and local levels of government. The New York Bureau of Municipal Research used 
the scientific approach to consider the functions of public administration and to clean up 
the corruption of municipalities (Holden, 1996; Lynn, 1996). According to Stivers (2000: 
117), the bureau’s scientific approach was reflected in its motto: “To promote the 
application of scientific principles to government”. The major components of the 
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bureau’s philosophy emphasized that government is more management than politics and 
called for increasing efficiency in public management through scientific inquiry.  
Taylor’s “Principles of Scientific Management” (1911) which stated if there is 
one best way to accomplish any given task, there can be also one best way to accomplish 
a task of social organization was quite popular in the government reform movement. 
Efforts to determine “one best way” became the mantra of attempts to focus on a “science 
of administration.” This effort is illustrated through the public administration texts 
authored by White and Willoughby, the work of the Taft Commission in creating an 
executive budget “that is value free, unpolitical decision-making” (Caiden, 1971), and 
Gulick and Urwick’s (1937) Papers on the Science of Administration. These latter 
authors noted that  “Politics in any bad sense ought not to intrude upon administration 
and in any case is pernicious if it invades the management process proper; that 
administration lends itself to scientific study, that out of scientific study of administration 
would emerge principles that are useful guides to the conduct of administration.”  
The focus on a science of administration that supports the politics-administration 
dichotomy is supported by Fayol’s 14 General Principles of Management (1916) and 
Barnard’s The Functions of Executives (1938). In both works discussions of theories of 
management, such as unity of command, span of control, specialization and division of 
labor. The emphasis was on science to improve the delivery of public service to the 
exclusion of a discussion of values of what to provide, not just how to provide. 
However, the politics-administration dichotomy started to lose cachet during the 
1930s and 1940s, as governments increased in size as a response to programs developed 
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to respond to the Great Depression and World War II. Two leading public administration 
theorists debunked the politics-administration dichotomy. Herbert Simon (1946) with his 
“Proverbs of Administration” satirized the tenets used by Gulick and Urwick and 
criticized and ridiculed their use of science. Simon brought a new dichotomy to the 
discussion, one of facts and values. Dwight Waldo opposed Simon, in his book entitled 
“The Administrative State” (1948), stating that through 60 years of PA in America there 
has been no progress in the name of democracy and service to the public. Furthermore, he 
argues that PA could never be a value neutral science, because even if all neutral facts 
were at hand the remaining question would be which line of action to take and that 
decision is a completely political one. This debate between Dwight Waldo and Herbert 
Simon marked the end of the orthodox era and replaced the politics-administration 
dichotomy with the logical division between value laden and value neutral.  
This division manifested itself in the split between the school of thought which 
still considered public administration as a science, for example Simon, and the school of 
thought that saw public administration as imbued with values and inherently political, for 
example Waldo and the Blacksburg school. Whereas the former stream of thought 
developed in the areas of policy science and organizational systems, the later set out to 
construct a democratic theory of public administration. These efforts resulted in the 1968 
Middlebrook Conference and the Blacksburg Manifesto, which laid the foundation for the 
inquiry of themes such as participatory democracy, citizenship, equity, and ultimately 
New Public Administration which do not exist in the Palestinian context. The former, PA 
as science, stream of thought carried Wilson’s goal for ‘businessification’ and efficiency 
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through various reform movements of which each had the goal to make the 
administration of government more efficient and more businesslike.  
    Administrators should make decisions based on facts, discovered through the 
logical-positivist view of knowledge. Waldo (1948) in the Administrative State questions 
whether training in the mechanics of administration and professional ethics is enough for 
running government affairs, calling for political theory and philosophy to support the 
field of administration.  
Additional public administration scholars who discuss the dichotomy include 
Rohr (2001) who saw the demise of the dichotomy in the Brownlow Commission 
recommendations that brought politics into the White House with the movement of the 
Bureau of the Budget into the President’s office. Appleby shatters the myth by stating 
that political activity acts as a check on the arbitrary exercise of bureaucratic power. He 
argues “Government is different because government is politics” (Shafritz et al., 2004: 
135). The research argues that government draws its politics and policies and implements 
them through the administrative systems. The Palestinian national government dominates 
the policies and the administrative systems completely. So for the Palestinians, there is no 
clear line between politics and administration and the role of government towards the two 
dimensions. 
Ostrom, in his book, The Intellectual Crisis in Public Administration, calls 
Wilson’s dichotomy bad medicine for reforming public administration because the latter 
is related directly to politics. Martin (1988), in “The Fading Legacy of Woodrow Wilson” 
states Wilson repudiated his version within three years of its publication arguing that the 
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state is not a private company or body corporate, rather it is a body politics which is not 
always rules of good business. Rosenbloom (1983) states that administration must 
involve all three branches of government and that administration is rooted in 
administrative law and the politics - administration dichotomy fails to include that branch 
of government. Public administration must be a combination of politics, law, and 
management. Frederickson (1971) states that administrators are not neutral and should be 
committed to values such as social equity. Administrators are actively involved in the 
executing policy.  
Waldo notes that the perdurability of the dichotomy is based upon the principles 
of scientific objectivity – people seek pragmatic answers to their problems and want an 
expert to give them those answers. With a professional class of administrators, we can 
feel safer that the complex management of government is being well handled. The 
dichotomy is the decision/execution dichotomy, to restate Goodnow’s work. According 
to Waldo, if we can understand it and find ways to relate the two realms, it will be 
relevant to the task of thinking who we are, what we are and the course we should pursue. 
Otherwise it is a totalitarian government that offers a seamless weave of politics and 
administration.  
In summary, the politics-administration dichotomy explained in the classical 
public administration literature sought to achieve governance reform away from the 
interference of politics. In other words, the politics-administration dichotomy was born in 
the reform context. The reformers of the 1870s and 1880s based their efforts on the 
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notion that as knowledge was acquired and if incorporated into management systems 
governance would exist outside of a political context.  
 Therefore, there are two schools of thought. For one, the politics-administration 
dichotomy to achieve reform, efficiency, and effectiveness is of paramount concern.  For 
the other school it is difficult to separate politics from administration because the latter is 
simply the former (politics). Therefore, the local governance of Palestine has been 
suffering from politics and its positive and negative contributions from largely external 
constituencies for centuries as will be described in the next chapters. To achieve any 
reform in its local governance – and to make it responsive to the culture of local residents 
– Palestinian officials must realize and organize the relationships between administration 
and politics in a way that the politics’ from non-local sources is bounded relative to its 
role in creating and defining local institutions.      
Without having organized and well-defined relations between administrators and 
politicians, the Palestinian local governance will continue suffering from the influence of 
non-local politics and its implications; this the specific danger to the creation of modern 
and effective local governance institutions that Goodnow was concerned about and about 
which he issues his warnings more than a century ago.   
2.3 Centralized Government 
The Palestinian people have been subjected to top-down administrative systems 
that ignored the voice, needs, and rights of people (Jarbawi, 1996). Since Palestinian 
local governance has been subjected to centralized systems that were created by the 
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Ottoman Empire, British Mandate, Egyptian/Jordanian Administration, and Israeli 
occupation, the second part of the literature review outlines the principles of 
governmental centralization and decentralization reflecting the advantages and 
disadvantages of the centralized and decentralized systems. Currently, the PNA is 
applying a central local governance system that is linked and related directly to the 
control of the central government. 
Oates (1990) discusses in detail two forms of government, centralized and 
decentralized, in terms of allocation, distribution, and stability. He tries to present the 
advantages and disadvantages of each form in order to introduce the most effective form 
of government that can handle administrative and fiscal policies. In terms of the 
centralized government, Oates (1990) argues that centralized governments have higher 
level of stability than the decentralized form that relies on state and local governments 
(SLG). He thinks that the centralized government has a better ability to maintain high 
employment level with stable prices. In addition, he points out that the size of money 
supplies needs to be controlled by centralized government rather than the decentralized 
form. SLG may mismanage the financial and administrative system if they independently 
take the control over it. 
The discussion about public debt also infers that a centralized government has 
more ability to stimulate the economy without burdening people with possible income 
transfers to outsiders in the future. Bahl (1992: 256) also agrees with this argument 
because when SLG borrow to “stabilize national income growth, a heavy burden would 
be placed on future generations of local residents.” The discussion about stability 
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concludes with the observation that “a central government is in a position to make good 
use both of monetary and of fiscal policy in maintaining the economy at high levels of 
outputs without excessive inflation” (Oates, 1990: 556).   
Oates (1990) asserts that the problem of distribution clearly appears in the 
decentralized form of government. The decentralized fiscal and administrative system is 
likely to face real difficulties when it works to achieve differing re-distributional goals 
independent from those of the central government. Therefore, Oates (1990) thinks that 
the centralized form of government has a better chance of success in dealing with the 
challenge of redistribution. He concludes that the “unitary form of government is 
therefore likely to be far more effective in achieving any agreed to re-distributional 
objectives” (Oates, 1990: 557)   
In terms of the allocation problem Bahl (1992) asserts that the determination of 
local services that should be offered and the concern about the national growth cannot be 
detached. He points out a critique of the SLG, “the fiscal choices made by state and local 
governments have contributed to a stunting of national economic growth” (Bahl, 1992: 
259). Oates (1990) also presents the advantage of centralized governments in terms of the 
allocation problem. He thinks that the central government is better able to provide the 
proper levels of public goods and services than the local governments. Decentralized 
system allows each local government to look for maximizing its own welfare regardless 
to the needs or objectives of the other local governments.  
Therefore, Oates (1990; 559) discusses how centralized governments provide “a 
better approximation to the efficient level of output of those public goods that benefit the 
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members of all communities than would a system of decentralized decision-making.” On 
the other hand, it is argued, according to Oates (1990), that the SLG can also have an 
effective decision-making system. This effectiveness comes from their better view of 
expenditures because they are tied to the real cost of resources to produce services. In 
summary, the centralized form of government functions is seen as better than the 
decentralized system of SLG in order to meet selected economic responsibilities, 
according to some viewpoints, even though it does not do an ideal job. 
As mentioned earlier, the Palestinians have been living under a strong centralized 
local governance system that has been shaped and formulated according to the decisions 
and policies imposed by the central government. Such central government bases its local 
governance system on a political agenda (important and strong conclusion for which data 
are required) rather than a professional and technical one as it is explained in the coming 
chapters. So it is important for Palestinians to organize the relationship between the local 
governance and central government on modern and pragmatic bases so that the 
administrative system can provide citizens with the different services efficiently and 
effectively and can meet their expectations and voices.   
2.4 Decentralized Government 
 In general, McClure (1990: 577) justifies his huge attack on the decentralized 
governments, wherein SLG decide fiscal and administrative policies, by determining four 
major disadvantages of this structure of government: 
At least four lines of reasoning suggest that tax and spending 
decisions by sub-national governments may not be optimal. First, 
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spending may be less than would be required for welfare 
maximization… because of spillovers of benefits between 
jurisdictions. Second, even if there are no spillovers…tax 
competition may result in suboptimal levels of expenditures. Third, 
in the absence of competition between jurisdictions, politicians and 
bureaucrats may act against the best interests of their 
constituents… Finally, interstate migration based on fiscal 
considerations may be excessive; because of the congestion 
migration creates.    
Although the decentralized form of government seems to be, for some 
economists, less efficient than the centralized system, some other economists advocate 
for the decentralized system because it has many advantages. Oates (1990) argues that 
when a central government supplies all public goods, it is expected to reach a uniformity 
of public program. However, individuals in different communities have different 
preferences about the consumption of public goods. While some people may prefer a high 
quality in specific programs, others may prefer to have a tax reduction in lieu of these 
programs.  
Tiebout (1956) discussed how consumers or voters move to the local communities 
that best satisfy their preferences. Centralized government is criticized because it 
provides similar outputs for all communities regardless to the possible variations that they 
may have. Bahl (1992: 256) points out that SLG can perform better in terms of “the 
decisions about how much local services will be provided and about how budgets will be 
financed.” He emphasizes that the efficiency of decision-making will be increased 
because the different preferences of local voters will be considered. Therefore, Oates 
(1990: 560) asserts that SLG can increase the “economic efficiency by providing a range 
of outputs of certain public goods that corresponds more closely to the different tastes of 
groups of consumers”   
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 In fact, Tiebout (1956) advocated for a decentralized form of government through 
presenting a complete model of local government. He illustrated that under specific 
assumptions the decentralized form of government can be adopted when voters change 
their communities based on their preferences. Voters will move to the communities that 
have taxes and expenditures that meet their preferences as much as possible. It can be 
said that “the greater the number of communities and the greater the variance among 
them, the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position” 
(Tiebout, 1956: 569).  McClure (1990) rejects this view, which seems to be too ideal, 
when one takes in consideration that migration creates congestion. 
Furthermore, Oates (1990) points out that decentralized forms of government 
have more chances to generate better experimentation and innovation in the production of 
public goods. The decentralized form of government encourages local government to 
increase the level of competitiveness with other local governments. This means that local 
governments engage in competitive efforts to provide the most efficient level of public 
goods and services.  
Finally, the discussion about the decentralized governments’ advantages can be 
seen in the effective decision-making, since they have “more efficient levels of public 
output, because expenditures are tied more closely to real resource cost” (Oates, 1990: 
560). Decentralized governments function better than the centralized form of 
government, under specific conditions, to meet the economic responsibilities, according 
to some viewpoints. This efficiency is considered in the SLG even though it does not run 
in a perfect way. This chapter presents overviews about the politics-administration 
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dichotomy and the centralized and decentralized government and how these two 
dimensions influence the performance of local governance system.  
2.5 Nation-State Model in Local Governance 
Reviewing the experiences in other developing and developed countries, the third 
part reviews nation-state model in local governance that integrates citizens, private 
sector, and non-profit organizations in planning, formulating and implementing the 
policies of local governance. While some countries have applied this model successfully 
in running their local administrative systems other countries have been facing difficulties 
in implementing this model.  
Local governments in Western Europe have become increasingly involved in 
network building with the local business community. Pierre (1997) suggests that 
governance processes are not value neutral but reflect and sustain political values beyond 
partisan conflict. Comparing managerial, corporatist, pro-growth, and welfare governance 
models of urban governance, Pierre (1997) argues that nation-state factors play an 
important role in shaping urban governance. Different sectors in urban politics display 
different models of governance and local political choice matters. Also, cities within the 
same national context differ with regard to the degree of inclusion of organized interests 
in urban governance, which, in turn, is reflected in urban policy outcomes. 
The spread of democratic ideas and the emergence of a global system have 
contributed to a resurgence of the local governance. One major form of decentralization 
in the twentieth century has been the breakup of empires into nation-states, the most 
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recent example being the Soviet Union. Events in Spain and the United Kingdom across 
the past 20 years offer further evidence of the decentralization-centralization tension 
within many societies fostered by histories of conquest and domination. Teune (1995) 
argues that the pressures for democratization have led to a new emphasis on local 
governance below the level of the nation-state. The rise of a global political economy 
provides localities with an alternative to national capitals. Although the patterns of local 
governance have similar features of provincial and local governments, the push for 
democracy will give local governance a greater role in the issues of peace and prosperity 
than has been true during the long recent period of the rise in authority of nation-states. 
Security for people, communities, and states is essential for sustainable 
development, democratization and conflict mitigation. Politicized, badly managed or 
ineffective security bodies and justice systems often create instability and insecurity, 
largely due to the lack of effective democratic systems. Ball (2005) argues that 
strengthening democratic security-sector governance after conflict presents enormous 
challenges, particularly: (1) developing and implementing a legal framework consistent 
with international law and democratic practice; (2) developing effective, well-functioning 
civil management and oversight bodies; (3) developing viable, accountable and 
affordable security forces; (4) ensuring that the institutional culture of the security forces 
supports the legal framework, international law, good democratic practice and civil 
management and oversight bodies. Addressing these challenges requires professional 
security forces, capable civil authorities, rule of law and regional approaches. Reform 
activities should be guided by local ownership, sensitivity to the politics of reform, local 
capacity, local context and a comprehensive sector-wide framework. Local stakeholders 
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must make hard decisions about priorities on the availability of domestic resources 
available and the costs and benefits of accepting external assistance. 
A strong rule of law is needed everywhere including in the Palestinian territories. 
For example, many Palestinian officials were accused of corruption and stealing public 
money but existing laws did not give the Attorney General the authority to investigate 
and prosecute (World Bank, 2006). Moreover, the PA has a weak and unprofessional 
security force (World Bank, 2006) that was not able to counter Hamas’s effort to control 
Gaza in June 2007, effectively dividing the Palestinian society into two and creating a de 
facto succession movement similar to what some groups tried (unsuccessfully) in the 
early years of the American republic.   
In developing countries, identifying the most effective community-level 
governance mode is a key issue in rural development; therefore, empirical evaluation of 
these different modes is desperately needed. Since the 1980s, tens of thousands of 
villages in rural China have held local government elections (Zhang, Fan, Zhang, and 
Huang, 2004), providing a good opportunity to investigate the effect of democratization 
on the level of local public goods provision and production. Using a recent village survey 
conducted across several years, Zhang, Fan, Zhang, and Huang (2004) compared two 
different governance modes. They find that elections affect little on the size of revenue 
but significantly shift the distribution of taxation from individuals to enterprises if 
possible. However, privatization has made taxation or levies on rural enterprises more 
difficult. They also show that elections and power sharing are conducive to improve the 
allocation of public expenditures.  
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Palestinians did not exercise their rights of electing their local governance 
representatives regularly under the different occupying powers. The PNA also never held 
local elections. Currently, Palestinian local governance is suffering from unfair 
distributions of public expenditures (World Bank, 2006) among the different cities and 
other localities in West Bank and Gaza where big cities, like Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron 
and Gaza, enjoying political power are receiving larger shares of the public budget and 
direct international donations without any coordination with the central government 
(World Bank, 2007).   
Zones of state failure that can be defined as the zones where the state is absent 
and cannot maintain and force the rule of law (Menkhaus, 2007). Zones of failure as a 
result of the PNA’s activities exist in Palestine as evidenced by Hamas’ control over 
Gaza which became subjected to a sever blockade imposed by Israel and the PNA. In 
reality, communities facing the absence of an effective state authority forge systems of 
governance to provide modest levels of security and rule of law (Menkhaus, 2007).  
Nowhere is this phenomenon more evident than in Somalia, where an array of local and 
regional governance arrangements have emerged since the 1991 collapse of the state.  
Menkhaus (2007) argues that the Somalia case can be used both to document the rise of 
governance without government in a zone of state collapse and to assess the changing 
interests of local actors seeking to survive and prosper in a context of state failure. The 
interests of key actors can and do shift over time as they accrue resources and 
investments; the shift “from warlord to landlord” gives some actors greater interests in 
governance and security, but not necessarily in state revival; risk aversion infuses 
decision-making in areas of state failure; and state-building initiatives generally fail to 
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account for the existence of local governance arrangements. The possibilities and 
problems of the “mediated state model,” in which weak states negotiate political access 
through existing local authorities, are considerable.  
Palestinian territories are sometimes facing similar zones of state failure including 
in Gaza where Hamas formally challenged and rejected the central authority based in the 
West Bank. Moreover, other territories are still under the occupation of the Israeli 
authorities for more than 30 years prohibiting the PNA from exercising its local 
governance responsibilities including planning, constructions, and other functions 
common to local governments (Jarbawi, 1992).  
In Palestine, local governance is influenced clearly by the elite interests (Jarbawi, 
1992) and, for example, this can be represented by the willingness of the central 
government to select certain mayors for specific cities from wealthy and big families, 
including Khalidis, Alamis, Husaynis, Dajanis, and Nashashibis, controlled the most 
prominent positions in the administrative and municipal offices (Maoz, 1984), as it is 
explained in the fifth chapter. Moreover, such mayors might coordinate and get funding 
from donor countries without any consultation or coordination with the central 
government and its ministries of finance and local governance. In other words, there is 
not an equity process of funding and supervision that is applied on all local governments 
in Palestine.    
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2.6 Citizenship Participation in Local Governance 
To create an indigenous administrative system, this research argues that this 
system has to address the voices, needs, and rights of people governed. The final part of 
literature review focuses on citizenship participation in establishing indigenous local 
governance. The final section of the chapter uses this research to define the research 
questions and hypotheses that guide this study. 
The modernity era saw the emergence of popular participation as a mechanism for 
promoting good governance in developing countries. Good governance was seen as 
crucial to efforts to improve the welfare of poor people in countries where elites had 
hitherto benefited disproportionately from policies conceived at the top without reference 
to ordinary citizens at the bottom (Habermas, 1996). Donor pressure to achieve 
governance reform sometimes helped accelerate the change.  With regard to planning for 
the physical environment of communities Aravot (1996) stresses the need for urban 
planners to create environments that reflect users’ preferences. This requires a widening 
of their basis for decision-making beyond their personal knowledge, norms of the 
profession, or a reflection of the desires of donors or central governments that frequently 
pay for the plans. He argues that public participation in the policies and planning process 
is necessary for the popular legitimization of governance in the design of communities.  
People have the knowledge, desire, and the willingness to engage in government 
activities and policies and to contribute to the implementation of plans if they are vested 
in the process (Macedo et al. 2005). 
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 In fact, the majority of the local governance research focused on the roles of 
influential and powerful actors in the urban planning process such as urban mayors 
(Teaford, 1990), federal officials and “political entrepreneurs” (Mollenkopf, 1983), and 
real estate officials (Weiss, 1980). However, the local governance research does not 
examine deeply another influential actor – citizens – and their relationship to other 
powerful institutions and groups that if properly fostered and nurtured can contribute to 
the legitimization of indigenous local governance systems. 
Throughout the decades the indigenous people in Palestine faced great challenges 
and difficulties to participate in local governance issues under the different occupation 
powers (Al-Abbadi, 1995). This exclusion begins with the centralized administration of 
the Ottoman Empire and was then continued under the British Mandate (Al-Nammura, 
1994), the administration by Egypt and Jordan (Jarbawi, 1996), and by the Israeli military 
occupations and the Israeli government’s failure to establish principles of civilian 
administration. After the establishment of the PNA people hoped to participate in free 
elections that could be the bases for establishing a new democratic state but this again has 
not been accomplished (Jarbawi, 1996, World Bank, 2006). Therefore, people have not 
been part of the local governance that affects and controls their lives and businesses.  
They believe that they have been separated from the administrative system (Jarbawi, 
1996) that is utilized to achieve a certain political ends by different central governments 
(World Bank, 2007).  
However, some Palestinian officials might respond that the limited participation 
of citizens in local governance is a result of several factors (Jarbawi, 1996). For example, 
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some local governance researchers argue that a limited number of citizens will participate 
in local governance issues and urban planning and this minority cannot represent the 
needs or perspectives of all citizens in the neighborhood. Transferring too much power to 
a vocal minority can also lead to alienation and disenfranchisement (Thomas, 1986).  
Consequently, citizen participation might favor a particular interest group and ignore the 
needs and interests of other groups. In addition, some local governance researchers 
believe that such participation might raise unrealistic expectations regarding what local 
governance and urban planning can achieve (Fagotto & Fung, 2006). Moreover, 
participation might consume some of the limited resources allocated for the local 
governance planning through frequent meetings and calls for studies (Fagotto & Fung, 
2006). Finally, the opinions and thoughts raised by participation might lead to vague 
guidelines and contradict the needs of residents that in turn will negatively impact city 
departments designing and implementing much-needed plans (Fagotto & Fung, 2006).   
The proponents of participation argue “there is no better way to ensure the long 
term success of public involvement than to institutionalize a decision-making role for that 
involvement” (Thomas, 1995: 163). This institutionalization can be achieved through 
neighborhood associations or resident committees that can collect data through surveys, 
direct meetings, and focus groups. These groups can permit concerns, fears, demands, 
and priorities to be addressed (Williams, 1985). This provides local governments with 
information that permits an understanding of the diversity of existing needs. In addition, 
the information regarding citizens’ preferences is advantageous because it creates “vast 
inventories of facts which are numerous to be related to individually, and might be 
rendered irrelevant to the planning process during statistical contraction” (Aravot, 1996: 
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67). The community organizations and associations with its volunteers can deliver this 
information to the city council for further review and discussion till reaching a final 
approval for the plan by all partners. The citizens should be involved in the 
implementation stage as well through resident committees that supervise and follow up 
the execution of the local governance plans and programs.  
Giving a seat at the table of decision making to citizens will create new levels of 
commitment to local governance systems as people participate in formulating and 
designing its programs and policies (Fagotto & Fung, 2006). The city government can 
benefit from this participation as citizen-volunteers are ready to assist in carrying out 
projects including cleanups, planting, community policing, and other community 
activities supported by the neighborhood organizations. In addition, citizens can find an 
available contact officer to resolve any complications or troubles that might occur during 
the implementation processes. This interaction and cooperation will grant the opportunity 
for the city government to learn more about the actual needs and fears of citizens and will 
help citizens to learn more about the urban governance. This participation will inject the 
local governance with a sense of realism that can address the actual local problems and 
create a civic infrastructure that can support and protect the plan (Fagotto & Fung, 2006).   
Are there any reasons to limit participation? There are three main reasons that 
stand behind the limited participation of citizens in local governance issues:  (1) the need 
to include and understand different and contradicted interests and needs of citizens; (2) 
the time required to make participation meaningful, and (3) cultural barriers that might 
represent obstacles in the way of participation. Firstly, citizens look at local governance 
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issues and urban planning programs as projects designed and implemented only for a 
specific group of residents. For example, some homeowners who are aware of the fact 
that local policies of urban planning are directly influencing the future value of their 
properties may participate while others either less affected or having less information 
may not participate. In addition, citizens who are renters might be discouraged from 
participating in any local governance meetings or discussions because they may believe 
that changes or new initiatives do not directly influence their personal wealth (Thomas, 
1986).  
Secondly, citizen participation in local governance issues requires a commitment 
of time from citizens (Fagotto & Fung, 2006). Thirdly, limited participation might be 
attributed to cultural barriers represented by citizens who have no experience or 
knowledge about local governance issues. Moreover, the cultural barriers might be 
represented by language and knowledge level proficiencies required for participation. 
Therefore, some residents cannot or will not express their concerns or demands regarding 
any planning or intended revitalization efforts (Fagotto & Fung, 2006). It is true that 
citizens cannot be forced to participate but more affirmative measures should be taken by 
to ensure that neighborhood meetings, committees, and associations reflect the 
neighborhood (Fagotto & Fung, 2006).    
 At the beginning of twenty-first century, urban planners and policy makers need 
to develop new methods to include all constituencies or impacted parties in plans to 
“guide economic growth and remedy the problems of uneven development” (Gotham 
2001: 308). The citizenship participation in urban and other local governance issues 
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consolidate and “renovate the social fabric and create a sense of ownership of the 
neighborhood and, more broadly, of the city” (Fagotto & Fung, 2006: 652). Emphasizing 
the important role of the mutual dialogue between the different partners of the 
community about various local governance issues to understand the meaning and the 
identity of the community, Simpson  (1995: 718) states that: 
a dialogic perspective allows us to hear people struggle to come to terms with 
urban community. Apart from the official surveys and studies that chart new 
businesses, measure numbers of tourists, and count populations, there is another 
story of community, a story told daily as people give voice to their experiences… 
people trying to become subjects, as well as objects, of the spectacle-producing 
machinery of modernization.   
To create an indigenous administrative system, the research argues that a system 
has to address the voices, needs, and rights of those to be governed. Consequently, the 
final part of literature focuses on citizenship participation in establishing indigenous local 
governance systems. The final section of the chapter uses this research to define the 
research questions and hypotheses that guide this study. 
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CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: 
My theoretical framework was developed from a review based on four main 
themes from literature in the fields of public administration and political science:  
(1) Governance after revolution; 
(2) Controlling political factions; 
(3) Local governance is for and from citizens; and, 
(4) Communicative discourse with citizens 
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3.1 Governance after Revolution 
Palestinians live under revolutionary circumstances as they are still struggling to 
achieve their freedom and establish an independent state. In On Revolution (1961: 273), 
Hannah Arendt states that a government after revolution is often “democratic in that 
popular welfare and private happiness are its chief goals; but it can be called oligarchic in 
the sense that public happiness and public freedom have again become the privilege of 
the few.” Arendt tries to examine some of the weaknesses of governance in the aftermath 
of revolutions by noting that the spirit or commitment that sustains a revolt eventually 
dissipates. She thinks this is a result of the unwillingness or inability of leaders to 
conceptualize the revolutionary experience and fervor in post-conflict periods.  This 
sometimes leads to a decline of or limited citizen participation in new governments and 
governance systems. For Arendt, freedom does not mean voting every four years for one 
of two candidates by unseen party functionaries, or even every two years for 
representatives and local leaders. She argues that the essence of freedom is not 
representation but participation and action.  This is similar to the perspectives put forth 
by Johan Stuart Mill (1972). Freedom is the opportunity to participate in government. 
What humanity calls democracy is really once again the few ruling the many or the 
minority controlling the majority (Olsen, 1997).    
Arendt argues that revolutions which humanity witnessed cannot maintain the full 
and continuous participation of the citizens in the governance process. This is what has 
been lost in the aftermath of every revolution. Enhanced participation existed for a time 
in the American town hall meetings, in Jefferson’s dream of wards at all levels of 
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government, in the Russian soviets, in the French societies, and in the Hungarian and 
other revolutionary councils. However, what happened after each of these revolutions is 
that people began to see one party dictatorships, two-party oligarchies, or multi-party 
chaos (Campbell, 1970).  
This view is aptly describes Palestine. After the Palestinian revolution ended with 
the Oslo Peace Accord in 1993, Fatah became the dominant ruler in the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches of the government. There was a virtual one party 
dictatorship in the Palestinian community from 1994 through 2005. However, after the 
last election of 2006, the opposition party, Hamas, won and the Palestinian community 
has witnessed a struggle for control of authority between the biggest two political parties 
leading to two-party oligarchies.The same can said in the Israeli side where the Labor 
Party became dominant for decades after the declaration of the independence.  However, 
this domination was followed by the rise of the Likud Party which drew a substantial 
portion of its electoral base on a political minority – Jews from Arab countries and 
Africa, the Sephardim – who were often excluded from the circles of power maintained 
by the Labor Party and its base of Jews from Europe and North America (Jarbawi, 1992).  
Some of the reasons behind the observed deterioration of citizen participation in 
post-revolutionary times might be attributed to the fact that the pursuit of happiness 
becomes, for many, the private accumulation of economic wealth (Arendt, 1961). This 
means that people are willing to forsake participation because of the years before and 
during a revolution where economic security and achievement was either postponed or 
not possible. Hence the focus becomes wealth accumulation with people willing to 
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forsake opportunities to participate or invest their time in governance systems. In 
addition, the chief end of government became protection of the state economy and market 
place and certainly events in the post-revolutionary period of the demise of the state 
system in the Soviet Union provides additional evidence of the validity of these 
observations. 
Arendt argues that to answer social questions does not necessarily mean to answer 
political questions. To end human poverty and organize an effective flow of goods and 
services are essential tasks for every government, even a mandatory obligation. However 
the establishment of such systems does not establish freedom. Revolutions or political 
change that does not deal with citizen participation and human freedom will not last for a 
long time as demonstrated by the quick decline of the former Soviet Union or accomplish 
anything (Campbell, 1970). Arendt asserts that in too many instances political freedom is 
often exchanged for economic benefits and gains. Arendt argues that the founding fathers 
meant “public happiness” in the revolutionary phrase “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness,” not private bohemia’s. Jefferson and Adams and the others experienced 
public happiness in public debates and long discussions of Congress, shaping by word 
and deed the web of political system and relationships in a new country (Campbell, 
1970). 
To expand or enhance citizenship participation in governance Arendt adopts 
processes to reinforce and strengthen the involvement of citizens in the governance. 
Therefore, she concludes On Revolution by suggesting that people should try once again 
to build structures of government through which at every level all people who want to 
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participate in public debates can do so.  She envisioned a series of councils – councils of 
peers – from local communities to the national level, with each council sending one of its 
members to constitute the next level council (Olsen, 1997). Her recommendations are 
sketchy but they hold at least the possibility that new political structures or systems are 
yet conceivable. In addition, her recommendations should motivate the political theorists 
to examine and prepare the rationales for considering such proposed political system in 
more functional and pragmatic way (Olsen, 1997).  
This perspective would suggest that Palestinian citizens were not given a chance 
to participate in the local governance system under the various occupations beginning 
from the Ottomans and ending with the Israeli occupation (Jarbawi, 1992). In addition 
their opportunities to advance economically have been thwarted by repeated political 
actions and endless circle of violence by Israel, Fatah, and Hamas (World Bank, 2006).  
Moreover, the citizens have not been granted a systematic and organized way to 
participate in the local governance under the PNA. The PNA did organize a few local 
elections but the election process was interrupted and fragmented but political actions and 
did not take place in some parts of the West Bank and Gaza. The role and participation of 
the citizens in the local governance was undermined and blocked by political interests 
exercised by the ruler (World Bank, 2006).  
Arendt favors the decisively more direct democratic councils and associations and 
structures of governance that seem to emerge inevitably “out of the organizational 
impulses of the people themselves” (1963: 283) in the revolutionary situation. She adds 
that such councils and associations are “never thought of... as germs for a new form of 
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government,” for the “professional revolutionaries” of the avant-garde. However, she 
believes that they should be “regarded... as mere instruments to be dispensed with once 
the revolution came to an end.” It is for this reason she adopts and recommends “the 
council system” in moments of revolutionary upheaval after revolution. She describes the 
status of having less democratic modes of governance after the end of revolution as “a 
strange and sad story,” and constitutes what she calls “The Lost Treasure [of]... the 
Revolutionary Tradition” (1963: 283). Throughout the chapters of On Revolution, it is 
obvious that the theme of citizenship participation in government and other public affairs 
flows on the surface once again. As it has been demonstrated in Mill’s assignment; this 
theme is one of the major issues in the field of public administration. To create an 
indigenous local governance system in Palestine, citizens have to participate in designing 
and implementing such a system. What is applicable in Palestine has been modified from 
other local governance system imposed by frequent occupation powers beginning from 
the Ottomans and ending by Israelis (Jarbawi, 1992; Al-A’raj 1996). The PNA has 
neither been able to legislate a comprehensive law governing the administrative system 
nor to organize comprehensive local elections in Palestine (World Bank, 1996). 
3.2 Controlling Political Factions 
In Federalist Papers #10 and #51 James Madison (1965) presents the major 
themes for societies that must deal with, cooperate with, and include factions within the 
governance systems of a society. The issue of the protection of minorities and minority 
interests against the infringements of majority interests and culture are paramount in his 
consideration of the need for representative government and a separation of powers. 
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James Madison argues in Federalist Paper #10 that factions in society lead to instability 
and injustice and they are the “moral diseases under which popular governments have 
every where perished” (Madison, 1965, p. 42). This means that a pure democracy would 
crumble under the pressure of various factions claiming their interests. Madison argues 
that the main reason for the establishment of factions is the unequal distribution of 
property. He further argues that a unified republic would “break and control the violence 
of factions” due to its extended sphere with so many passions and interests that no faction 
would be able to get strong enough to dictate their will. Madison states that there are two 
lines of action that could prevent the formation of factions, of which the first is the 
removal of all liberties that makes it possible to form and maintain a faction. However 
this solution is worse than the problem and unacceptable. The second solution would be 
to create an equal society where every citizen had the same passion and interest, however 
this is impossible as well, because people have the liberty to foster different interests.  
Different interests mainly arise because of the issue of property rights.  
As property ownership and its defense is defined by the existence of a state, that 
responsibility manifests itself into political divisions between owners and non-owners. 
Therefore it is impossible to prevent the formation of factions. The only thing that can be 
done is to control the effects. This would be easy if the faction would be a minority, 
because popular vote would prevent them from dictating their will. However, when the 
majority starts oppressing the rest of the citizens the situation is more difficult because 
the goal is to establish a government and prevent oppression. Madison argues that 
majorities with common interests have to be located distant from each other (to avoid 
political and civil conflict) and there has to be enough power and independent that neither 
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can oppress the other. Pure democracies cannot protect themselves from the implications 
of factions and that is why they are short in life and violent in their death (1965:46). 
Madison claims that only an extended republic can render the implications of factions.  
He then continues to refine his theory of an extended republic in the matters of 
representation. He defines representation as the delegation of government to an elected group 
of citizens. This chosen, wise body of citizens would then “refine and enlarge public views.” 
This filtering effect would ensure that permanent common goals would be attained rather 
than short-lived goals serving any group’s interest. According to Rohr (1986), the Federalists 
feared the excesses of democracy and favored a ruling of the better sort and wanted to “curb” 
it with representation. Another characteristic of a unified republic is its great number of 
citizens. They would elect enough representatives so no self-serving group among them 
could form. Furthermore, if representatives are elected it will be much more difficult for 
“unworthy candidates” to corrupt the system. In summary, the greater the sphere and 
citizenry of a republic the less likely factions will emerge to disrupt or oppress other interest 
groups. According to Madison, these conditions are met in a unified republic. 
In the Palestinian context, there are more than five political factions in the Palestinian 
community; each has separate ideologies, agendas and goals. For example, Fatah adopts a 
strategy of peace negotiations to resolve the conflict with Israel while Hamas is not even 
ready to recognize the existence of the Israeli State (Schulz, 2006). This research argues that 
there has not been any legal mechanism by which the Palestinian people can control the 
political factions’ ambitions and their political interests, or resolve the differences. In 
addition, different ruling regimes in Palestine have benefited from the existence of the 
 48
competing interests (Jarbawi, 1992). The rule of law cannot decide and judge on the conflicts 
that often break out between the political factions. After the establishment of the PNA, Fatah 
was the dominant political faction in the West Bank and Gaza from 1994 through 2006.  It 
exercised a kind of partisan governing strategy and corruption in the field of administrative 
appointments and financial issues (World Bank, 2006). After its success in the 2006 election 
Hamas began to hire its own political appointees in all the fields of public sector and 
eliminated staff affiliated with Fatah in the high and middle public positions and in all 
ministries. There have been continuous conflicts between the two political parties for control 
of the governing authority and its employment possibilities creating a dual system unable to 
government or effectively provide needed service and stability. The result is two 
governments, one in Gaza and one in the West Bank. Yet, in each locale, opposition party 
members seek to advance the interests of their party. Therefore, the political parties have 
been exercising disenfranchising policies against each other in the local governance without 
any consideration for merit, qualifications, virtue, and experience in the employment process.  
Therefore, Palestinian citizens are paying the price of having poor administrative 
governance system subjected to competing political factions. This research argues that the 
Palestinian society is not able to control its political factions due to the fact that the relations 
between politics and public administration are not organized. Palestinian politics interferes 
negatively in the administrative system shifting it away from being a bureaucratic tool to 
serve citizens to a political tool to serve limited interests of one political party. This might be 
attributed to the absence of the role of law that can organize the relations between the 
parliament, elected government, bureaucracy and governance systems. In other western 
countries, such relations are organized and controlled by the role of law. This dissertation 
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measures the attitudes of the Palestinian community leaders towards these unorganized 
relations between politics and administration in the Palestinian community and its negative 
consequences on the level of the services provided to people. 
3.3 Local Governance is for and From Citizens 
On Representative Government, John Stuart Mill (1972: 210) states that  
We have now, therefore, obtained a foundation for a twofold division of 
the merit which any set of political institutions can possess. It consists 
partly of the degree in which they promote the general mental 
advancement of the community, including under that phrase advancement 
in intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency; and partly of 
the degree of perfection with which they organize the moral, intellectual, 
and active worth already existing, so as to operate with the greatest effect 
on public affairs. 
Mill’s analyses his theory of government by arguing that the principles of 
competence and participation are the major goals and basis of a good government.  
Citizens have to participate in the public affairs and the most qualified have to provide 
the leadership for good government that requires virtue, and experience. The hope was 
these skills are available in the citizens who serve and those who are sovereign. Then 
Mill identifies the measurement of the good government in two ways: First, “the degree 
in which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively and 
individually”; and second, “the degree of perfection with which they organize the moral, 
intellectual, and active worth already existing, so as to operate with the greatest effect on 
public affairs” (Mill, 1972, 210). 
The government’s work should be evaluated by citizen in terms of its actions, 
improvement or deterioration of the people conditions and affairs, and its ability to 
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perform good work for them. But is this enough? Mill adds that good government should 
also dedicate itself to develop the virtue and the intelligence of the people. The 
government will not be good if it does not possess the necessary levels of civic virtue, 
interest and morality. Mill asserts that every person should have a voice in government. 
However, he limits this influence for the persons who have less education and experience 
in government. It is obvious that Mill concentrates on the principles of citizenship 
participation. But why does Mill insist on citizenship participation in government? He 
argues that participation protects the interests of people by granting them a voice in 
government that must be accountable to its citizens (Warner, 2001).  
Mill advocates for popular limited government and argues for the benefits of 
participation. He believes that properly administered and representative government can 
be the best form of government for the people either in theory or in practice. The political 
process that creates the representative government will be one of several tools that work 
to improve the intellectual level of people. Consequently, citizens will learn the benefits 
of having their affairs managed by persons of greater knowledge and intelligence through 
participation and civic education. Moreover, Mill argues that the representative 
government can be a shield against the danger and the tyranny of democracy. In addition, 
the inclusion of various opinions, skills, and experiences diffuses knowledge and 
prosperity and thus benefits the context of the citizens as a whole (Warner, 2001).  
Mill states that  
In addition to this, the Parliament has an office, not inferior even to this in 
importance; to be at once the nation’s Committee of Grievances, and its 
Congress of Opinions; an arena in which not only the general opinion of 
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the nation, but that of every section of it, and as far as possible of every 
eminent individual whom it contains, can produce itself in full light and 
challenge discussion (1976: 258, 259) 
Here, Mill discusses the wise representative theme arguing that the 
representatives should be selected carefully from among the people. These 
representatives must enjoy superior intellect, high education, and supervisory experience. 
At the same time, they should reflect diverse opinions and voices of the people. Because 
of the trust that people give to these representatives the later in turn have moral 
obligations and national commitment that they must respect and preserve. “This is the 
trust that is given by voters choose a representative wiser than themselves” (Warner, 
2001: 407).  
But what is the role of representative? Mill argues that the representative has to 
talk, deliberate, discuss, publicize, propose diverse opinions, suggest views to be the 
nation’s “committee of grievances, and its congress of opinion.” In other words, the 
elected representatives have to facilitate the process of the public discourse regarding any 
public issue or problem encountered (Warner, 2001: 407). 
Mill argues that   
The work of government has been in the hands of governors by 
profession; which is the essence and meaning of bureaucracy. Whether the 
work is done by them because they have been trained to it, or they are 
trained to it because it is to be done by them, makes a great difference in 
many respects, but none at all as to the essential character of the rule 
(1976: 265) 
Through this quotation, Mill explains the need for skilled bureaucrats. He believes 
that government works require training and necessary skills to be implemented and done. 
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For example, the legislative commission and the administrative body should consist of 
qualified and well-trained bureaucrats. Why? Mill argues that the representative body 
cannot function well simply because the legislative work is not an easy task. The 
legislative commissions are responsible for protecting the existing laws and making sure 
that the new laws match and do not contradict with the previous ones (laws). The 
representative body can propose ideas for legislation and such ideas have to be modified 
and improved for ratification. Mill asserts that this complicated process needs qualified 
people who are well-trained and experienced on performing the legal studies and devices. 
In addition, the representative body cannot function well without the assistance and the 
help of the technical experts (bureaucrats). Mill argues that the principles of 
administration can be taught and understood by anybody. However, these principles do 
not come spontaneously or by intuition but they do come through study, practice and 
experience. He adds that the administrative bureaucracy can do the whole work of the 
government by applying the principles of public administration to actual governing of the 
state (Warner, 2001).  
Such bureaucratic administrations should be controlled by certain limits and rules 
that it should be above partisan and political interests; Palestinian leaders have not have 
not been these procedures. When created they should be based on merit with clear lines 
of responsibility and accountability. Therefore, to recruit for the bureaucratic 
administration, intelligence, education, and governmental skills should be available in the 
characters of the expected employees. In addition, such employees should demonstrate 
their capacity of good record keeping, measures of accountability, and other technical 
knowledge through passing certain tests (Warner, 2001). Mill argues that the 
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representative body should not interfere in the work of the bureaucratic administration 
simply because this body does not have the knowledge and the experience in this field. 
Moreover, such interference might lead to achieve some political interest that in turn will 
be the source of corruption in the administrative system. Mill emphasizes the need to 
dismiss any bureaucrats who might be engaged in such corruption (Warner, 2001, p. 
407).  
However, this does not mean that bureaucrats have complete freedom. The 
representative body must be responsible for checking, criticizing, supervising, following up, 
giving final approvals, or withdrawing approvals of the public work. So it is clear that Mill 
separates the function of the representative bodies from the legislative and administrative 
bureaucracy “to attain as many of the qualities of the one as are consistent with the other.” 
The process of hiring bureaucrats in the Palestinian context ignores the principles of 
skill, merit, experience, virtue, and others that should be available in any bureaucracy (World 
Bank, 2006). The whole process of hiring has been based and influenced by political interests 
and partisan efforts to gain power inside the executive bureaucratic system in Palestine. 
While the same situation might be applicable in many democratic countries including the 
USA the Palestinian context ignores the educational, professional and the experiential 
requirements that must be available in any candidate for the positions (World Bank, 2006).  
Therefore, waves of fraud, theft, and other shapes of corruption have increased involving 
political officials. However, no one has been prosecuted on the grounds of any legal claims 
of corruption (World Bank, 2006), a scenario which does not exist in the democratic 
countries. On contrary, some of them are still holding higher political positions in the 
 54
Palestinian government. Thus the Palestinian public has lost confidence and belief in the 
government that reflected negatively on the citizens’ interest to activate their participation in 
public affairs. 
3.4 Between Facts and Norms 
Jurgen Habermas presents a theory of democracy developed and presented in 
Between Facts and Norms. In particular, he focuses on the concept of communicative 
power that is the key normative resource that is supposed to counter the norm-free 
steering media of money and administrative power theory (Flynn, 2004). He explains 
systematically the discourse theory in relation to democratic and legal. He develops a 
model of democracy that combines a procedural account of democratic legitimacy with a 
deliberative politics. Habermas tries to specify how the normative ideal of popular 
sovereignty may still be preserved or implemented in recognizable ways within a context 
of complicated modern social conditions (Flynn, 2004). Habermas states that “[I]n 
contrast to Weber, who sees the fundamental phenomenon of power as the probability 
that in a social relationship one can assert one’s own will against opposition, Arendt 
views power as the potential of a common will formed in non-coercive communication” 
(1996: 147). 
Habermas, here, tries to present the concept of the communicative power. He 
argues that the attempt to interpret popular sovereignty in procedural terms must be 
carefully defined so as not to mix up the meanings of the popular sovereignty with the 
radical-democratic content. He defines the principle of popular sovereignty in terms of 
discourse theory by arguing that all political power emerges from the communicative 
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power of citizens. On the other hand, he states that the communicative power lies at the 
heart of the communication model of the political process and consequently expressing 
the radical democratic content of popular sovereignty. It is believed that “Habermas 
borrows the concept of communicative power from Hannah Arendt, while reformulating 
it” (Flynn, 2004). Arendt argues that power is always something exercised by the whole 
people collectively, not by an individual. Power is possessed and is kept alive and active 
and practiced so long as the group is united. Habermas was influenced by Arendt’s view 
of political power in terms of ‘jurisgenesis’ and the authorizing force involved in the 
creation of laws and the founding of institutions (Flynn, 2004). 
After the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 the decision-making 
has been dominated by a limited group came from Tunisia (Jarbawi, 1996). In other 
words, a few individuals from Fatah dominate all decisions regarding local governance 
(Jarbawi, 1996) depriving citizens from debating, discussing, and participating in the 
administrative system that organizes their life. The communicative power indicated by 
Habermas has not existed in the Palestinian society in any form including the 
organizations of comprehensive local elections (Worl Bank, 2006). 
Habermas adds that 
For the transformation of communicative power into administrative has 
the character of an empowerment within the framework of statutory 
authorization. We can then interpret the idea of the constitutional state in 
general as the requirement that the administrative system, which is steered 
through the power code, be tied to the lawmaking communicative power 
and kept free of illegitimate interventions of social power (1886: 150). 
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Habermas believes that it is necessary to differentiate between the concepts of 
political powers. He states that the communicative power, which is generated, is not the 
same as administrative power that is employed for implementing the laws and regulations 
efficiently and effectively. He adds that we have to distinguish administrative from 
communicative power and to look at law as the mediator for translating or transferring 
communicative power into administrative one. He argues that law is considered to act as 
a transformer of communicative power and the practice of state authority through 
administrative power that is only legitimate if it is accompanied by this generated 
communicative power exercised by the people (Flynn, 2004). 
But who is the source of this communicatively generated power and how is it 
formed? Habermas answers by stating that a communicative power of this kind can be 
established only in un-deformed public spheres. It can survive only from structures of 
undamaged inter-subjectivity found in non-distorted communication (Flynn, 2004). Once 
again, being influenced by Arendt’s theories, Habermas develops the concept of 
communicative power in relation to his own account of communicative rationality and his 
procedural model of popular sovereignty (Flynn, 2004).   
Habermas clarifies that “Practical reason no longer resides . . . in the ethical 
substance of a specific community, but in the rules of discourse and forms of 
argumentation that borrow their normative content from the validity basis of action 
oriented to reaching understanding” (1996: 296–7). Habermas emphasizes on his theory 
of procedural rationality by calling for the use of reason within politics. Reason can 
provides us with logic and understanding of politics and its implications on the 
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community. He agrees with this focus on deliberative politics. “The idea of a network of 
discourses, on the other hand, does not limit the public use of reason to ethical–political 
reasons but runs the entire gamut of reasons including pragmatic and moral reasons and 
extending beyond ‘rational discourse’ to bargaining processes” (Flynn, 2004). Habermas 
has called this model ‘Kantian republicanism.’ However, this model places constraints on 
ethical–political reasoning from all sides. The network of discourses interwoven with the 
principle of democracy leads to a complex notion of legal validity (Flynn, 2004) 
 The Palestinian community did not practice an authentic discourse under the 
foreign occupations of the Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate, Egypt, Jordan, or Israel 
(Jarbawi, 1992). Citizens were forced to live with local governance laws and regulations 
imposed by the occupiers to meet their political objectives as it is shown in chapter VI. 
Therefore, Palestinians did not have a set of indigenous laws that could act as a 
transformer of communicative power. The practice of state authority through 
administrative power is only legitimate if it is accompanied by this generated 
communicative power exercised by the people, as stated earlier by Habermas. The laws 
and regulations imposed on the Palestinian citizens were foreign and they did not reflect 
the authentic needs and views of the governed.  Even after the establishment of the PNA 
in 1994, the Palestinian Authority has not set up a comprehensive law that can organize 
and rule in Palestine (World Bank, 2006). On contrary, while the Gaza Strip is still 
applying some Egyptian laws the West Bank is still applying some Jordanian laws in the 
local governance sphere and both of the two areas are rules by the same Ministry of Local 
Governance and the same central government. Therefore, the research argues that the 
principle of popular sovereignty in terms of discourse theory where all political power 
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emerges from the communicative power of citizens has not been existed yet in the 
Palestinian context.     
3.5 Conceptual Framework  
 The research argues that the Palestinian local governance administrative system, 
after the end of its revolution, suffers from lack of accountability, transparency, 
professionalism, efficiency and effectiveness. Such difficulties are mainly attributed to 
the central government’s interference and the application of top-down administrative 
system to dominate and rule the local governance for the sake of achieving certain 
political and partisan interests. In the Palestinian context, the dichotomy between politics 
and administration has not existed. On the contrary, the research argues that the politics is 
the only final decision player who shapes, formulates and influences the local governance 
administrative system in order to serve specific political interests on the account of the 
indigenous citizens’ needs and rights.   
This role of politics has been found in the local governance administrative system 
imposed by the Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate, Egyptian/Administrative 
Administration, and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Politics’ role can be 
investigated and verified by historical overview of the frequent occupying powers and 
data collected under the current PNA which led ultimately to create an un-indigenous 
local governance that has not addressed the concerns of the people.  
 
 
 59
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
This dissertation addresses several points related to the development of 
Palestine’s local government systems. One goal is to understand how successive external 
forces influenced the development of local government systems. The dissertation first 
investigates how externally imposed local government institutions created to largely 
control Palestine have interfered with the political maturation of indigenous 
administrative systems through a detailed analysis of historical studies and documents. 
The dissertation then focuses on how the PNA’s politics shaped and formulated local 
government systems to serve the interests of political factions’ while ignoring the 
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establishment of indigenous local government institutions. This analysis also relies on an 
analysis of past studies and historical documents. The third area of interest is on the 
current state of Palestine’s indigenous local government systems and their ability to serve 
local residents while providing opportunities to facilitate participation in the local 
governance process and the implementation of modern administrative structures. These 
issues are addressed through a survey of community leaders.  
These issues, then, are addresses through a three-pronged, triangulation approach 
relying on primary and secondary data sources. According to Creswell (1994), 
triangulation is a combined method study, one in which the researcher uses multiple 
methods of data collection and analysis. These methods might be drawn from “within 
methods” approaches, such as different types of quantitative data collection strategies 
(e.g. surveys and experiments). Alternatively it might involve “between methods,” 
drawing on qualitative and quantitative data collection procedures (e.g. a survey and in-
depth interviews). Denzin (1978), Jick (1979), and Denzin and Lincoln (1998) have each 
studied the utilization of an approach involving the triangulation of research methods for 
social research. 
4.1 Overview of Data Sources 
In order to learn more about Palestine’s indigenous local government systems and 
its implications for Palestinian society, a triangulation approach aims to examine, in an 
explanatory fashion, whether the current local governance system can respond to the 
needs of the Palestinian community. The data sources used in this research include 
historical documents and studies used to discuss the development of the local governance 
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systems under different regimes that have controlled Palestine: the Ottoman Empire, the 
British Empire through the mandate from the League of Nations, the governments of 
Egypt and Jordan through their control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank from 1949 to 
1967, and finally the military system imposed as a result of the Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank (1967 through 2008) and of Gaza (1967 through 2006). The second source of 
data is the historical assessment that focuses on the status of the local governance systems 
applied by the previous occupations and the current applied local governance system 
under the current Palestinian National Authority. The third data set is a survey of 
community leaders. The survey completed by leaders in Gaza and the West Bank asks 
respondents about the potential and efficiency of the current local governance system, its 
relationship to political issues and the judicial system, and its ability to meet citizens’ 
needs and expectations. The survey also included questions to understand what 
respondents thought are the needed local government systems and to compare that ideal 
with what actually exists. The survey is also an experiment itself in that a unique data 
collection process was followed given the political issues for respondents. The success of 
this technique is also discussed and analyzed as it may help identify a data collection 
method for studies in areas with extreme political divisions.   
W. Lawrence Neuman (1997) concluded that before a researcher begins to 
conduct a study, he or she must decide on a specific type of research. Neuman identified 
four dimensions of social research: 1) the purpose of doing it; 2) its intended use; 3) how 
it treats time; and 4) the research techniques used in it.  The dissertation then utilizes an 
exploratory methodology that incorporates the following four dimensions. First, its 
purpose is to explore a new topic or issue to learn about it because little is known or 
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written on the topic of interest. Exploratory research may be the first stage in a sequence 
of study. According to Neuman (1997) exploratory studies often go unpublished; 
typically their intended use is to incorporate their results into further research conducted 
and published at a latter point. Since an exploratory study is intended to provide initial 
insights into a topic it can be conducted using a variety of research techniques. 
Second, the intended use of the study is to investigate the current local 
governance systems in the Palestinian territories and provide insight regarding the current 
governance system to produce some recommendations that can assist in establishing a 
healthy and indigenous local governance system in the forthcoming Palestinian State. 
Third, for the time dimension the research provides a historical assessment of the 
development of the local governance systems in the Palestinian territories since the 
Ottoman Empire through the establishment of the PNA. Fourth, the study utilizes a 
survey of community leaders in Palestine to assess attitudes regarding the development of 
local governance systems. Moreover, the survey includes questions about the influences 
of the previous occupations powers on to the evolution of local government institutions in 
Palestine.  
“Exploratory researchers are creative, open minded and flexible; adopt an 
investigative stance; and explore all sources of information … Exploratory researchers 
frequently use qualitative data. The techniques for gathering qualitative data are less 
wedded to a specific theory or research question. Qualitative research tends to be more 
open to suing a range of evidence and discovering new issues” (Neuman, 1997: 215). 
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Babbie (1995) underscores many of these points in his description of the importance of 
exploratory and descriptive research. 
Consistent with the dimensions of an exploratory study, the methodological 
approach used in this research includes qualitative research that is converted and coded 
into a data set. Strauss and Corbin (1990: 17-18) describe the meaning of the term 
qualitative research as follows: 
By the term qualitative research we mean any kind of research that 
produces findings not arrived by the means of statistical procedures or 
other means of quantification. It can refer to research about … lives, 
stories, behaviors, but also about organizational functioning, social 
movements or interactional relationships… Some researchers gather data 
by means of interviews and observation-techniques normally associated 
with qualitative methods. However, they can code that data in a manner 
that allows them to be statically analyzed…”   
 
Creswell (1994) states “[I]n quantitative studies as in qualitative studies, 
questions, objectives, hypotheses represent specific treatments of the purpose of the 
study. In survey projects these restatements typically take the form of research questions 
and objectives …”   
A survey design provides quantitative or numeric descriptions of some fraction of 
a population – i.e. a sample-through the data collection process of asking questions of 
people. Qualitative implies an emphasis on processes and meanings not rigorously 
examined, or measured in terms of quantity, amount, intensity or frequency (Denzen and 
Lincoln, 1998). 
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4.2 Research Model 
The research model in this mixed method is described in Figure 1. The model 
illustrates the various factors that have interacted and impacted the development of local 
governance systems in Palestine. The model begins with the inputs and impacts from four 
external or occupying forces, recognizing that each had different temporal components. 
For example, Palestine was ruled by the Ottoman Empire for more than 200 years. 
Britain’s mandate from the League of Nations lasted from the end of World War I until 
1948 and the United Nations’ decision to partition the land into two states. After the 
regional war established a second set of borders for Israel and Palestine, Jordan and 
Egypt established different local government systems in the areas they controlled from 
1948 through 1967 when the Israeli occupation began. Neither Egypt nor Jordan elected 
to fulfill the United Nation’s objective of creating an independent Palestinian state. 
Instead they imposed their control, and after the 1967 war, Israel too resisted the creation 
of an independent state for Palestinians. During these different periods of occupation or 
foreign rule, each occupying government or force developed and defined local 
governance systems for the Palestinians. Some institutions and practices extended for 
longer or shorter period of times (corresponding to the length of an occupation) and in 
some instances practices and policies implemented by one power were continued by the 
next. 
The second phase of the development of local systems was initiated after by the 
Oslo accords between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel. These 
agreements established the framework for an indigenous Palestinian government by 
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vesting authority in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Since its creation and 
establishment the PNA has governed the West Bank and Gaza Strip within the constraints 
and limitation imposed by Israel’s occupation. Those constraints and limitations have 
consistently changed relative to local political issues between Israel and Palestinians 
short-circuiting the development and maturation of Palestinian institutions. For example, 
checkpoints and closures have sometimes made economic development and management 
in possible to execute. In that regard, then, the PNA while a “de jure” institution created 
as a result of the Oslo accords has at times had its de facto existence curtailed. 
Presidential and legislative elections were held with the participation of 
candidates from only one party, Fatah. As other Palestinian political parties opposed the 
Oslo Accords they chose not to submit lists of candidates in the parliamentary-style 
elections. However, the Palestinian political map changed in 2006 when Hamas, an 
opposition political party that had decided to adapt to the new reality of the PNA, won 
the legislative elections. Palestinian politics was immediately transformed into a two 
party struggle that quickly escalated to include armed confrontations between opposing 
supporters. This conflict has had extreme negative consequences for the development of 
local administrative systems creating a de facto civil war. In effect each party has begun 
to protect its own political interests ignoring the professionalization of administrative 
systems in favor of the establishment of two governments and administrative systems. 
Hamas’ organization is vested in Gaza but it has supporters in the West Bank. Fatah’s 
organization and government is concentrated in the West Bank, but it too has supporters 
in Gaza. Opposition supporters living in areas controlled by the other party have been 
targets of violence and discrimination (Edwards, 2007). 
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Figure 1:  Research Model 
The research model in Figure 1-4 is divided into three parts. The initial inputs into 
the formation of local government systems is defined by the rule of the external powers 
represented by the Ottoman politics, British Mandate politics, Egyptian/Jordanian 
politics, and the Israeli politics. The second phase are the developments in the post-Oslo 
period which was distinguished by the establishment of the PNA and the evolving 
struggle between the biggest two political factions, Fatah and Hamas, and its implication 
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on the local governance system in such matters as the funding of government, the 
supervision and hiring local governance servants, the establishment of laws and elections, 
the selection or the appointment of mayors when no elections approved and organized by 
the central government, and the appointment of senior staff. Finally, the model depicts 
the connections and the involvement between the local governance system and citizens 
who have the right to express their voices, views and needs, participate in the supervision 
of municipal operations and having the bureaucrats accountable and transparent. 
The inputs of the model are identified and defined as fellows: 
a. Ottoman Politics – the political system used by the Ottoman regime in 
Palestine from 1870 to 1917 and its impact on local governance system in 
Palestine. 
b. British Politics – the political system used by the British under its Mandate 
from the League of Nations in Palestine from 1918 to 1948 and its impact on 
local governance systems in Palestine.  
c.  Israeli Politics – the political system used by Israel for local affairs in the 
West Bank and Gaza during their occupation of the West Bank from 1976 
through the present date and in the Gaza Strip from 1967 from through 2006 
and its impact on local governance systems in Palestine. 
d. Palestinian National Authority (PNA): The PNA established after the 
Declaration of Principle between the PLO and Israel in 1993. The PNA ruled 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip and while its operations and institutions never 
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were created in the absence of Israel’s occupation the PNA is as near to the 
concept of self-autonomy as has ever existed for Palestinians. 
e. Fatah Party: The most popular political faction in the Palestinian territories 
and it dominated the governance system from the establishment of the PNA 
through 2006. Now it controls the governance system only in the West Bank. 
f. Hamas Party: It is an Islamic Political Party that opposed the Oslo Agreement. 
In 2006, it won the legislative elections in both the West Bank and Gaza and 
now controls the Gaza Strip through an independent government.  
g. Local Governments: These are various administrative offices created by 
occupying forces or the PNA that are smaller than a state. The term is used to 
contrast with offices at nation-state level, which are referred to as the central 
government, national government, or (where appropriate) federal government. 
h. Funding: It is the process of financing to provide the capital needed by local 
governments/authorities for infrastructure and service delivery.  
i. Law: It is a system of rules, usually enforced through a set of institutions, 
applied to govern a group of people. 
j. Regulation: Legal restrictions promulgated by government authority. One can 
consider at least two levels in democracies -- legislative acts, and 
implementing specifications of conduct imposed sanction. This administrative 
law or implementing regulatory law is in contrast to statutory or case law. 
k. Staffing: Staffing involves finding the right people, with the right skills, 
abilities, and fit, who may be hired or already working for the local 
government or municipality. 
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l. Supervision: This refers to the act of watching and guidance over the local 
governments’ work or tasks of municipality who may lack full knowledge of 
the concept at hand.  
m. Elections: An election is a decision-making process by which a group of 
people chooses an individual to hold local government or municipality office. 
n. Mayor: The word of mayor is a modern title used in many countries for the 
highest ranking officer in a municipal government. 
o. Citizen: Generally citizenship is membership in a society, community, or a 
country and carries with it rights to political participation; a person having 
such membership is a citizen. 
The study utilizes studies and historical documents that provide data related to the 
local governance systems implemented in Palestine by the occupations forces or 
governments of the Ottoman Empire, the British government through its League of 
Nations mandate, the countries of Jordan and Egypt, and Israel. This historical 
assessment helps to explain the development of the existing systems of Palestinian local 
governance. The results from the survey of community leaders and their attitudes are also 
possible to assess elements of the efficiency of the current local governance system. 
Utilizing the two assessments, the study draws a group of recommendations that can help 
in establishing more healthy local governance system.  
The measurement of each of the elements of the model and the data collected 
through the survey is clarified in Table I: 
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Table I 
No. Independent Variables Factor Measurement 
1. Occupations’ 
Influence Dimension 
1. Ottoman Empire 
2. British Mandate 
3. Egyptian/Jordanian Administration 
4. Israeli Occupation 
Survey responses 
and historical 
analysis. 
2.  National Government 
& Local Government 
Dimension 
1. Dissolving local governments 
2. Postponing local elections 
3. Approving or denying any 
local government budget 
4. Administering local police 
services 
5. Forming new local 
governments by citizens 
Survey responses 
and historical 
analysis. 
3. Professional 
Dimension 
1. Selection  of mayors 
dominated by politics 
2. mayors lack academic 
qualifications & experiences 
3. Staffing inside the public 
sector is based on favoritism 
4. Municipalities lack the 
technical and professional 
manpower capabilities 
Survey responses 
and historical 
analysis. 
4. Politics Dimension 1. Electing an independent, well-
qualified candidate is better 
than electing politically 
affiliated, well-qualified 
candidate  
2. Politics relations must be 
reorganized  with the 
administrative system 
3. Selection and the appointment 
of mayors of local governance 
are based on political 
affiliations only 
4. Political factions’ struggle 
hinders the efficiency & 
effectiveness of municipalities 
 
Survey responses 
and historical 
analysis.  
5. Legal Dimension 1. PNA’s Local Governance Law 
does not contribute largely 
toward achieving an efficient 
and effective performance of 
the administrative system 
2. The Palestinian Legislative 
Survey responses 
and historical 
analysis. 
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Council needs to take further 
laws to reinforce the 
transparency  
3. The current Palestinian role of 
law is weak  
4. The national government 
interferes and influences the 
performance and the functions 
of the judicial system 
6. Citizenry Dimension 1. Municipalities and local 
councils do not address the 
indigenous needs and wants of 
citizens British Mandate 
2. Local governance institutions 
have representation of civil 
society representatives 
Survey responses 
and historical 
analysis. 
The data sources used in this mixed method analysis are described as fellows: 
1) The study presents an assessment of the historical development of the 
Palestinian local governance system under the Ottoman Empire, British Mandate, 
Egyptian/Jordanian Administration, and finally the Israeli occupation examining the 
extent to which systems encouraged or extended local involvement or limited it. An 
extensive literature search was conducted to collect data from secondary sources to 
understand how the Palestinian local governance system was administered before the 
establishment of the PNA in 1994 and to explores and explains how the local governance 
system emerged and developed beginning from the Ottomans and through the Israeli 
occupation. Chapters V and VI illustrate the consequences of the these foreign and the 
PNA’s local governance systems on the Palestinian society especially in the areas of 
laws, selections of mayors, staffing, operations, funding, supervision and elections which 
are essential factors  and the core of any local governance system.  
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2) What ought to be done by the current PNA based on the experiences of the 
previous occupations and the current applied local governance system and its limitations 
is also emphasized in this study. Chapter VI explores the current local governance system 
established by the PNA since 1993 up-to-date now in the field of elections, selection of 
mayors, staffing, supervision, funding and the used laws and regulations. Chapter VIII 
includes a group of short-term and long-term recommendations that PNA should do to 
improve the local governance systems if a viable and healthy Palestinian State is to 
establish in the near future. 
3) The final data source includes the community leaders’ response to the survey 
which investigates the potential and efficiency of the current local governance system, its 
relationship with politics and judicial system, and its ability to meet citizens’ needs and 
expectation. The survey data permits compassion of what ought to be done with what is 
actually done by bureaucrats of the local governance and their political supervisors in the 
PNA for the sake of establishing a viable Palestinian state. Chapter VIII presents some 
recommendations based on the respondents’ views that could assist in establishing the 
indigenous local governance system based on the responses of the survey and the history 
of the development of the local governance system. 
4.3 Survey of Community Leaders 
a. Study Population 
The population for the study in the survey consisted of the Palestinian community 
leaders working in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors in the West Bank and Gaza 
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Strip reflecting the attitudes of various citizens working in different academic and 
professional sectors. A total of 1000 surveys were sent to more than 80 organizations that 
participated in the study. The selection of these organizations was based on their 
knowledge about the impact of the previous occupying powers on the community and 
their involvement in the different issues of the local governance systems including 
corruption combating, transparency of public servant recruitments, public financing and 
others.  
The community leaders are mixed economically and geographically and they 
represent the two sexes and different ages beginning from 30 to 60 years old.  
B. Respondents: 
The respondents are Palestinian community leaders who are working in different 
sectors in the West Bank and Gaza.  
C. Survey Instrument 
A survey instrument was developed to gather qualitative data. Each leader was 
asked to complete a series of questions on a survey instrument that was designed to 
capture what the community leaders think of the efficiency and the effectiveness of the 
current local governance system and what ought to be done to create an indigenous local 
governance system that can meet citizens’ needs and expectations. The survey design was 
based upon the research questions.  
The survey instrument consisted of five sections that are described below: 
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1. Occupations’ Influence Dimension: Local government institutions in 
Palestine have evolved through periods where the Ottoman Empire, the 
British Government, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel have controlled elements 
of the political, social, and economic life of Palestinians. This sector 
tries to assess the occupations’ impact on local governments in Palestine 
today through the responses of educated and involved officials in the 
different governance issues in Palestine.  
2. National Government and Local Governments Dimension: This sector 
tries to explain the current relations between the two governments and 
the how such relations should be.  
3. Professional Dimension: This part measures the proficiency of local 
governance system including the staffing policies, the academic 
qualifications, and relevant experiences of the mayors and employees.  
4. Politics Dimension: It explains what kind of relations between politics 
and local governance system in the Palestinian context. 
5. Legal Dimension: It explains the relations between the legal system and 
the administrative system. It measures the efficiency of role of law in 
the Palestinian community. 
6. Citizen Participation:  Respondents were asked to provide their views 
about the efficiency and the effectiveness of the local governance 
system towards meeting citizens’ needs and expectations.  
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d. Data Gathering  
Each respondent was provided with a sealable envelope for returning the survey 
to the address found on the consent form. Also an electronic copy of the survey was 
submitted to these organizations so that respondents, if they wished, could print more 
copies and email the filled survey directly to the co-researchers. As the survey responses 
and signed consent forms are retrieved they will be manually recorded to keep an 
accurate count. The survey responses and signed consent will be recorded and were 
stored separately, to insure anonymity.  
For more information about the questionnaire and the Research Project Consent 
Letter to participants, please refer to the appendix B. 
4.4 Data Analysis 
Once it was confirmed that all completed the survey, the filled surveys had been 
returned to the researcher and the data was entered into the SPSS Program. The SPSS 
data explains the profile of participants (community leaders) and provides different 
descriptive statistics about the responses of the different questions classified into different 
dimensions. In order to know the relations between two variables, Chi-Square Tests are 
used as well.  
4.5 Summary 
The multi-method methodology employed in this study was used to seek 
information that would assist in answering how non-indigenous local government 
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institutions in Palestine have interfered with the political maturation of administrative 
systems, how the PNA’s politics has shaped and formulated local government systems to 
serve limited political factions’ interests ignoring the establishment of indigenous local 
government institutions, and what Palestine’s indigenous local government systems 
means.  
The data sources used in this research includes a historical development of the 
Palestinian local governance system under the Ottoman Empire, British Mandate, 
Egyptian/Jordanian Administration, and finally the Israeli occupation. An extensive 
literature search was conducted to collect data from secondary sources to research how 
the Palestinian local governance system was administered before the establishment of the 
PNA. In addition, the data source includes community leaders’ response to the survey 
which asks about the potential and efficiency of the current local governance system, its 
relationship with politics and judicial system, and its ability to meet citizens’ needs and 
expectation.  
The survey was pre-tested to ensure clarity of language, order of questions, format 
and to ensure validity and reliability and it was approved by the IRB Review Board at 
Cleveland State University. The survey consisted of six dimensions that include 
occupations’ influence dimension, national government and local governments 
dimension, professional dimension, politics dimension, legal dimension, and finally the 
citizenry dimension.  
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CHAPTER V 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN PALESTINE 
SINCE THE OTTOMAN PERIOD 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
  This chapter initiates the exploration of the extent to which Palestinian governing 
institutions have been the product of external forces. While external forces likely impact 
the governing systems of all countries, in the Palestinian context local or indigenous factors 
were constantly thwarted or relegated to positions of secondary importance to insure that 
the needs of the occupying forces were met. At the same time, the evolution of governing 
institutions in Palestine occurred against the backdrop of a prolonged struggle for 
independence. That struggle continues today. This chapter first presents a literature review 
of the history of local governance system in Palestine from its Ottoman roots, through the 
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British Mandate period. Attention is also directed towards changes made by Jordan and 
Egypt during their periods of occupation. Careful attention is also directed at understanding 
what occurred during Israel’s military occupation. The governing systems that now exist 
are a result of the imposed politics exercised by occupations (LID Strom, 1999). These 
imposed systems not only short-circuited the needed political maturation process, but it will 
be argued that the establishments of a professionalized and modern bureaucracy for 
effective public administration was also thwarted by the actions of the occupying countries 
or societies. 
The following account of the evolution of local governance system in Palestine 
prior to the establishment of the PNA is divided into four historical stages, each of which 
displays the nature and the relationship between the central authority of the ruler and local 
authorities. The following part sheds light on the characteristics of local governance system 
in each of the following stages: 
1. Palestine as Part of Ottoman Empire; 
2. Palestine under the League of Nations’ Mandate to Great Britain;  
3. Gaza Strip under the Egyptian Government;  
4. West Bank under the Jordanian Government; and 
5. Palestine under the Israeli Military Occupation. 
The key laws or administrative decisions made impacting the formation of local 
government in Palestine are enumerated in Table II. Each of these is discussed, in turn, 
and their impact noted. 
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Table II  
The Most Important Laws of Local Governance in the Palestinian History 
1.  Ottoman Empire’s law of 
district administration in 
1864. 
This law defined a five-level hierarchy of regional and local 
administration and defined the authorities and responsibilities of 
governors in each level. 
2.  Ottoman Empire’s of Law of 
Municipalities 1877 
The 1877 Law of Municipalities is considered as the organizational and 
legal basis of the structure of municipal councils and the functions of 
municipalities during the late Ottoman period.  
3.  Articles Nos. 50-55 of the 
Ottoman Empire’ s 1877 
Municipalities Law 
These articles necessitated the accompaniment of municipal councils by 
“municipal societies” which were government appointed.  
4.  The  1921 British Law of 
Local Councils 
The law preserved certain Ottoman laws with regards to Arab local 
councils, gave the British High Commissioner the authority when 
instructed by the governor of the district, to change the administration of 
any large village to a local council through the issuance of a decree, and 
specified the form of the council, its functions, and authorities.  
5. The British Mandate’s 1930 
Local Municipalities Law 
It defined the functions and the authorities of municipalities in supervising 
local construction, streets, and commercial markets and others.  
6. The British Amended Local 
Municipalities Law of 1934 
It confirmed the authority of the High commissioner, the head of the 
British civilian regime, to appoint and dismiss both the mayor and the 
deputy-mayor of the municipal council, dismiss a council, call for 
elections, approve bylaws or reject them, and sanction or disapprove of 
financial transactions. 
7. The British Amended Local 
Municipalities Law of 1938 
It confirmed the authority of the High commissioner to appoint “any 
person” to fill a council vacancy. His will was both encompassing and 
absolute as there was no legal way to appeal his decisions or limit his 
wide-ranging administrative prerogatives. 
8. The British Villages 
Administration Law of 1944 
It defined the functions and the authorities of village councils. 
9. Egyptian order No. 509 of 
1957 
In the Gaza Strip, the establishment and administration of village and 
municipal affairs were addressed by this Egyptian order No. 509 in 1957. 
10. The Jordanian 1951law The 1951 law stipulated that all the references mentioned in the 1934 law 
to the Mandate government, the high commissioner and the district 
governor are replaced by the government of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan, the Cabinet, the Interior Minister, and the governor respectively. 
11. The 1954 Jordanian Law of 
Municipalities and later 1955 
amendment no. 29 
It is the law which applied by the Jordanian Administration in the West 
Bank from 1950 till 1967. The law replaced the previous laws and 
regulations related to municipalities and local councils in the Kingdom 
(Article 105). The Law of Municipalities (Article 47) defined the 
procedures for election of local councils by the citizens and the election of 
the municipal chairman by the local council (from among the elected local 
council members). Also, the law made provisions for complementary sub-
elections when a seat became vacant in the municipal council (Article 45) 
and other local governances’ details. 
12. Israeli Military Orders 80 
and 194 in 1967 
The orders specified that laws which were valid in both regions before the 
6th of June, 1967, would remain valid as long as they do not oppose the 
Israeli military orders. The orders transferred the different powers of the 
central authority included in the Jordanian and British laws to Israel’s 
Interior Military Officer. 
13. The First Presidential  
Decision No. 1 of 
Governance Rules in 1994 
The Israeli military orders remained in force until the 1994 Oslo 
Agreement. On November 20th, 1994, President Yasser Arafat issued the 
Presidential Decision No. 1, which confirmed that the rules, regulations, 
and orders in place in June 1967 would remain valid till further notice. 
 
Source: (Drori, 1975; Al Abadi, 1995; Peretz, 1986; & Amro, 1991). 
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5.2 Palestine as Part of Ottoman Empire 
 
Figure 2:  Map of the Ottoman Empire and Its Growth and Expansion 
                                                                  Source: images.google.com/imgres? 
In 1516 the Ottoman Turks conquered Palestine and the surrounding areas of 
modern-day Syria, Jordan, Israel, and Egypt. The entire region was incorporated into the 
dominions of the Ottoman Empire (see figure 1). Local governors were appointed from 
Istanbul where annual revenues were sent, but important public works projects were also 
undertaken.1 For example the city walls surrounding Jerusalem were extended in 1537 and 
remain an important historical site.  Palestine remained under Turkish rule until the end of 
World War I. However, between 1832 and 1840 the Egyptian vassal, Muhammed Ali, led a 
rebellion and took control of Palestine, Syria and areas of Asia from the Ottoman Empire. 
                                                 
1 The name Istanbul has been in common usage for the city since the conquest by the 
Turks in 1453.  Western sources used the name Constantinople through the end of the 
19th century even though the Ottoman Empire used the name Istanbul for the seat of their 
empire from the later part of the 15th century. 
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His control was short-lived and the area was re-conquered by the Ottoman Empire with the 
assistance of the British and Russian Empires (Verete, 1978, Al-Abadi, 1995).  
The Ottoman government divided the region or area that is the Middle East today 
into four districts that included the major cities or urban communities and their surrounding 
areas. These districts were Jerusalem, Nablus, Hebron, and Gaza and each was attached 
administratively to the province of Damascus (Verete, 1978). Despite the federalist-like 
structure of districts, provinces, and the national government (headquartered in Istanbul) 
there was little decentralization and all decisions had to be approved by the central 
government in the capital city. The Ottoman regime applied an administrative system based 
on the central government in Istanbul through tightening control of its administrative 
sections in all the geographical areas of the empire (Aronson, 1990). They gave names to 
some administrative units in east Jordan and Palestine based on the names of most 
important cities. However, there were no significant relations between the geographic and 
organizational units. For instance, the Nablus District was once connected administratively 
with Jerusalem and once was connected with Beirut (Al-Abbadi, 1995). It can be inferred 
that there was no sustainable system regarding the distribution of the administrative 
districts in the area. The administrative districts of Palestine under the Ottomans are 
depicted in Figure 5-2. 
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walls of the Old City and in adjacent areas and their political and social significance for the 
Empire’s important allies, France and Russia required special attention from the Empire. 
That attention help to insure that neither France nor Russia would threaten military action 
to protect the sites that were important to Christianity and the Churches in their countries. 
In addition the region, then, as now, was prone to conflicts among residents increasing the 
pressure on the Empire to maintain order (Kushner, 1999). According to Kushner (1999), 
there were also other problems included the control of the nomadic population (the 
Bedouin, a non-territorial people that still create administrative and political challenges for 
Israel and Egypt), the collection of taxes, the lack of public funds, and the inefficiency and 
corruption of the administrative apparatus. Yet, the importance of Jerusalem for the 
Empire’s allies and powerful countries that could become enemies required that the city 
and its holy places receive special attention. The overall management situation was further 
complicated by the presence of protectors2 in Istanbul who ignored the needs of ordinary 
people and looked after the interests of individuals or groups - such as foreign consuls, 
Jews, notables, and officials - and who prevented the removal of corrupt officials by the 
governors (Kushner, 1999).   
  In 1854, the Ottomans approved the first municipal council in the Empire by a 
special decree. However, the procedures for establishing regional or local administrative 
units or councils were not legally clarified until a second decree regarding district 
administration was issued in 1864 (Amro, 1991). This law established a five-level 
                                                 
2 Protector refers to a person ruling a kingdom or Empire during the minority, absence, or 
incapacity of the sovereign. Protectors were the Ottoman senior employees who were in 
charge of employing the rulers in the Jerusalem District and supporting their corrupt roles 
and safeguarding their illegal actions.  
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hierarchy of regional and local administration structures, categories, or levels and defined 
the authorities and responsibilities of governors in each administrative level. In 1870, local 
government autonomy was enhanced by a decree that transferred authority for municipal 
affairs from the ruler of the city to the municipal councils (Al-Nammura, 1994). 
Subsequently, in 1871, a state law was issued creating the various levels of regional 
administration: regional districts (designated as Wileit), districts, and villages.  
Municipalities, on the other hand, remained without appointment or recognition until the 
Ottoman Law of Municipalities was issued in 1877 (Al-Abbadi, 1995). 
The 1877 Law of Municipalities issued by the Ottoman Empire regarded by many 
researchers as the organizational and legal basis of the structure of municipal councils and 
the functions of municipalities during the late Ottoman period (Amro, 1991). The law 
created the procedures for establishing municipalities (urban or city governments) and 
their functions and responsibilities separate from the powers granted to regions or districts 
(Maoz, 1984). The decree also created the background or structures that characterize the 
current local governance system in Palestine. The decree stated that a municipal council 
would be established in each city and village and suburb. However, to ensure the Ottoman 
dominance of the local councils, the central authority stipulated that the members of the 
municipal council should be able to write and speak Turkish (Article 18/Ottoman Law, 
1877). In addition, all council members had to be regarded as wealthy or from influential 
families and hold Ottoman citizenship. These requirements made it impossible for most 
Palestinians to be directly involved in the local governance systems that impacted their 
daily lives. Citizenship in the Empire was granted only to individuals whose fathers, not 
mothers, were originally Ottoman (Maoz, 1984). In essence the local government system 
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was a structure developed to co-opt wealthy and leading families who could be trusted 
with the reigns of local control. Their support was seen as a requirement to maintain 
stability and control over the conquered lands.  Little attention was placed on service 
delivery or democratic control. Control over the empire and its domains were the only 
priority. The delivery of services or the building of professional administrative structures 
connected to any sort of democratic institution was not a concern for the Empire.  
The number of municipalities in Palestine reached 22 by the end of the Ottoman 
reign. Acre, Haifa, Shafa Amro, Safad, Nazareth, Tiberias, Bissan, Jenin, Tulkerm, 
Nablus, Ramallah, Jerusalem, Al-Lud, Al-Ramleh, Jaffa, Beit Jala, Bethlehem, Hebron, 
Beer Al-Sabe’, al-Majdal, Gaza and Khan Younes were each recognized (Al-Nammura, 
1994). There is no evidence that the 22 municipalities created by the Ottomans in Palestine 
were established to serve the needs of local public interests (Maoz, 1984). For example, 
the services of education and health were not available to all residents. Service delivery 
was restricted and provided only in specific urban areas and for the influential and rich 
families. The remote areas even suffered from a lack of pure water and well-planned roads 
and streets that could help improve local economies and permit residents to have access to 
surrounding cities and villages (Al-Nammura, 1994). The infrastructure of roads was 
designed to meet the military needs of the Empire and its military forces (Maoz, 1984).   
The central Ottoman authority was directly involved in the selection of the 
chairman of the municipalities’ councils although it did not involve itself openly in the 
election process of council members (Maoz, 1984). Article 5 of the Ottoman Municipalities 
Law of 1877 stated that the chairman of the municipality would be appointed by the central 
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government of the Ottoman Empire (Maoz, 1984). The central authority also restricted the 
autonomy of the local councils by requiring that local actions and decisions had to be 
approved in advance by the local administration council (Mary & Usama, 1996). Moreover, 
the central authority adopted Articles Number 50 through 55 requiring each municipal 
council to be connected to a “municipal society.” The societies were governmental entities 
consisting of Ottoman appointed employees to supervise all the municipal issues in the 
Empire’s areas (Al-Abbadi, 1995). Reinforcing the desire to centralize policy control, the 
municipal societies met twice a year in Istanbul and were given the authority to investigate 
conditions of any municipal council and issue reports submitted to the Ottoman governor 
evaluating the performance of any council (Al-Abbadi, 1995). 
Competing candidates did not contest elections and the right to vote was 
restricted. The governance system implemented was designed to insure that influential and 
wealthy families supported the Empire.  These families - the Khalidis, Alamis, Husaynis, 
Dajanis, and Nashashibis - controlled the most prominent positions in the administrative 
and municipal offices and ruled the regions on behalf of the Empire (Maoz, 1984). Other 
people could not run for positions in the municipal governments as a result of the 
requirement to speak Turkish and hold citizenship in the Empire. Further if these 
requirements were not sufficient to insure that acceptable people were selected to lead the 
cities, the Ottoman government could interfere in the appointment of any individual 
through the chairman of the municipality (Al-Nammura, 1994). 
The authority granted to the local councils was also limited. They were not given 
the responsibility or authority to deliver services to large segments of the population. For 
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example, the local councils’ responsibilities were limited to supervising hotels, cafés, 
theaters, and recreation places, registering individuals, recording births, deaths, and 
property transfers, supervising and facilitating traffic and transport processes within the 
municipality, cleaning the city, and preparing annual council budgets and monthly reports 
on revenues and expenditures (Ottoman Law, 1877). Different from the US where local 
governments by tradition also provided limited services at this time, self-help or citizen 
groups/organizations did not emerge to bridge gaps in the provision of services by local 
governments. Local organizations were suppressed as these were seen as expressions of 
Arab nationalism or independence. The Empire would not tolerate any expression of 
national identity or independence (Jarbawi, 1996). 
Most importantly relative to the economic development of cities the councils did 
not have any authority to deal with infrastructure development, maintenance of existing 
assets, and urban planning and land use. Further, the curricula used in schools was also set 
by the Empire meaning that virtually all of the fundamental services that could advance 
local areas and improve the quality of life in the cities was controlled by Istanbul (Jarbawi, 
1996). Public education, from its very beginnings, was never under the control of the 
Palestinian people but instead, was controlled by successive colonial external 
administrations beginning in the Ottoman period (1516 to 1917) and continuing through 
the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Abu-Saad, 2006). During four 
centuries of Ottoman rule in Palestine, the Palestinians also relied on traditional medicines 
delivered by local practitioners who may have had little formal training and used herbal 
medicines. Male religious healers routinely performed bone-settings and cauterizations and 
probably relied on blood-letting through the period of Ottoman regime (Abu-Rabia, 2005). 
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Professionalization of health care delivery in conquered areas was also not a priority for 
the Ottoman Empire. 
It is also important to note that peasants did not own the lands they plowed and 
planted outside the village perimeter and there was little they could achieve for themselves 
except for the future delivery of their harvests to the governments of the areas (Doumani 
and Jaquet, 2006).3  The land property contract was related to a centralizing Ottoman state 
that decided on the use of land in Palestine and limited people’s participation (Doumani 
and Jaquet, 2006). Moreover, Cosgel (2006) argued that the Ottomans’ administered a 
discriminatory taxation system based on an analysis of taxing procedures and their 
distributional consequences in Palestine, Jordan and Syria. The tax system applied in these 
areas was different from the one applied in Istanbul and other original Turkish areas 
(Cosgel, 2006). 
It is obvious that the local government institutions created under the Ottoman 
regime did not serve the indigenous people.  Rather the system created was used to 
centralize authority in the Istanbul. All plans and policies were determined by the central 
authority and without meaningful representation of the indigenous people who could not 
influence the decisions, rules, and laws of the local governance systems (Amro, 1991). 
Local governance in Palestine was overly centralized with policies and practices shaped by 
the politics and needs of the Ottoman Empire (Al-Nammura, 1994). The dichotomy 
between politics and administration was not applicable in Palestine as the Ottoman Empire 
                                                 
3 This would emerge as an important political issue in the early 20th century as a result of 
the Empire’s decision to sell land to European Jews who created a string of communities 
(the Kibbutzim and Moshavim) that, in turn would lead to increased conflicts between 
Jewish and Arab residents of the region during the British Mandate years. 
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was shaped all policies, practices, and institutions of public administration. In this sense 
the entire system was a product of activities located distant from the indigenous people and 
created without respect to their needs or desires (Jarbawi, 1996). All policies, laws, and 
rules of local governance systems were decided in Istanbul and in the attendance of the 
appointed Ottoman employees and the chairpersons of municipalities.  
5.3 Palestine under the League of Nations’ Mandate to Great Britain 
The boundaries between Palestine and Jordan were drawn up as a result of the 
1916 Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain, France and Russia to determine the future of 
the Middle Eastern Ottoman Empire after World War I. Most contemporary discussions on 
the Middle East ignore how the current system of states was formed as David Fromkin 
(1989) points out in A Peace to End All Peace. The system of states in the Middle East was 
invented by the end of the First World War and was crafted by Europeans in the early 
1920s to expand their empires as they divided the holdings of the fallen Ottoman Empire 
(Fromkin, 1989). The created states were administrative conveniences to allow the British 
and French to establish their influence and control following practices used in previous 
areas after other wars. By 1922, the political characteristics of the Middle East seems were 
drawn. 
Britain tinkered with elections in the new state of Iraq to set up and control 
influential Arab figures who fought with the Western countries against the Ottoman Empire 
for the British promises of helping them to gain the authority in their areas (Fromkin, 
1989). The British supported kings and rulers to guarantee their loyalty in the different 
areas of the Middle East on the account of achieving any democratic popular process 
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(Fromkin, 1989). For example, Feisal (Hussein’s son) as ruler of Iraqi; Britain set up 
Abdullah (Hussein’s other son) in Jordan; ibn Saud, who kept causing problems with 
Abdullah, was given Saudia Arabia; and Britain managed to mollify France by parceling 
out Syria and Lebanon. Fromkin’s main point is that by 1922, European powers had 
partitioned the former Ottoman Empire into states and setup puppet regimes, drawing 
boundaries and imposing rulers while ignoring the wishes of the indigenous people who 
actually lived there.  
However, the situation in Palestine was more complicated and different from the 
new neighboring Arab areas. The area was to be directly administered by Great Britain.  
Great Britain had previously made a commitment to representatives of the International 
Zionist Movement to assist in the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. The commitment 
was defined in the 1917 Balfour Declaration in which the establishment of a Jewish 
homeland in Palestine was clearly outlined (Barker, 2008). Arab residents of Palestine were 
ill-informed about the scope of the declaration and the British government’s commitment 
to it when the area came under British military administration in October 1918 (Gil-Har, 
2000). In turn, the Palestine’s Arab leadership as well as the Arab leaders in other areas 
rejected the principles of The Balfour Declaration. However, during World War I Arab 
countries sought their independence from the Ottoman Empire and similarly from the 
British Empire after the war (Al-Nammura, 1994). That focus deflected attention from the 
commitment of other Arabs for and to Palestinian independence or the establishment of an 
Arab state in the land administered by the British. In a strategic error the Palestinian 
community did not seek its own independence.  
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Segev (2001) argues in his book, One Palestine, Complete Jews and Arabs under 
the British Mandate, that the Arabs did not receive the British as an army of liberation 
when they occupied Palestine in 1917-18 but rather as an enemy of the Ottoman Empire. 
Loyalty to the Ottoman Empire or just poor insight might have contributed to the failure of 
using the UN Mandate period to seek an independent Palestinian state. Segev additionally 
argues that the British were pro-Zionist and supported the establishment of the Israeli state. 
Inserting rich historical details and being sensitive to all perspectives, Segev describes the 
decline of the British Empire in the area, the birth of the Israeli nation, and the tragedy of 
the Palestinian people. Segev (2001) asserts that whatever the British may have said to the 
Palestinians, their actions were uncompromisingly pro-Zionist from the start. For example, 
the British administration appointed Zionist Jews to important positions: not only Herbert 
Samuel, but also his son Edwin Samuel to serve as liaisons with the Zionist Commission 
and Norman Bentwich as attorney-general. Zionist influence in London annoyed British 
high commissioners and senior officers alike, but that did not deter the commitment to the 
creation of a Jewish state. For example, the officers knew that Chaim Weizmann, a 
Russian-born Jewish immigrant who sought to succeed Herzl after his death in 1904 as 
leader of the Zionist efforts to create a Jewish state, had far better access to British prime 
ministers than they did any Palestinian Arab leader (Segev, 2001). He believes this was 
done out of the mistaken, anti-Semitic belief that “[I]n standing by the Zionist movement, 
the British believed they were winning the support of a strong and influential ally. This was 
an echo of the notion that the Jews turned the wheels of history, a uniquely modern brand 
of classical anti-Semitic pre-conceptions and romantic veneration of the Holy Land and its 
people” (Segev, 2001: 125). Segev (2001) completely downplays the impact of Western 
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war guilt over the Holocaust that led to a huge growth in support for an independent Israeli 
state at the expense of Palestinian rights. He analyzed why the British left Palestine in 1948 
by stating that it was because the 1936-39 Palestinian-Arab revolt made the British sick of 
Palestine and convinced them once and for all that there was nothing left for them to do in 
Palestine. 
The Palestinians suffered tremendously under British’s rule (Al-Nammura, 1994). 
Britain made efforts to fulfill the commitments in the Balfour Declaration and to give a 
legal basis to its policies once the League of Nations had approved the British Mandate for 
Palestine in June 1922 (Amro, 1991). The Mandate changed some Ottoman administrative 
divisions by issuing the 1921 Law of Local Councils and the 1934 Municipalities Law. The 
six administrative districts are explained in Table III. 
Table III 
The Six Administrative Districts divided into sixteen sub-districts under the British 
Mandate in 1921. 
 
District  Sq.Kms.  Headqtrs. Subdistricts  Sq.Kms.
Gaza  13,689  Gaza  Gaza  1, 113
   Beer Al-Sabe’  12,576
Lydda  1,206  Jaffa  Jaffa  336
   Ramle  370
Jerusalem  4,334  Jerusalem  Jerusalem  1,571
   Hebron  2,076
   Ramallah  687
Samaria  3,266  Nablus  Nablus  1,637
   Jenin  839
   Tulkarm  790
Haifa  1,021  Haifa  Haifa  1,021
Galilee  2,804  Nazareth  Nazareth  499
   Acre  810
   Beisan  361
   Safad  695
   Tiberias  439
Source: A Survey of Palestine, Prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the Information 
of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (Jerusalem: Palestine Government Printer, 
1946), volume 1, pp. 103-105. 
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     Table IV 
The Population of the Historical Palestine under the British Mandate  
 
Religions 1920 1921 1922 
Muslims 521,403 585,271 590,890 
Jews 66,574 81,263 83,794 
Christians 77,801 88,049 73,024 
Others 7,415 7,213 9,474 
TOTAL 673, 193 761,796 757, 182 
 
Source: Chapter 1: Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem 
www.palestine-encyclopedia.com/EPP/Chapter01.htm 
The British implemented and managed two different local governance policies, 
one for the Jewish immigrants and the other for the Palestinians (Amro, 1991). While the 
1921 Law of Local Councils served to pave the way for establishing a national homeland 
for the Jews in Palestine (Amro, 1991), the British kept some Ottoman laws and thus the 
Palestinian administrative councils were not able to represent the indigenous people 
(Jarbawi, 1996). For example, Segev (2001) argues that the British kept their promise to the 
Zionists. They opened up the country to 20,000 Jewish immigrants between 1920 and 
1922. By 1948, the Jewish population had increased by more than tenfold a result of the 
Holocaust and WW II. At the same time, there were active movements designed to 
encourage Muslims and Christians to move to the area to protect their own holy sites after 
the Belfour Declaration (Jarbawi, 1996). The Jews were permitted to purchase land, 
develop agriculture, and establish industries and banks. The British allowed them to set up 
hundreds of new settlements, including several towns adjacent to Tel Aviv (the city that 
was to become the largest in Israel). These towns became suburban cities in the Tel Aviv 
metropolitan area. The Jewish immigrants also created a school system and military 
organizations (Haganah); they had sophisticated political leadership and created several 
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institutions that held elections to choose leaders (Jarbawi, 1996). Each of these institutions 
contributed to the military victory Israel secured after the partition of Palestine in 1948. 
The Jewish Diaspora including funds to purchase land also provided financial support. All 
of this took place with the full support of the British forces to underscore the support for 
the Balfour Declaration. Contrary to the widely held belief of Britain’s pro-Arab policies 
and positions, British actions supported the Zionist enterprise (Segev, 2001). In addition, 
the Jewish Diaspora’s substantial financial support led to the creation of the prestigious 
Hebrew University. That too was done with British support.  
According to 1921 Law of Local Councils, the British High Commissioner had 
the authority, instructed by the governor of the district, to change the administration of any 
large village to a local council through the issuance of a decree. The decree also specified 
the form of the council, its functions, and authorities. The British High Commissioner had 
the authority to declare the formation of a local council in any suburb of a city (Articles 1-
20 of the law). The establishment of the new Palestinian local councils faced challenges 
during that era because there was a tendency towards establishing a kind of electoral 
institutions that were unfamiliar and new to Palestinian society (Amro, 1991). The 
Palestinians were accustomed to the very centralized local governance used by the Ottoman 
Empire with limited opportunities for participation. The Jewish immigrants largely from 
Europe, however, had more experience with the institutions, policies, and practices created 
and implemented by the British (Segev, 2001).  
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Table V shows the development of sub-district and their population in 1931 and 
1948: 
Table V 
 
Source: Chapter 1: Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem 
www.palestine-encyclopedia.com/EPP/Chapter01.htm 
For example, prior to the first municipal election in 1926, the British had 
established municipal institutions, created municipal districts as indicated in Table 5-4, and 
appointed mayors without giving the local population – either Jewish or Palestinian – the 
opportunity to express its political views (Maoz, 1984). Thus British politics shaped public 
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administration in Palestine. When local elections were held in the major cities, the voting 
was so demanding and restrictive that only six percent of the indigenous inhabitants of 
municipalities actually voted (Maoz, 1984). Because of continuing Palestinian-Jewish 
conflict the British were not able to achieve a real development or reform in local 
governance system. Because of the security situation the British cancelled elections in 1930 
and it was not until four years later, following the passage of the Municipal Corporations 
Ordinance, that elections for mayors and municipal councils were held. Moreover, the 1934 
legislative enactment did not provide a strong legal foundation for the advancement of local 
rule in Palestine but primarily served British interests rather than those of the indigenous 
population (Asuf, 1985; Jarbawi, 1996). For example, the senior health care officers, who 
were British, were responsible for the administration and supervision of the health care 
activities while the Arab Palestinian employees only acted on those tasks approved by the 
British (Abu-Rabia, 2005). Moreover, malaria, tuberculosis, trachoma, and other diseases 
were widespread in Palestine during the British Mandate (Sufian, 2002). Abu Rabia (2005) 
states that people, particularly in the Negev, suffered from numerous communicable 
diseases, illnesses, isolation, ignorance and the stress of economic conditions. All of these 
factors greatly contributed to the high mortality rate. Most illnesses sprang from cold, damp 
and mosquitoes. Many infants died at birth, and mothers died during delivery. The existing 
local governments did little or nothing to improve conditions. 
In addition, the education curricula that were imposed on the people by the British 
mandate did not meet the culture needs of the Palestinians but did emphasize literacy skills 
(Abu-Saad, 2006). In many cases, people expressed their disappointment and frustration at 
the lack of Palestinian autonomy over their educational system that was administered and 
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controlled by British officials (Mar’i, 1978). Numerous authors have commented on the 
very alien curriculum imposed by the British on Palestinian students, in which “direct 
teaching of contemporary history was excluded from the official syllabus” (Tibawi, 1956: 
196; Khalidi, 1981).  
Goren (2006) in his discussion of the establishment of Palestinian neighborhoods 
in 1930s cited various factors that led to the failure of the housing projects undertaken by 
the local governments in Haifa and Jaffa and other districts due to the failure to secure 
central government financial support. All urban planning and land use decisions were made 
by the British often without regard to local needs, preferences, or the participation of local 
residents in the planning process (Goren, 2006). Stockdale (2006) argued that through 
missionaries and other long-term English residents the British organized ‘mothers’ 
educational meetings based on English methods that contradicted the Palestinian 
indigenous maternal knowledge and culture. This was just another example of the 
imposition of British practices and philosophies in area that included people from a non-
European culture. While the Jewish residents – comprised of large numbers of European 
immigrants – were comfortable with British policies, practices, and institutions, for the 
Arab residents of the area an alien culture was trying to impose its values and practices 
without regard for their preferences and norms.    
Table 5-5 shows the number of British, Arab, and Jewish high officers in the 
governmental departments in 1937. There were a total of 556 British employees, 309 Arabs 
and 177 Jews (Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem, 2006). Examining Table VI 
illustrates that the majority of the public employees were British generally and in the fields 
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of administration, labor, legal system, police, public works, railways, secretariat, 
government printing, social welfare, surveys, and city planning. This implied that the 
policies, decisions, rules and regulations were dominated by the British views rather than 
the views and hopes of the Palestinian people. 
Table VI 
Number of British, Arab, and Jewish officers in the governmental departments in 1937 
 
Source: Chapter 1: Encyclopedia of the Palestine Problem, 2066. 
www.palestine-encyclopedia.com/EPP/Chapter01.htm 
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According to the 1934 Ordinance, the British High commissioner had the military 
authority to appoint and dismiss both the mayor and the deputy-mayor of the municipal 
councils. The high commissioner could similarly dismiss a council, call for elections, 
approve bylaws or reject them, impose sanctions, and disapprove of financial transactions 
(Asuf, 1985). In a 1938 supplement to the Ordinance, the High Commissioner was granted 
the authority to appoint “any person” to fill a council vacancy. The high commissioner’s 
will was both encompassing and absolute.  In addition, there was no legal way to appeal 
decisions and the only limits to the wide-ranging administrative prerogatives lied with the 
British authorities in London (Peretz, 1986).  
Local and administrative units suffered from internal divisions between Jews and 
Arabs, the British and the Palestinians, and the British and the Jews, a general lack of 
public interest and participation, and violent confrontations between Jews and Arabs 
(Peretz, 1986). Consequently, with this weak foundation for autonomous local action and a 
narrow electoral base, any potential to form a government characterized by professional 
public administration and a representative government was very limited. Indeed, from a 
purely quantitative approach, it is revealing that there were 31 local councils within the 
Arab sector in 1926, 20 in 1931, and only 24 by 1944. The fact that the number of 
municipalities remained fairly constant – 22 in 1917 and 24 in 1944 – indicates that this 
level of local government was not matching the growth of the population and their 
increasing needs (Maoz, 1984). Maoz (1984) argues that the one-third elimination of the 
municipalities was attributed to the lack of the financial resources that ignored the annual 
population increase indicated in Table VII.   
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Table VII 
 Yearly Population Growth in Mandatory Palestine 
 
 Year Muslims 
Percentage 
Change Christians 
Percentage 
Change Total "Arabs" 
Percentage 
Change Others 
Percentage 
Change Jews 
Percentage 
Change 
1922 589,177  71,464  660,641  7,617  83,790  
1923 609,331 3.4 72,090 0.8 681,421 3.1 7,908 3.8 89,660 7.0 
1924 627,660 3.0 74,094 2.7 701,754 2.9 8,263 4.4 94,945 5.8 
1925 641,494 2.2 75,512 1.9 717,006 2.1 8,507 2.9 121,725 28.2 
1926 663,613 3.4 76,467 1.2 740,080 3.2 8,782 3.2 149,500 22.8 
1927 680,725 2.5 77,880 1.8 758,605 2.5 8,921 1.5 149,789 0.1 
1928 695,280 2.1 79,812 2.4 775,092 2.1 9,203 3.1 151,656 1.2 
1929 712,343 2.4 81,776 2.4 794,119 2.4 9,443 2.6 156,481 3.1 
1930 733,149 2.9 84,986 3.9 818,135 3.0 9,628 1.9 164,796 5.3 
1931 753,812 2.8 87,870 3.3 841,682 2.8 10,024 4.1 172,028 4.3 
1932 771,174 2.3 90,624 3.1 861,798 2.3 10,281 2.5 180,793 5.0 
1933 789,980 2.4 95,165 5.0 885,145 2.7 10,532 2.4 209,207 15.7 
1934 807,180 2.1 99,532 4.5 906,712 2.4 10,746 2.0 253,700 21.2 
1935 826,457 2.3 103,371 3.8 929,828 2.5 10,896 1.3 320,358 26.2 
1936 848,342 2.6 106,474 3.0 954,816 2.6 11,219 2.9 370,483 15.6 
1937 875,947 3.2 109,769 3.0 985,716 3.2 11,520 2.6 386,084 4.2 
Average Increase  2.6  2.9  2.7  2.8  11.0 
 
Source: www.mideastweb.org/palpop.htm 
This bureaucratic system encouraged the British to appoint secretaries and 
municipal commissions to oversee a number of Palestinian towns, councils and 
municipalities. These individuals had the authority to ignore any electoral process that 
involved the people. In 1939 the scheduled elections were cancelled after violent 
confrontations between Jews and Arabs. Even the basic human services including water 
and electricity for houses, schools, and streets were disrupted because of the violence and 
the inability of the British administration’s to contain it (Amro, 1995). The administrative 
organizations provided a limited number of services in the field of health and education. In 
1946, (after World War II) local elections were held in the Palestinian towns but the results 
remained controlled by the policies of the British authorities that left Palestine in 1949 with 
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weak form of local governance (Peretz, 1986). Moreover, the Ottoman Law restricting 
chairmanship and membership of the municipal councils to specific wealthy individuals of 
influential families was still exercised and applied by the British through the final years of 
their administration of Palestine (Amro, 1995). 
In summary, the British gave special attention to municipalities and local 
government institutions largely because they those municipalities were institutional liaisons 
that could be used to penetrate the Palestinian local community and tighten effective 
control (Jarbawi, 1996). The British authorities were also interested in fulfilling the 
commitments made in the Balfour Declaration (Segev, 2001). Therefore, the dichotomy 
between politics and administration was not applicable in Palestine as the British politics 
shaped and drew the characteristics of the public administration that was far away from the 
indigenous needs of people and close enough to their military rule and political promises 
and agendas.  
5.4 Gaza Strip under the Egyptian Government 
The Gaza strip was under Egyptian administration from 1948 until 1967. The 
administrative systems used were specified in order No. 509 issued in 1957. Participating 
with the French and British colonial powers Israel briefly occupied Gaza in 1956 as part of 
their attack on Egypt in an effort to restore Western control over the Suez Canal after 
Egypt’s after its nationalization. Between 1948 and 1957 the Egyptian administration 
maintained the British mandate laws and regulations without any important changes or 
amendments (Jarbawi, 1996). The Egyptians regarded the Gaza Strip as a region separate 
from Egypt with two municipalities, Gaza and Khan Younis, and one village council, Deir 
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Al-Balah. In 1957 Egypt decided to establish nine new village councils that matched the 
nine villages of Gaza, (Rafah, Nuseirat, Buriej, Maghazi, Jabalia, Beit Hanoun, Beit Lahia, 
Abbassan, and Khuza’ha) and maintained the status of the two cities. The Gazan local 
administrative entities did not enjoy autonomy and could only oversee specific and limited 
services in the field of education, health, and transportation (Amro, 1991). Moreover, no 
local municipal elections were conducted throughout the period of the Egyptian 
administration (Jarbawi, 1996).  
The Egyptian administration appointed municipal committees and councils in an 
effort to control the activities and missions of local government in the Gaza Strip. Thus, 
councils operated under strict and tight control by Egypt’s central authorities. In the case of 
changing or imposing any amendments, an Egyptian legislator, not a Palestinian, was the 
final decision maker (Jarbawi, 1996). In spite of the absence of free elections for the local 
governance in Gaza, the Egyptian legislation required that both the electors and nominees 
for municipal and village councils had no overdue taxes owed to the municipality prior 
their official appointment by the governor.  
In summary, the dichotomy between politics and administration is not applicable 
in Gaza as the Egyptian politics shaped and drew the characteristics of the public 
administration that is far away from the indigenous needs of people. This demonstrated that 
there was an absence of democracy and that the officials had to meet the criteria established 
by the Egyptians. Candidates for municipal office had to be accepted to the Egyptians 
(Amro, 1991). At the same time, the people in Gaza could not achieve their essential needs 
of having proper electricity and water supplies, professionalized urban planning services, 
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leadership for their economy and the needed infrastructure for development. Moreover, the 
people were forced to implement Egyptian curricula in their school systems. There was no 
single college or university developed in Gaza during their administration (Jarbawi, 1996).    
 
Figure 4: Map of the West Bank & Gaza 
Source: images.google.com/imgres? 
5.5 West Bank under the Jordanian Government 
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan assumed administrative control of the West 
Bank after the 1948 War with Israel and held it until 1967. After the termination of the 
British Mandate and the establishment of the State of Israel, the Arab States rejected the 
decision to divide the country between Palestinians and Jews and instead chose to engage 
the emerging State of Israel in a war fought on three fronts. Syria attached from the north, 
the Jordanian army advanced from the east, and Egyptian forces attacked from the south. 
When the establishment of a Jewish state was announced, many countries including the 
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former Soviet Union, the USA, France and others recognized the Jewish State leaving the 
Palestinians’ fate to be decided by the other Arab countries. It is unclear if the Palestinians 
themselves would have accepted a separate state or if they too wanted to engage the 
emerging Jewish state in a war. The Jewish leadership declared the existence of the State of 
Israel but no similar declaration of independence was made by the Palestinians. The 
Palestinians’ case and hopes for an independent state and homeland rested with the three 
Arab governments that engaged Israel in the war. Officially the Palestinians’ case was 
represented by the Arab League (officially the League of Arab States); a regional 
organization of Arab States. These independent countries were located across southwest 
Asia and north and northeast Africa. The League was formed in Cairo in March 1945. 
Egypt and Jordan were founding members (Al-Abbadi, 1995) and were committed – or so 
it seemed to an armed confrontation with the emerging Jewish state. Years later it would be 
learned that Jordan’s interest lied with the creation of Israel and its intent with regard to the 
West Bank was to include it in its sphere of influence and as part of the Hashemite state 
(Segev, 2007).  
When the Palestinians failed to declare their independence Jordan’s King 
Abdullah was able to secure his interests by controlling and annexing the Palestinian 
territories of the West Bank including East Jerusalem (Al-Nammura, 1994). The King 
wanted to unify that land with his existing kingdom and extend his authority to both sides 
of the Jordan River. These intentions were formally declared at the 1949 Jericho 
Conference where the King called for the unity of Jordanian and Palestinian lands with him 
as the reigning monarch (Al-Nammura, 1994).  
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After the annexation of the West Bank Jordan tried to amend the British 1934 
Municipalities Law to respond to some of the demands of the Palestinian people. In 1951, a 
number of Hebron residents sent a petition to the district governor asking for revisions in 
the electoral law. For example, they wanted to change the voting law to extend the right to 
vote to citizens between 18 and 21 years of age. They also wanted the mayor to be elected 
by city council members (Al-Abbadi, 1995). In addition, they demanded reforms of the city 
tax code and municipal systems in accordance with the population size of cities and 
villages and asked that the municipal council should be accountable to the people (Maoz, 
1984). 
In a transparent effort to legitimatize the annexation of the West Bank, King 
Abdullah called for elections to establish a new Jordanian Parliament that would formally 
approve the annexation of the West Bank.  Without any hesitation the elected parliament 
approved the annexation. The administration of the West Bank was then subjected to the 
laws and regulations of the Jordanian Constitution and the country’s administrative 
structure including statues related to municipalities and village councils. However, the 
Jordanian government required numerous reforms and frequently changed laws and 
procedures. For example the 1934 Law of Municipalities remained as the administrative 
format for the West Bank until 1951 when a new law amended the 1934 act (Maoz, 1984). 
The 1951 law stated that all the articles of the British 1934 law would be changed to 
comply with laws and statutes of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Cabinet, the 
Interior Minister, and the regional governor respectively. The Jordanian Constitution of 
1952 referred to the establishment of local units in the areas of the Kingdom. Article 121 
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stipulated that municipal and local affairs were to be administered by municipal or local 
councils in accordance with national laws. 
The British Mandate’s laws of local governance and municipal councils were 
replaced by the Jordanian municipalities and local councils law (Article 105) that granted 
very limited autonomy to the local councils. The Law of Municipalities (Article 47) 
defined the procedures for electing local councils by the citizens and electing the municipal 
chairman by the local council (from among the elected local council members). Such 
changes from the procedures established by Great Britain under its Mandate from the 
League of Nations allowed local councils to appoint private and public committees that 
monitored specific tasks and problems handled by the councils (Article 58). Also, the law 
allowed for complementary sub-elections when a seat became vacant in the municipal 
council (Article 45). 
However, local autonomy was severely limited and the election procedures were 
controlled and dominated by the central authority of the Jordanian Interior Minister. That 
minister had the authority to establish or cancel any municipal body, to change the 
boundaries of the municipal areas (Articles 2-5), to determine the number of the municipal 
council members through the approval of the Cabinet, to determine the dates of municipal 
elections (Article 58), to divide any municipal area to elective constituencies (Article 12), 
and to define regulations concerning the methods of nomination and election (Article 20). 
All municipal budgets were also under the supervision and administration of the Interior 
Minister (Articles 70-71), and the municipal councils were not allowed to make any 
payments unless part of a previously approved budget (Article 61). Governors and rulers, 
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under the 1957 Law of Administrative Divisions, were given the power to control and 
supervise all municipal affairs. 
The Municipalities Law of 1954 remained in effect for only one year. In 1955 the 
Jordanian legislature found that the 1954 law was not covering all the municipal affairs and 
therefore issued a new and more comprehensive Municipalities Law (Number 29) (Amro, 
1991). This law and its amendments constituted the framework for present day legal and 
organizational framework of local councils both in Palestine and Jordan (Amro, 1991). The 
Jordanian government also issued a series of administrative regulations, instructions, and 
formations following the law’s publication. It appears through reviewing those procedures 
that the central authority would continue to exercise direct control of municipal affairs 
through two approaches. The first consisted of issuing several regulations and rules during 
the 1950s to control the local councils and restrict their political autonomy. These 
procedures caused the dissolution of several local councils and the appointment of 
municipal committees from 1962 through1966. The second tactic involved the appointment 
of two members of each municipal council by the Ministry (Technical team, 1994). 
Municipalities Law No. 29 gave the central authority (represented by the Interior 
Minister and subject to the approval of the Cabinet) the power to appoint two additional 
members to each local council (Article 27). In appointing these members, the government 
considered political balances and the interests of important local families in the municipal 
councils. The rural councils were second to urban ones in the hierarchy. Similar in 
principle to the Israeli local councils, these were established by a proclamation of the 
Jordanian Minister of the Interior in accordance with the prevision of the Villages 
 108
Administration Law, No 5 of 1954. A local council enjoyed less autonomy than 
municipalities. During the period of Jordanian governance there were 96 rural councils; 
almost half of them stopped functioning in 1967 (Drori, 1975). 
  A close examination of the Jordanian Constitution regarding local administration 
illustrates that the Jordanian Parliament applied two administrative approaches to monitor 
and administer local governance. The legislature assigned the administrative divisions to 
the cabinet while the organization of municipal and village affairs were assigned to the 
legislative authority that is represented by the Jordanian Parliament. The governance 
system that emerged in Jordan consisted of administratively running regions and partly 
elected local authorities. The administratively operated regions were granted authority to 
supervise and control the lower level of local authorities and to perform functions that were 
assigned to local authorities. Therefore, it can be argued that administrative governance, in 
practice, created a substantial overlap between the responsibilities and authorities of two 
separate systems of local governance (Al-Abbadi, 1995). 
The governor was granted complete control over the municipal council staff 
(Articles 52, 77-79-82). Under the provisions of the 1957 Law of Administrative Divisions 
No. 2 a three -level hierarchy was created. The central authority, represented by the 
cabinet, exercised full power by having the right to establish, change and amend the 
administrative divisions. The Jordanian king appointed a governor who administered the 
nine governorates, three of which were in the West Bank (Nablus, Jerusalem, and Hebron). 
Each governorate was divided into several areas, administered by rulers that were also 
appointed by the King. Areas were divided into smaller districts that did not function as 
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administrative units (Amro, 1991). Powers granted to the local councils in the law of 1954 
were restricted to the provision of rather limited services, quite similar to the British 
Mandate Law of 1934 (Article 87). Once again, the Palestinians were living within a top-
down centralized local governance administrative system with extremely limited 
opportunities for local participation. 
Indeed, the analysis of local governance in the West Bank was designed to 
centralize political power in Amman and to combat any local Palestinian political 
leadership in the Hashemite areas including the West Bank. There was a substantial 
number of Palestinians living within Jordan having relocated as refugees after Israel State 
declared its independence. The Jordanian political agenda aimed to fight against the 
concept of regional Palestinian nationalism in the West Bank and worked hard to control 
party organizations and ideological groups, as well as local authorities. Therefore, it can be 
argued that local governance in the West Bank was controlled directly by officials in 
Amman with little attention focused on the political and social needs of the indigenous 
people living in the West Bank (Maoz, 1984). 
The last local elections for the central towns in the West Bank were conducted in 
September 1963. Elections were not held in 1967. In the aftermath of Israel’s occupation 
of the West Bank new procedures were developed (Drori, 1975). The Israeli military 
occupation cancelled the scheduled local elections. 
It can be argued that external governors dominated the legal and administrative 
framework of municipal government. As result, local governance and municipalities 
suffered from weak administration, scarce resources, limited autonomy, limited 
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opportunities for citizenship participation, non-local laws and regulations, and a narrow 
range of responsibilities (Jarbawi, 1992). Several conditions and various factors including 
limited educational services, lack of administrative development, and weak citizen 
participation prevented local governance and municipalities from being responsive to the 
different needs of the people (Al-Abbadi, 1995). The final decisions were made in Amman 
regardless of the issue or local sentiments or attitudes and that inhibited the establishment 
of indigenous bureaucratic system that matched the sociopolitical characteristics of the 
Palestinian people (Amro, 1991). Simply put, the municipal and local governance served as 
one of the government’s political instruments for control (Maoz, 1984).   
In summary, then, during the Jordanian control of the West Bank the local 
governance and the municipal system were directed from Amman and shaped by politics 
related to Jordan’s needs. Jordan wanted control over the West Bank and the Palestinian 
people. The Jordanian regime did not establish an institution of self-rule or local autonomy 
where the indigenous population could exercise their political rights, issue their own laws 
and regulations, and adopt administrative reforms that met their expectations, needs, and 
will-expression. 
5.6 Palestine under the Israeli Military Occupation  
On June 7th, 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and 
established military control over all Palestinian lands (Jarbawi, 1992). In the immediate 
aftermath of the military victories over Egypt and Jordan the Israeli authorities maintained 
laws and practices established by the British, the Egyptians, and the Jordanians with regard 
to local government institutions. The Israeli army stated that existing Jordanian, Egyptian, 
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and British laws and orders would be valid in both regions as long as the established 
practices, policies, and mandates did not contradict any Israeli military directives or 
security concerns. However, the orders did transfer center powers to Israel’s military 
forces. Civilian authorities in Israel never would have control over the affairs of the 
residents of the West Bank and Gaza. The areas were to remain occupied territories subject 
to military oversight. This practice was different from the policies and practices of the 
Egyptians, Jordanians, the Ottomans, and the British despite the roles played by their 
military forces (Technical team, 1994; Segev, 2007). 
Many Israelis, however, had never stopped dreaming of a Greater Israel; those 
supporting the concept of a Greater Israel wanted to the Jewish state to extend from the 
Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea thus including all of the West Bank and Gaza. 
Within this policy perspective was the idea that Palestinians would eventually relocate to 
Jordan or remain as non-citizens of the State of Israel. Some justified their desire for more 
territory on strategic grounds; others were motivated more by national and religious 
sentiments (Segev, 2001). In short order those dreaming of a Greater Israel would be 
outside of the mainstream of Israeli political thought, both camps exerted considerable 
moral and political influence and remain powerful political minorities focused on retaining 
the Golan Heights and as much territory as possible within the West Bank (Gorenberg, 
2006; Segev, 2007). Gorenberg (2006) writes with great insight about such forces, 
including radicals within the ruling Labor movement who had opposed the idea of partition 
since the 1920s and continued to do so after Israel’s independence. He quotes leading 
rabbis who prayed that the Jews would recapture the Western Wall and other holy sites that 
had fallen under Jordanian control in 1949. He gives scant attention, however, to another 
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important force: Menachem Begin’s right-wing Herut (Freedom) Party, which, after 1948, 
did more than any other group to keep the hope for a Greater Israel on the political agenda. 
As a member of the war cabinet, which was hastily formed in June 1967, Begin played a 
major part in the fateful decision to occupy East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. 
To achieve complete control and dominance of local governance structures in the 
Palestinian territories Israel’s military command issued several orders that interfered with 
indigenous control, placed indigenous institutions under direct Israeli supervision, and 
directly organized the structure and work of local governing systems to support Israel’s 
occupation. In the first two days of its occupation the Israel issued Military Orders 80 and 
194. These decrees made it clear that all Palestinian governance and legislative affairs 
would be subordinate to the Israeli (Drori, 1975).    
The military orders were designed to control local governance and to dominate 
and control planning, land use, and economic development. Israel sought to reinforce its 
dominance in the occupied territories through the holding municipal elections, seeking 
local Palestinians who would have some loyalty to Israel. Israel’s goal was to supplant the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that was interested in securing its role as a 
government-in-exile and the sole representatives of the Palestinian people. Israel wanted 
new leaders and partners for an eventual peace settlement with the Palestinians 
(Hammoudeh, 1972). Al-A’raj (1996) argues that 37 out of the 46 military orders 
concerning municipalities issued through 1986 were designed to achieve Israeli dominance 
over the remaining Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza. Some military orders 
restricted the municipal councils in a way that citizens were not being able to exercise 
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active citizenship participation in the local governance.  However, there was a new change 
in the local governance practice in the Palestinian territories in that women were allowed to 
participate in the elections and be candidates for municipal councils. The Israeli military 
commander of the Gaza Strip issued military order No. 519 in 1975 and his peer in the 
West Bank issued military order No. 627 which allowed women to participate and be 
candidates for municipal council seats (Technical team, 1994). Israel tried to suppress the 
political elite’s opposition to Israel rule. By giving women the right to participate it was 
hoped new and moderate leadership would emerge in the Palestinian territories (Maos, 
1984). 
As mentioned earlier, municipal elections planned by Jordan for September 1967 
were cancelled following Israel’s occupation. Military order No. 80 aimed at extending the 
service period of the existing local councils. Mayors were selected by the Israeli Civil 
Administration administered by the Israeli Army, from wealthy families and demonstrated 
loyalty and support to the Jordanian regime that continued to provide some of the financial 
resources to West Bank municipalities. The Israeli authorities organized local elections in 
1972 and in 1976, and village council elections in 1975 (Gazit, 2003). The elections were 
for councils that would have limited authority to provide education and health services. On 
the other hand, Israel did hold elections in Gaza where the military occupation had used 
appointed Palestinian mayors dominated and controlled by the Israeli civil administration.  
Hammoudeh (1972) investigated the Israeli objectives regarding the 1972 
municipal elections. He argued that the objectives included finding new groups and 
participants in the affairs of the West Bank who would cooperate with the Israeli 
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authorities.  Another hope was to enhance the democratic image of the Israeli occupation.  
There was also a political hope that new leaders could be found to replace the PLO. 
While this group was in exile, it objected to municipal elections and urged the 
Palestinians not to participate (Hammoudeh, 1972). Even though the Jordanian 
government was not formally present in the West Bank after 1967 it considered the West 
Bank as Jordanian territory (occupied by Israel after its military victory) and thus 
opposed the proposed elections. Jordan regarded itself as the representative of the West 
Bank as the land had been formally annexed. Israel’s military occupation and the absence 
of a peace treaty did not, from their perspective, change its sovereignty. Despite the 
decision by a majority of Palestinians not to participate in the elections, Israel went 
forward with the effort to create a political mechanism for establishing new Palestinian 
leadership. Again, Israel’s desire was to eventually negotiate with this leadership with 
regard to final disposition of the land. The Israeli Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan, 
declared on Israeli television on May 31st, 1972 that the newly elected officers were the 
properly constituted representatives of the Palestinian people (Gazit, 2003). Shlomo 
Gazit, the coordinator of the works of the Israeli army in the occupied territories declared 
that the elections were essentially important for three reasons.  
First, the elections began the process of normalizing life in West Bank after the 
military occupation. Second, the Israeli occupation tried to defeat the objections to new 
elections put forward by Jordan and the PLO. Third, Israeli authorities believed that 
elections could create municipal councils that would then alone new Palestinian leaders 
to emerge (Gazit, 2003). 
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On January 16, 1975, the military Regional Commander of West Bank signed 
three military orders under which elections were to be held, according to Jordanian Law, 
for the rural councils of Beita (Nablus District), Ziddah (Tulkarem District) and Dahariyya 
(Hebron District). The elections took place on February 2, 1975 (Maos, 1984). Later, more 
local elections occurred in several West Bank villages and towns (Drori, 1975). Israel tried 
to demonstrate that the elections held in several Palestinian towns and villages reinforced a 
democratic society in the West Bank that was a result or product of Israel’s occupation 
policies.  
The elections of 1976 were held under very different circumstances from those 
that existed at the time of the 1972 elections.  After the 1973 October War, the PLO 
enjoyed greater influence in the affairs of the West Bank and Gaza and that was 
problematic for Israel. The active role of the PLO was reinforced by the Arab League’s 
decision at the Rabat Summit of 1974 (Gazit, 2003), held in Morocco to recognize the PLO 
d as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Israel had worked hard to 
strengthen the local Palestinian leadership enhancing administrative autonomy in an effort 
to weaken ties to the PLO (Al-A’raj, 1996).  Local municipalities were given the autonomy 
to administer education and social affairs and the role of the Israeli military government 
was minimized in these policy areas. However, the military continued to have the final 
authority for any action. The new Israeli policy was still aimed at maintaining the control 
of the Israeli army over security and the overall economy of the Palestinian territories. For 
example, the Israeli civil administration controlled and supervised aspects with regard to 
land use and construction of new buildings and infrastructure in the Palestinian territories 
(Jarbawi, 1996). However, the Israeli government remained focused on creating a 
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separation between the Palestinians living inside West Bank and Gaza and the Palestinian 
Leadership represented by the PLO living in exile. For example, Israel prevented 
Palestinian mayors from participating in the 1976 Palestinian National Council meeting in 
Cairo (Aronson, 1990). 
  The Israeli military authority did not help in the financial affairs of any of the 
Palestinian administrative units. This prompted many Palestinian mayors to seek assistance 
from Jordan (Gazit, 2003). Some Palestinian mayors visited Jordan and openly called for 
an economic federation with the Hashemite Kingdom (Maos, 1984, Amro, 1991). While 
some mayors criticized the political positions of the PLO towards Israel and called for a 
peaceful resolution to the issues of control of the West Bank and Gaza and sovereignty 
other mayors called for the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip (Al-Nammura, 1994). Moreover, the mayors invited the PLO to consult with them 
regarding any political agenda (Jarbawi, 1992) in direct contradiction to Israeli policies and 
preferences. 
  The PLO leadership, in turn, expressed its anger towards mayors who did not 
support their agenda. The PLO was concerned that new leadership would seek to eliminate 
it as the representative of the Palestinian people and then enter into negotiations with Israel 
(Maoz, 1984). The PLO even accused some mayors of cooperating with the Israeli 
occupation (Amro, 1991). However, the majority of the mayors continued to acknowledge 
that the PLO was the only and sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people 
(Jarbawi, 1992).  
 117
  Many mayors led the National Steering Committee that became the Palestinian 
National Front that openly opposed Israeli policies. As a result, the Israeli military decided 
to minimize the authority and responsibilities of the municipal councils in the occupied 
territories (Jarbawi, 1992). In addition, the Israeli authorities refused to organize any new 
elections and began to appoint new leaders (Maoz, 1984). Some Israeli settlers tried to 
assassinate some of the nationalist mayors including the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and 
Al Bireh. Both the mayors of Nablus and Ramallah lost their legs when two bombs 
exploded under their cars (Arabic Parliament Publication, 1980). In 1981, Israel established 
the Civil Administration, consisting of Israeli military officials and subject to the command 
of the Israeli Defense Minister, which municipal councils refused to cooperate with the 
new institution. The municipal councils refused to coordinate with the Israeli military 
authorities, implement any instructions and rules, or attend any meetings with the Israeli 
Civil Administration (Jarbawi, 1996). Consequently, Israel dismissed the mayors of Nablus 
and Ramallah in February 1982 and dissolved the municipal councils of Nablus, Ramallah, 
and Al-Bireh. The military authority then appointed new committees of influential 
Palestinians to manage the municipal affairs in the concerned cities (Maoz, 1984). For 
example, Thafer Al-masri, the mayor of Nablus, was appointed to the committee in Nablus 
in 1985 but he was assassinated a few months later (Jarbawi, 1992). In 1986, following an 
agreement between Jordan and the PLO, Israel agreed to appoint committees composed of 
Palestinians in the municipalities of Ramallah, Hebron, Gaza and Al-Bireh. 
  Table VIII shows that from 1981 to 1986 there were 30 municipalities (26 in the 
West Bank and 4 in Gaza) and 112 village councils (112 in the West Bank and 7 in Gaza). 
Discontent was chronic, however, especially among the younger Palestinians in refugee 
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camps (Jarbawi, 1996). Nearly half the Palestinian population of the occupied territories 
lived in twenty refugee camps in the West Bank and eight camps in the Gaza Strip, in 
overcrowded and unsanitary conditions (Palestinian Ministry of Local Government 
Editorial, 2000). The camps had existed since the flight of Palestinian who left their homes 
to avoid the conflict in 1948.4 
Table VIII 
                 Local Administration in West Bank and Gaza Strip from 1981 to 1986 
 
 
Area Population 
 
Municipalities. 
Village 
Councils  
 
Local Units 
 
Villages 
 
Camps 
W.B. 961,500 26 112 - 216 20 
G.S. 545,000 4 7 5 - 8 
Total 1,506,500 30 119 5 216 28 
 
                Source: Ministry of Local Government Editorial, August 2000 
 
Communal conflict was liable to break out at any time between Palestinians and 
Israeli settlers who were building settlements on the Palestinian territories inside the West 
Bank and Gaza (Maoz, 1984). Friction also arose from security measures taken by Israeli 
authorities to counter perceived threats (Maoz, 1984). The first Palestinian uprising 
(commonly referred to as an Intifada, which refers to the Palestinian resistance against the 
Israeli occupation) started in 1987 and continued with varying intensity until the signing of 
the 1993 Oslo accord between Israel and the PLO. The escalating level of Palestinian 
unrest precipitated a series of protests and violent demonstrations that began on December 
9, 1987, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and later spread to Arab communities in 
Jerusalem and Israel itself (Jarbawi, 1996). Thousands of mostly teen-aged Palestinians 
                                                 
4 This issue has precipitated the difficult issue of the right of return for civilian 
Palestinians who abandoned their homes to avoid battles in the war or who were forcibly 
removed from their homes during battles and subsequent military actions. 
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banded together, setting up barricades in refugee camps, confronting soldiers, and attacking 
Israeli traffic with rocks. Unlike previous demonstrations, the violence did not appear to be 
directed or coordinated by the PLO and continued almost unabated for many months 
(Maoz, 1984). It can be argued that the local municipalities in the West Bank exercised a 
mixed role with regard to its municipal responsibilities on one hand and political and 
national roles on the other hand (CTT, 1994). On one hand, municipalities had an 
administrative role of supplying basic services of water, electricity, road pavement and 
waste collection. On the other hand, they were not authorized to provide leadership and 
direction for planning, land use, or the construction of physical assets that are essential 
responsibilities for any viable municipal government (Aronson, 1990). The mayors 
involved in politics trying to persuade PLO to adopt pragmatic political positions refusing 
the Israeli trials to make them the political representatives of the Palestinian people 
(Jarbawi, 1992). Once again, this historical view shows that politics-administration 
dichotomy did not exist and Israel tried to give the local leadership a political role only to 
for serve its own political interests. This disruption of the local governance administrative 
system in this period influenced negatively the local services to people. 
5.7 Conclusion 
The historical review portion of this dissertation examines the history of local 
governance systems in Palestine since 1877. According to the Ottoman Empire’s 1877 
Municipalities Law, cities and towns in Palestine were given the authority to oversee local 
construction, urban planning, commercial markets, public health, education, and land use 
through different regional governmental bureaus. The municipal councils in Palestine 
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maintained the same functions given to local governments by the Ottoman Empire under 
the rules established by Britain under its Mandate in the 1930 Local Municipalities Law. 
That law was then amended into the Local Municipalities Law of 1934, and the Villages 
Administration Law of 1944 (Al-Abadi, 1995). These laws remained in force until 1948 
when the State of Israel was established and Jordan annexed the West Bank, including East 
Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip was annexed by Egypt.   
Following the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip Israel 
legitimized the existing laws applied in both areas unless they otherwise conflicted with 
military procedures and needs. Nevertheless, the occupying authorities amended their laws 
and regulation to meet their own self-interest, rather than the interests of the Palestinian 
people on the ground (Jarbawi, 1996). The Israeli military orders remained in force until 
the 1994 Oslo Agreement. On November 20th, 1994, President Yasser Arafat issued the 
Presidential Decision No. 1, which confirmed that the rules, regulations, and orders in place 
in June 1967 would remain valid till further amendment or change (Amro, 1991). 
Frequent occupations that successively governed Palestine concentrated on the 
important role of municipalities and local government institutions largely because those 
municipalities and institutions were the bridges that could be used to penetrate the 
community and tighten effective control (Jarbawi, 1996). Central governments controlled 
and dominated local governance structures by executing powers of supervision, control, 
appointments, and the designation of roles and responsibilities. Mary Rock (1996) argued 
that through imposed or amended laws the external authorities consolidated their 
domination over local government institutions ignoring the voices of indigenous citizens. 
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For example, the activities of local governance were restricted to engagement with the 
provision of limited services of public education and health to people. Local institutions did 
not enjoy any substantial autonomy or an independence from the central authorities with 
regard to their mission, objectives, activities and rigorous representation of citizens. Also, 
the local institutions and their leaders were restricted from engaging in local development 
efforts (Jarbawi, 1996). 
It is quite evident that the various occupying powers maintained policies and 
practices to further their political self-interest. The Ottoman regime tailored their laws, 
rules and regulations in Istanbul and maintained their existing administrative divisions for 
decades. The Ottoman Empire considered Palestine as a part of the Islamic state and 
imposed on it the same policies followed in other countries within the regime, (Amro, 
1991). The Ottoman laws created a centralized government that negatively influenced local 
Palestinian autonomy. Similar to the Ottomans’ policies, the British viewed the local 
governments as tools to advance the interests of the central government.  
The Egyptian administration treated the Gaza Strip as a separate region that 
remained under the laws issued by the British Mandate. The Jordanian laws were 
distinguished by a method intended to enable the Jordanian occupying forces to tighten 
their dominance on the political, social, and economic aspects of life in the West Bank (Al-
Nammura, 1994). Activities of the municipal and villages councils were affected by the 
competitive struggle between Jordan and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) to 
represent the people of the West Bank. It is worth noting that the PLO has led the 
movement for liberating the Palestinians from Israeli’s occupation. The second military 
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occupation after the British Mandate began during the Israeli era with its efforts to 
dominate the West Bank and Gaza Strip through altering the current circumstances during 
that era. Israel did not help in establishing a viable and independent Palestinian economy, 
tried to eliminate political opposition and even sought to create a new local leadership 
willing to cooperate with Israeli objectives on the ground and replacing the PLO at the 
same time (Jarbawi, 1996). No urban and economic infrastructure was established in the 
West Bank and Gaza under the Israeli occupation so that Palestinians could not have an 
economic independence from Israel till now as demonstrated by the World Bank and other 
international organizations reports. 
The aim of this chapter was to review the evolvement of local government system 
throughout the history of Palestine beginning from the Ottoman Empire, the British 
Mandate, Egyptian/Jordanian Administration, and the Israeli military occupation. An 
objective of the successive central authorities of the Ottoman Empire, British Mandate, 
Egyptian/Jordanian Administration and Israel was to constrain the development of the local 
governance and to make it an organic extension of their central authority that aimed at 
controlling citizens’ needs and rights. Indigenous people were forced to live in a foreign 
context of legal, economic, political and social constraints. Thus the Palestinian National 
Authority inherited a multi-dimensional and complicated local governance system 
consisting of laws and legislation of the frequent occupying powers that do not reflect the 
indigenous needs and rights of the people on the ground.  
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CHAPTER VI 
CURRENT LOCAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEM 
 
 
 
This chapter reviews and explains the current local governance system and 
structures used by the PNA. It describes the characteristics of local governments and the 
role played by the PNA’s Ministry of Local Governance (MoLG). The work of the 
Ministry of Finance is also considered as that agency has a large effect on the shape and 
role of local government. The chapter also focuses on the main features of the 1997 Law of 
Local Councils. Finally the struggle between different political factions to control the local 
governance system is also analyzed. 
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6.1 Local Governance under Palestinian National Authority 
Former Palestinian President Yasser Aarafat created and led the Fatah Party that 
has dominated the PNA since its creation. As would be expected, Fatah’s leadership had a 
pronounced impact on the design and operations of local governments for a period of 
several decades through its domination and control on the PNA. Fatah’s leaders were 
determined to place into positions of leadership only individuals loyal to the party and to 
Yasser Arafat (Work team, 1999). As a result Fatah members dominated the entire 
administrative apparatus of the PNA including the PLO, the Palestinian Legislative Council 
(Parliament), Palestinian security bodies, and the general public administrative system.  
With political control the key factor driving appointments, the best individuals were not 
always chosen for some positions. With its members firmly in control the PNA centralized 
all administrative and political power in the hands of its ministers, ministry senior 
employees, governors of governorates/districts, and mayors. The PNA did establish small 
municipalities and regional offices of the MoLG, but power and control remained 
centralized.  
The PNA sought to establish a democratic system in each local government 
through the use of popular elections. However, the PNA reinforced a centralized 
government structure and actually granted very little autonomy and power to any local 
government.  There never really was a democratic system implemented despite the passage 
of the 1996 Law of Local Councils that authorized elections and the 1997 Law of Local 
Councils that focused on the structure of local government. The elections were delayed for 
more than seven years and took two years to complete after the approval of the local 
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election laws and procedures. The local elections held in 2004 and 2005 were divided into 
stages or phases targeting different parts of the West Bank and Gaza (World Bank, 2006). 
This was necessary to deal with security conditions after the 2001 Intifada and the resulting 
response from Israel that included roadblocks and “lock downs” that became common 
practices to restrict the mobility of Palestinians. 
The 1996 and 1997 laws failed to change the imbedded traditional norms of local 
governance carried over from the policies and practices of the occupation powers. For 
example, families and local political affiliations continued to assume large roles in the 
selection of local leaders by the central government (Al-A’raj 1996). The Ottoman Empire 
had used influential families to establish and lead local political institutions. The selection 
of people for leadership positions loyal and acceptable to the ruling power created systems 
that valued loyalty more than merit and performance. Fatah did not want to substantially 
change that system. Continuing systems that were not transparent seemed to be “business” 
as usual and Palestinians found comfort relying on familial-based systems (Jarbawi, 1996). 
Finally, many of the individuals selected as local governors in Palestine had had military 
careers or were returning members of the Palestinian Diaspora who were loyal Fatah 
members. 
The chief or most important local government official is the governor. The 
governor is the representative of the President and is responsible for managing all local 
affairs in the governate. A governor’s status is that of a cabinet minister5 and the PNA 
                                                 
5 A cabinet is a body of high-ranking members of government, typically representing the 
executive branch and it is based on the British system of governance and widely popular 
in many countries all over the world. 
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President appoints each governor. Many of the governors initially chosen by the President 
were from the Diaspora and included Fatah party members living exile. The governors for 
Nablus, Tulkrem, Ramallah, Qalkilia, Jenin and Bethlehem lived outside of Palestine and 
moved back to the region after the signing of the Oslo Accords. In Jerusalem and Hebron 
the governors were residents of the Palestinian territories (Jarbawi, 1996). Regardless of 
their origin, all the governors have roots in the PLO military and, predominantly, the Fatah 
movement. 
  The PNA also inherited the structures of local governments created by the Israeli 
military occupation that involved a two-tier system for the classification of cities. Local 
governance in Palestine has been based on large municipalities that enjoy political power –  
Ramallah, Nablus, and Gaza – and smaller municipalities such as Rafah, Khan Younis, 
Jenin, and Tulkerm that had far less authority. The PNA then classified these municipalities 
into four categories: A, B, C, and D, roughly according to the size of the city (by land and 
residents). This classification emerged from the elements of the Oslo Accord between the 
PLO and Israel that fragmented the Palestinian territories into smaller isolated geographical 
area units (Zones A, B, and C). Under the PNA classification of municipalities, the large 
municipalities include Ramallah, Nablus, Bethlehem, Hebron, Tulkerm, and Gaza. Table 6-
1 shows the classified municipal units. Municipality A is a metropolitan local government 
carrying the name of the governate and municipality B is the former municipalities outside 
the metropolitan areas inherited by the PNA. Municipality C refers to newly established 
municipalities and municipality D is a new village council that did not exist under the 
Israeli occupation and was upgraded from a local council to a city council within a 
governate. All four PNA classified local governments are subject to the authority and 
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supervision of the MoLG. At the same time, the responsibilities of local governments are 
subject to its three Oslo Accord classified areas as it is shown in Table X. 
Table X 
Municipal Organization in the PNA in 2004 
 
Municipal Classification Number Population Size Number of Council members 
Municipality A 14 10,000 + 15 (center of Governorates) 
Municipality B 41 8,000 + 13 (former municipalities) 
Municipality C 47 4,000 – 8,000 11 (Newly established 
Municipalities) 
Municipality D 220 1,000-4,000 9 (village councils) 
Local Development 
Committee H (A) 
83 1,000-500 7 
Local Development 
Committee H (B) 
65 Less than 500 7 
Total 470*   
? Source: Ministry of Local Government in the PNA, 2004. 
? This total number of local authorities does not include Hamlets and Refugee Camps (refugee 
camps are beyond the mandate of the MoLG). 
? Local Development Committees A and B are below the threshold of 1,000 and are not classified as 
D municipalities. 
Political issues between Palestine and Israel have interfered with and continue to 
influence the formation of the Palestinian local governance system. For example, 
according to the terms in the Second Oslo Agreement there was to have been a division 
of responsibilities for the overall local governance systems between the PNA and Israel. 
The West Bank is divided into three urban areas: Area A placed under full Palestinian 
self- rule; Area B (mainly small towns and villages) placed under limited Palestinian 
civil control and Israeli security control; and Area C remaining under direct Israeli 
administration. Table XI shows the responsibilities in the three areas of the West Bank. 
This political fragmentation negatively affects local governance in Palestine by 
restricting the urban planning in Area C communities that remain under full Israeli 
supervision. Moreover, Israel controls the main roads leading to its settlements in the 
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West Bank (World Bank, 2006).6 Therefore, without a final political agreement between 
the Israeli occupying power and the PNA, the local governance in Palestine will remain 
disrupted and paralyzed in the West Bank.  
Table XI 
Responsibilities in areas A, B, and C according to the Oslo accord 
 
Responsibilities Area A Area B Area C 
Planning PNA, local governments PNA, local governments Israeli administration 
Implementation PNA, local governments PNA , local governments PNA, local governments 
and Israeli administration 
Resource control PNA, local governments 
and Israeli 
administration for water 
recourse 
PNA, local governments, 
Donors and international 
and Israeli administration 
for water 
Human resources: PNA 
Natural resources: Israeli 
administration 
Finances PNA, local 
governments, Donors 
and local communities 
PNA, local governments, 
Donors and local 
communities 
PNA, local governments, 
Donors, Local communities 
and Israeli admin. For 
settlements and by-pass 
roads 
Construction PNA, local 
governments, Donors 
and local communities 
PNA, local governments, 
Donors and local 
communities 
PNA, local governments, 
Donors, Local communities 
and Israeli admin. For 
settlements and by-pass 
roads 
Security Full PNA control Police: PNA 
Security: Israel 
Full Israeli control 
 
Source: ARD, 2000e. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 International law specifies that Israeli settlements in occupied territories illegal 
according to the UN resolutions 242 and 338 related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In 
view of Article 80 of the U.N. Charter, “the Palestine article,” provides that “nothing in 
the Charter shall be construed ... to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any 
states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments…” Israel has 
justified the settlements using other interpretations of history and the ultimate disposition 
of these communities will be part of any peace accord between Palestine and Israel.  
 129
Figure 5: 
Palestinian Areas of A, B, and C according to the Oslo Accord in 2000 
 
 
Source: www.iris.org.il/oslo_2000.htm 
This fragmentation of Palestinian controlled territories also has had a negative 
impact on the process of developing local governments and systems of governance (Al-
A’raj 1996). The smaller and isolated municipalities are very weak economically and 
politically and often do not have sufficient resources to pay staff salaries. The geographic 
fragmentations of the areas in the West Bank created as a result of the political and security 
situation between the PNA and Israel (as determined by Israel’s military leadership) 
imposed real challenges on the local governments to achieve solid or permanent economic 
prosperity and stability and to provide decent services to its residents (ARD, 2000). The 
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geographic isolation strangles economic and political development in the West Bank 
(World Bank, 2007). This fragmentation became worse after the Second Intifada in 2001 
because of more than one hundred Israeli military checkpoints separating Palestinian cities 
and villages (World Bank, 2006). Both the Israeli military occupation and the centralized 
structure of the PNA have contributed to the weak structures of local governments in the 
West Bank.  
In addition, these local governments have limited capacity and authority to 
generate or raise revenues. As a result most local governments were quite dependent on the 
central government represented by MoLG. On the other hand, municipalities with large 
numbers of residents, especially those with the status of a provincial capital, have 
tremendous political power and independent access to financial resources (Jarbawi, 1996). 
These municipalities include Ramallah, Nablus, Bethlehem and Gaza City. Many 
Palestinian mayors also hold other political positions in the PLO that, in turn, gives them 
substantial political and financial power by advocating getting bigger budgets in the 
Palestinian cabinet. For example, the mayors of Nablus, Hebron and Gaza play important 
roles in the politics of the PLO as they are members of its executive committee. These 
mayors have the authority to receive direct financial donations and projects from donor 
countries and without any prior approval from the MoLG (ARD, 2000). However, other 
mayors of smaller cities or local councils are not allowed to receive direct financial 
donations from external donors without the approval and the supervision of the Ministry of 
Finance. Double standards are applied within the local governance system that favors the 
mayors of the large cities and the mayors who have strong political power through 
belonging to the membership of executive committee of the PLO. 
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6.2 Palestinian Ministry of Local Governance 
  The MoLG was established on May 25, 1994, after the Oslo Accord that handed 
responsibility for large segments of the West Bank and Gaza to the PNA. What was 
received was a fractured and fragmented system of local governments produced by the 
frequent changes in policies and practices by the occupying forces. The existing units of 
government were bureaucratically and financially quite weak. Given this situation three 
priorities for the MoLG were quickly formulated (Jarbawi, 1996): 
1. Establish a decentralized administrative system based on the principles of 
democracy as a core for founding a Palestinian civil society that included democratic 
elections and the establishment of a meritocracy. 
2. Review the conditions of the local governance that existed prior to the establishment 
of the NPA to identify needed adjustments and create an indigenous system of local 
governance that can serve the Palestinian people.  
3. Advance the delivery of services to citizens living in rural areas to reduce and then 
eliminate gaps in service levels provided to residents of urban and rural areas. 
Trying to achieve the above-mentioned goals the MoLG adopted a new vision for 
a progressive local Palestinian governance model (Al-A’raj 1996). This vision shaped the 
Palestinian local government system that is divided into two parts. The first established 
the central authority branch represented by 16 governorates and two districts, the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, which were controlled and supervised by the Ministry of Interior 
(MoI). The district is wider and larger than the local governates. The two districts are the 
West Bank and Gaza; each of which includes several governates. In each district, there is 
 132
an office of the MoLG that supervises and administers all the district’s local affairs and in 
coordination with the Palestinian Cabinet through the Minister of Local Governance. 
Within each of the 16 governorates and districts that are listed in Table XII and the 
population included (see Table XIII) there is an office of MoLG, headed by a Director-
General. The Local Governments Minister recommends candidates who are then 
appointed by the President of the PNA. The Director-General has extensive authority to 
monitor the municipalities within his/her district and to handle local affairs including 
approving the final budgets of all cities and villages, approving the hiring of all senior 
staff, and approving all urban planning projects. However, the Director-General does not 
have infinite authority as he/she reports to the governor who is the final decision maker in 
any local affairs in coordination with the MoLG.    
The second part of the vision involved the establishment of smaller local councils 
along with the municipal governments. With the support of the members of the 
Palestinian Legislative Council (Parliament), the MoLG established more than 300 new 
municipalities during 1996 (MoLG, 2004). Such a high number of municipalities may not 
be needed in such a small geographic area with less than 4 million people living in 16 
geographical districts. The PNA local governance system deals with the governates (e. g., 
Jenin, Tulkerm, and others) as metropolitan areas surrounded by many villages 
designated as city municipalities. For example, it is difficult to justify that a city such as 
Jenin with less than 200,000 residents needs 12 local city councils. The same situation 
exists for Tulkerm where there are 125,000 residents and 11 local city councils along 
with the Tulkerm metropolitan municipality. This indicates that there may well be too 
many units of government leading to inefficiencies.   
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Table XII 
PNA – Number of Local Authorities in Each Governorate in 2004 
 
No. Governorate/ 
District 
Popula. Munci. Village Council Comm. Locality Total 
1. Jenin 197,661 12 24 *** 1 1 3
8 
2. Tubas 33,203 3 3 *** *** *** 6 
3. Nablus 254,305 9 38 *** *** *** 47 
4. Tulkerm 123,884 11 12 *** *** *** 23 
5. Qalkilia 73,549 5 8 *** 1 *** 14 
6. Salfeet 52,443 9 7 *** *** *** 16 
7. Ramallah 219,025 15 44 *** 1 *** 60 
8. Jerusalem 120,167 *** 14 9 *** *** 23 
9. Jericho 27,312 1 2 2 *** *** 5 
10. Bethlehem 127,880 10 9 *** *** 3 22 
11. Hebron 415,073 17 20 *** 2 2 41 
12. North Gaza 146,037 3 *** *** *** 2 5 
13. Gaza 350,849 1 2 *** *** *** 3 
14. DeirAlbalah 59,598 2 2 *** *** *** 4 
15. KanYounes 189,897 6 1 *** *** 4 11 
16. Rafah 71,954 1 2 *** *** 1 4 
17. Total 2,46 2,837 105 188 11 5 13 322 
? Source: Ministry of Local Government, PNA, 2004 
? All listed categories are above the population threshold of 1,000 (See Appendix2). 
? Classification of local authorities into municipalities, villages, councils, communities and localities 
served the Ministry of Local Government in 1996, but is not based on specific criteria. 
 
Table XIII 
Local authorities in the West Bank by population size in 2004 
 
 
Population 
Number of local authorities  
Percent 
Up to 1000 persons 11 3.7 
1001-2000 102 34.2 
2001-5000 108 36.2 
5001-10,000 41 13.8 
10,001-20,000 19 6.4 
20,001-50,000 12 4.0 
50,001-100,000 3 1.0 
100,001 + 2 0.7 
Total 298 100.0 
Source: Ministry of Local Government in the PNA, 2004 
The PNA created a large number of new municipalities, the majority of which were 
small villages that were upgraded from village councils to municipalities. These 
municipalities were granted limited authority to collect local taxes and issue building 
permits (and collect the fees for the permits). However, the metropolitan municipality in 
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the governate does not have any authority to provide financial or staff resources to its 
local municipalities. These municipalities were not granted any measure of autonomy and 
remain under the control of the central authority represented by the MoLG (World Bank, 
2006). The local governance units established after 1994 do not have the authority to 
define municipal boundaries within their districts or to collect property taxes. The setting 
of municipal boundaries was made more difficult by the settlements established by Israel 
and its continuing military presence in the West Bank (Jarbawi, 1996). A similar situation 
existed in Gaza before the evacuation of the Israeli settlements in 2006.  
The PNA established the MoLG in an effort to centralize the activities and 
agendas of the local governance system.  While many small municipalities were created 
there was no true decentralization. Instead what has been created is a network of weak, 
inefficient, and fragmented administrative entities that cannot provide the services needed 
by citizens. The local service delivery system is dependent on the central government 
(World Bank, 2006). The new small municipalities lacked the financial and human 
resources to pursue economic development, overseeing necessary infrastructure projects, 
provide services and create a more modern form of government. 
6.3 The Main Features of the 1997 Law of Local Council 
The Local Councils Law of 1997 organized and specified the role of the elected 
councils of local government units (LGUs) and their relationship to the central 
government through the MoLG. However, the law was not implemented until 2004 
because elections were delayed for 8 years. Some international organizations justified the 
delay in conducting the local elections due to security problems and the disruptive effects 
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of the interrupted peace process between the PNA and the Israeli government (World 
Bank, 2006). From 1994 until conducting the first local elections in 2004, the President in 
coordination with the MoLG appointed all mayors. The MoLG selected the members of 
the local councils. The MoLG chose to appoint a large number of council members from 
wealthy and influential families (World Bank, 2006). 
However, many mayors and councilors believed that the new law did not bring 
any fundamental changes that would have allowed for the advancement of local control 
and the improved performance of local governments (ARD, 2000e). The new law in their 
view did not provide local government officials with any new authority (ARD, 2000e). 
The law states that local governance councils, elected every four years for four-year 
terms, are to have a wide range of responsibilities. For example, the councils are 
responsible for providing utilities, administering local services, collecting taxes, fees, and 
garbage, and licensing the construction of buildings and houses. Article 3 in the 1997 
Local Government Law encouraged a level of cooperation and coordination between the 
neighboring local governments through Joint Service Councils (JSC) to fulfill their 
municipal functions. However, all the activities of JSC are to be supervised and approved 
in advance by the MoLG. This insured centralized control of the setting of taxes and fees, 
annual budgets, and procurement and staffing and other related issues (World Bank, 
2006).  
The JSCs are groups of local authorities that gather within a defined framework to 
cooperatively provide one or more services to their citizens. The establishment of JSCs 
provides a viable solution for overcoming limited revenue-raising potential faced by 
 136
many local councils and for enabling them to deliver services while adhering to a perhaps 
overly fragmented system created by the MoLG (ARD, 2000h). With the encouragement 
of the MoLG, some smaller municipalities and communities have joined together to form 
JSCs to provide one or more specific services. In 2003 there were 49 JSCs in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip providing services to 360 communities as shown in Table XIV. The 
average population served by a JSC is 8,500, which by comparison makes them roughly 
equivalent to a ‘C’ category municipality. The services provided by JSC include garbage 
collection, water and electricity distribution and billing systems (ARD, 2000h).  
Table XIV 
Number of JSC according to districts and its functions, 2004 
 
District No. of JSC No. Councils Functions 
Hebron 3 39 Garbage, Sewage, Solid 
waste 
Jenin 5 103 Garbage, Water, Solid 
waste 
Jericho 3 10 Garbage, Solid waste 
Jerusalem 5 28 Garbage, Solid waste 
Nablus 3 18 Garbage, Solid waste, 
Water 
Qalkilia 3 28 Garbage, Solid waste, 
Water 
Ramallah 12 47 Garbage, Roads 
Salfeet 3 8 Garbage 
Tubas 2 12 Garbage 
Tulkerm 3 29 Garbage, Water, Solid 
waste 
Gaza 7 38 Garbage, Water, Solid 
waste 
Total 49 360  
Source: Ministry of Local Government Publication July 2004 
 
Another example of the effort to create a centralized system can be found in the 
Article 4 of the 1997 Law. This part of the act states that the structure, formation, and 
jurisdiction of local governments are to be approved by the central government. Such 
control by the central government is emphasized by Article 19 which states that “the 
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Minister would issue staff regulations for the local bodies” specifying staff duties, the 
grading of positions, the method of appointment, the standards for promotion, and the 
rules for termination, vacations, disciplinary action, medical care, insurance, pensions, 
travel allowances and related tasks.  No discretion was left for local governments. 
In fact, the 1997 Law of Local Councils maintained pre-existing laws relating to 
the responsibilities and authorities of the governor that were derived from Jordanian and 
Egyptian administrative procedures (ARD, 2000e). The law lists the functions, 
responsibilities and authorities of the councils that include water supply, electricity, 
sewage, waste collection, public markets, parks, recreational facilities, libraries, schools, 
museums, clinics and hospitals, town planning and building regulations. In addition the 
law provides that the regulation of wide-set of activities (sanitation, health, peddlers and 
beggars, weights and measures, advertisements, hotels and animals, internal: budget 
preparation, staffing and management of property, and any function given by other laws) 
lies within the responsibility of city councils (ARD, 2000e). 
It can be argued that the law re-established or validated a centralized local 
government system that was somewhat distant from a system that underscored 
democratic values and emphasized the principles and practices of modern public 
administration. However, the law was the first dealing with the broader issues of local 
governance ever passed by a Palestinian parliament. While the large municipalities had 
already assumed many of the functions and responsibilities assigned in the 1997 Law, the 
newer and smaller municipalities had neither the financial nor the human capital to 
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effectively fulfill the required responsibilities (ARD, 2000e). Article 15 lists 26 of these 
functions and responsibilities that are summarized in Table XV. 
Table XV                                                                                        
Analysis of functions and responsibilities according to the Local Government Law 
 
Function/ 
responsibility 
Sub 
Total of 
Functions 
Public economic  
category 
Skill needed 
in management 
Local /regional 
impacts 
Financial 
management 
of  municipality 
2 Non –toll public 
service 
Municipal 
finance skills 
Integrated with 
Central MOF 
procedures 
Physical 
management 
9 Mostly public toll 
services 
Municipal 
engineering 
skills 
Central 
Authorities and 
Local impact 
Regulatory 
Planning 
Developme
nt 
Permits 
Licenses 
Control 
 
1 
 
 
 
4 
 
10 
Total: 26 
 
Mostly non –toll 
public services 
 
 
 
 
Some merit 
services 
Public 
administration 
skills 
Local impact 
Source: Associates in Rural Development Inc. (ARD) (2000c) 
 
The Law of Local Councils did not discuss citizen participation and 
recommended addressing public participation through public open meetings, public 
access to decisions, minutes, reports, and regulations, and public consultations (ARD, 
2000d). Citizen participation through general local elections was delayed for more than 7 
years after approval of the 1997 law as a result of security issues. When local elections 
could be held they were not general as the elections had to be organized in different 
stages with part of the West Bank and Gaza holding elections on some days and other 
parts holding elections on other days. Moreover, the Law of Local Councils is not a 
comprehensive code covering all aspects of local governance issues. For example, 
important matters were not addressed such as the formation of new local authorities, the 
MoLG’s oversight role, and most importantly the distribution of central revenues to local 
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authorities. In addition, many other national ministries also interact and can interfere with 
the operations of local governments, and the relationships with these other national 
departments were not specified or discussed. Table XVI shows the interrelated 
responsibilities and duties among the Palestinian ministries and the local governance 
system. 
Table XVI 
The interrelated responsibilities among the Palestinian ministries at the local level 
 
Line agency Central level Governorate  level Local level 
Ministry of Finance Issues Rules, Regulations 
Manuals and Guidelines 
concerning Fiscal issues 
Collecting Property 
Taxes 
Collecting, VAT 
income taxes and 
customs 
Auditing, 
participation 
Ministry of Planning National and regional 
planning 
Coordination  grand and 
loans with donor counties 
  
Ministry of Public 
Works 
Guidelines for 
infrastructure development 
Plans and designs for 
regional roads 
 
Ministry of 
Transportation 
Rules and regulations. 
Instructions 
Village council areas, 
implement public work 
projects 
Transportation 
planning and 
design 
Ministry of Tourism Rules and regulations. 
Instructions 
Safeguard cultural 
heritage 
Building 
licensing and 
planning, permit 
endorsement 
Ministry of Health Rules and regulations. 
Instructions 
Provide health services Public health 
Ministry of 
Environment 
Rules and regulations. 
Instructions 
Environmental impact 
assessment 
Environmental 
impact 
assessment 
Ministry of Local 
Government 
Law, bylaws, supervision 
Monitoring, instructions 
Supervision, 
monitoring and 
instructions 
Control, 
endorsement 
Ministry of Labors Laws, instructions, bylaws Monitoring, guidelines 
and manuals 
Work safety, 
licensing 
industrial 
establishment 
Ministry of Industry Laws, instructions, bylaws Monitoring, guidelines 
and manuals 
Industrial parks 
and zones 
Energy Authority Energy planning Coordination  
Water Authority Water planning Coordination  
Source: ARD, 2000a. 
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6.4 Local Governance in Palestinian Practices 
After 1994, instead of holding local elections the PNA representatives in the 
MoLG began a policy of appointing mayors for the local councils. Political affiliation 
was the most important criterion for appointment (Fatah affiliation). Tribal and kinship 
factors, however, were also considered to advance unity and avoid conflicts (Jarbawi, 
1996). The PNA sought to control municipalities through the use of political and family 
criteria in the appointment of leaders. Professional experience, academic qualifications, 
and efficient performances were not the major criteria for appointment (World Bank, 
2006). For the 14 municipalities, the mayors (except the mayor of Hebron) were 
appointed directly by the President of the PNA through the MoLG. The family and 
kinship relationships were the practically major political criteria for appointing the 
mayors of Qalkilia, Tulkrem, Salfeet, Jenin and Tubas (Jarbawi, 1996). In Jericho and 
Nablus, the criteria for appointment were primarily political – loyalty to the Fatah 
movement (Jarbawi, 1996). The appointed mayors in Ramallah and Bethlehem were 
chosen using religious criteria – mayors of both municipalities must be Christian. 
According to a presidential decree, the mayors of 11 municipalities must be Christian 
(Ramallah, Birzeit, Jifna, Einerek, Altayba, Alzababda, Aboud, Derqedes Bethlehem, 
Betsahor, and Betjala). In Hebron, the same mayor has remained in office since the 1976 
elections (Jarbawi, 1996).  
In summary, the central government controlled the local governance system and 
its administrative and municipal units politically through three policies. First, it 
established strong districts directly controlled by the President of the PNA.  Second, the 
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President also appointed the directors of different administrative units again with input 
from the MoLG. Third, the President also appointed the mayors in consultation with the 
MoLG.  
6.5 Political Factions’ Struggle Over Local Governance 
The size of the public sector and its payroll has been increasing as a result of the 
reduced opportunities for Palestinians to work in Israel and the weak economy in 
Palestine that reduced the number of private sector jobs (World Bank, 2007).  Without an 
expanding public sector the unemployment level – already high – would be even worse. 
Most of the appointments to government jobs were based on political affiliation to 
strengthen the ruling party, Fatah.  As a result the quality of leadership and 
professionalization in local and even national governance suffered from nepotism, 
favoritism, and the need to keep as many people employed as possible. According to the 
World Bank (2007), international donor countries also have failed to force the PNA to 
establish a real mechanism that can vigorously combat the corruption of fiscal policy and 
recruitment policies that contributed to the continued growth of the public sector’s budget 
(and budget deficits). Different positions were filled with under-qualified personnel, often 
through patronage appointments that rewarded political loyalty (World Bank, 2007).  The 
positions of deputy ministers, general directors and heads of public agencies were 
predominantly occupied by Fatah party loyalists. Therefore, the expansion in the number 
of public employees was driven by the need to reduce the high unemployment rate and 
those who received jobs were affiliated with the Fatah party. To get a job many people 
identified with the Fatah Party even if they were only mildly interested in politics. 
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Administrative needs were not the highest priority. Table XVII shows the distribution of 
local authorities by the most important development need for the local authority and 
governorate. 
Table XVII 
 
 
Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), 2007 
 
During the January 2006 elections, the Palestinian public rated the PA’s weak 
performance and perceived corruption as their most important concerns following the 
unemployment high rate and Israel’s policy of closing the West Bank (and Gaza). 
(Israel’s action was a form of collective punishment in response to attacks by suicide 
bombing and other acts it classified as terrorist attacks). According to the Palestinian 
Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in its 2005 report, anticorruption themes 
were also prominent in the local and presidential elections. Public perceptions of the 
integrity, honesty and performance of the government officials were largely negative with 
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respondents noting widespread corruption and high levels of nepotism in the appointment 
of employees (PCPSR, 2005). According to a PCPSR poll in 2004, 77 percent of the 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza believed that public sector jobs were largely 
obtained through “connections” (wasta) based on political agendas; 84 percent believed 
that there is a widespread corruption in the PNA, and 87 percent strongly supported calls 
for reforms. 
Global surveys also indicate a widespread impression that the Palestinian 
government lacks integrity and is not committed to stopping corruption. In 2005, 
Palestine was ranked 112th on Transparency International’s Global Corruption 
Perceptions Index. Palestine was seen as worse than Lebanon (83rd) and Yemen (104th). 
The share of Palestinians who believe that the PNA has substantial levels of corruption 
increased from approximately 50 percent in 1996 to 91 percent in late 2005 (PCPSR, 
2005). Concerns with corruption relate mostly to a lack of transparency. Traditional 
problems such as bribery or corruption are seen as other important problems (World 
Bank, 2002). In one of the World Bank studies in 2001, Palestinian businesspeople 
emphasized the danger of corruption as the second greatest impediment to the 
development of public and private sector activity and it came after the political instability 
and uncertainty, although only 21 percent reported having to regularly pay bribes. 
The most recent study of the World Bank (2007) regarding corruption in the West 
Bank and Gaza states that 
Until now the PNA has not adopted a serious, real, and practical 
comprehensive national anticorruption strategy, and the limited 
anticorruption activities undertaken have been ad hoc rather than part of a 
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systematic approach to combating corruption. However, the January 2006 
election victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) 
elections may provide a new political impetus for addressing corruption. 
Civil society has filled some of this gap by proposing anticorruption 
measures (World Bank Report, 2007: 81).  
 
Because of the unwillingness of the PNA to combat corruption in the public 
sector, other Palestinian nongovernmental organizations took the lead in calling for 
reforms. In particular, AMAN,7 the Coalition for Accountability and Integrity, the local 
counterpart of Transparency International, issued a comprehensive three-year action plan 
to combat corruption in all branches of government and civil society. But this plan has 
not been implemented because of the lack of the financial resources and political support 
from Fatah (World Bank, 2007).  
Under pressure and demands for reform from donor countries, the central 
government working with the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) approved the Basic 
Law, the Law on Illicit Gains, the Law on Duties and Rights of the Members of the 
Legislative Council, the Civil Service Law and the Criminal Code to combat corruption. 
However, a World Bank study (2007) concluded that although these laws cover a number 
of activities and call for the review of the performances of various higher-level public 
officials, there were still gaps in the legislation. For example, these laws did not address 
nepotism and conflicts of interest, two of the most prominent forms of corruption in West 
Bank and Gaza.  
                                                 
7 AMAN is an Arabic word meaning “security.” AMAN is a Palestinian non-profit 
organization in the West Bank that works on reinforcing the transparency policies and 
combating corruption especially in the public sector. 
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The Office of the Commissioner was established after the approval of the Law on 
Illicit Gains in 2005. This individual is responsible for investigating allegations of illicit 
wealth involving higher-level public officials and cabinet ministers. But while a 
Commissioner has been appointed the office has been largely inactive (World Bank, 
2007). The Auditor General also has a limited role in addressing corruption (World Bank, 
2007).  Equally important in addressing corruption is the Office of the Attorney General 
and public prosecutors who are responsible for both investigating and prosecuting cases 
of corruption. In general, the Office of the Attorney General has been hesitant and 
cautious to investigate corruption cases (World Bank, 2007). For example, in January of 
2006, the Attorney General announced that almost 50 investigations of high-level public 
officials were underway. However, these cases have not been completed and through 
2007 there was no evidence of any action taken (PCPSR, 2007; World Bank, 2007).  
6.6 New Political Structure 
Hamas’ electoral victory in the January 2006 parliamentary elections changed 
the political structure in Palestine. Some observers described the victory as an earthquake 
in Palestinian politics and in the region (Barry, 2006). The failure of the peace process to 
produce tangible results for the average Palestinian and the perceived high levels of 
corruption in the local governance system were the major factors that led to the defeat of 
the governing political faction. Fatah lost its long-held monopoly on the political system 
and set a new Palestinian political and administrative agenda (Palestinian Center for 
Policy and Survey Research, 2005). Barry (20062) argues that Fatah collapsed in the 
Parliamentary and local elections because of the chaos in local governmental structures, 
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function, and performance. Hamas attracted large majorities in the local elections in the 
larger cities of Nablus, al-Bireh, Jenin, and Ramallah. By the end of the four stages of 
balloting approximately half of all Palestinians lived under councils that were dominated 
by Hamas party members (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2007). 
  With corruption a dominant election issue, Hamas members were elected to lead 
120 local authorities between December 2004 and May 2005. This seemed to enhance the 
image of Hamas and its political influence. Hamas’s desire and willingness for change, its 
apparent commitment to transparent and non-corrupt public service, and the promises made 
for real reform in the administration of Palestinian agencies attracted supporters. Voting for 
Hamas was not based on family affiliation but more on political affiliation and the need for 
new leaders who could lead the process of the change and reform (Schulz, 2006). The 
victory of the opposition party, Hamas, in the January 2006 PLC elections marked the 
beginning of a new stage of the political and administrative system in Palestine.  
  In summary, experts believed Hamas’ victory was a result of several factors:  
? The corruption within Fatah and its inability to achieve real reform in the 
administrative system reduced its opportunities to win the public support (Schulz, 2006).  
? Usher (2006) argues that Fatah was unable to address and resolve its internal crisis 
between its role as a national liberation movement with that as ruling party of the 
Palestinian community. Fatah had not held internal elections for more than 30 years and 
its leaders remained the same for a long time. Many of these leaders were accused of 
corruption and theft and many public crimes. 
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? Islamic institution-building and networking in the form of schools, mosques, health 
clinics, kindergartens, charities, sports clubs, choirs, computer centers etc. are forms of 
mobilization from grassroots which Fatah ignored. The public perceives Hamas as a non-
corrupt grassroots organization that gradually has been able to show its capacity to 
provide social welfare to the poorest (Mashal & Sela, 2000, Hroub, 2000). Therefore, 
people “have high expectations that Hamas will democratize Palestinian society better 
than the previous Fatah led PNA” since its establishment (Schulz, 2006). 
? At present two-thirds of the Palestinians live below the poverty line and it is likely 
that it is within this disenfranchised segment of the population that Hamas finds its core 
support. Knudsen (2005) argues that about one in every six Palestinians in the West Bank 
and Gaza benefits from support from Islamic charities. Hamas, for its part, allocates 
almost all its revenues to its social services, but there is no evidence that Hamas or the 
other Islamic charities always provide assistance conditional upon political support 
(Knudsen, 2005). 
Since Hamas’s electoral victory with its ‘Change and Reform’ candidates in 
January 2006 and the subsequent formation of a Hamas government in April 2006 the 
dynamics of democratic politics in the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been severely 
undermined and challenged. There has always been tension and distrust between the two 
dominant political parties that ended temporarily in June 2007 when Hamas completed its 
military control of the Gaza Strip. In seizing control the security systems established by 
Fatah were removed by military force. President Abbas attacked the use of violence to 
seize control and formed a separate ‘emergency government’ located in the West Bank 
(Edwards, 2007). Hamas immediately declared the emergency government illegitimate 
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and Fatah responded in-kind calling Hamas’ control illegitimate. Residents in Gaza have 
suffered from the resulting civil war between the parties followed by the efforts of Israel, 
Egypt, and the US to isolate Hamas.   
6.7 Public Administration System under The Mercy of Politics 
More than 130,000 Palestinian public employees did not receive their full salaries 
for more than 15 months after Hamas’ victory (Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 
2007). Gaza has been under a complete closure by Israel and the social, medical, 
economic, educational systems entirely collapsed in 2007 and early 2008 (PCPSR, 2008). 
Senior public servants affiliated with Fatah were removed from their positions in Gaza. 
The Western World has supported the Palestinian President and more funding began to 
flow to the budget of PNA in Ramallah. Speaking at a press conference following a 
cabinet meeting in Ramallah attended for the first time by President Mahmoud Abbas, the 
newly appointed Prime Minister, Salam Fayyad, declared that salaries would be paid. He 
emphasizing that 31,000 public employees out of a total of 164,000 were excluded from 
the payment because they were hired or promoted by the Hamas government since the 
beginning of 2006. In addition, about 1,000 employees did not receive their salaries for 
failing to abide by orders from President Abbas not to cooperate with the dismissed 
Hamas’ government of Ismail Haniya in the Gaza Strip (PCPSR, 2008).  
Palestinian public employees have not received a regular salary since March 
2006, when the Islamist Hamas formed a government following a sweep of legislative 
elections held in January 2006. An international financial and economic embargo 
imposed on the Palestinian government prevented it from meeting its financial 
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obligations. The embargo ended when Prime Minister Fayyad formed his emergency 
government on June 17, 2007, without any Hamas members following the military 
conflict in Gaza.  After the battle essentially two separate governments exist with Hamas 
in control of the Gaza Strip while the West Bank remains under the authority of 
Mahmoud Abbas’ Fatah party. Public employees have been trapped in the Hamas-Fatah 
conflict over salaries, regulations, appointments, firing from service, work weekends and 
other administrative issues.  
6.8 Conclusion 
For the first time beginning in the 1990s the Palestinian people were served by a 
government created by an indigenous political party. This created an opportunity to 
initiate a process that would lead to the development of indigenous institutions. Yet, the 
material reviewed suggests that the political appointees of governors and general 
managers by the PNA were based on the political affiliations and family connections as a 
priority over professional skills, bureaucratic experience, and familiarity with principles 
of modern public administration (Jarbawi, 1996; World Bank, 2007). Moreover, the 
political unsettlement between the PNA and the on-going Israeli military occupation 
continued the existence of a physically fragmented structure in the West Bank with more 
than one hundred military checkpoints. In addition, the formation of more modern and 
professional forms of local governance was not a high priority for the PNA (World Bank, 
2007). This de facto decision is attributed to the fact that modernization of public 
administration might threaten the authority and legitimacy of young central government 
institutions that suffer from substantial administrative and efficiency problems and 
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political instability. Moreover, the data presented suggests that local government 
appointments have been based on political affiliation. A department was created, the 
“Public Organization Security,” to verify each applicant’s political affiliation (World 
Bank, 2007). Unfortunately, Hamas followed a similar practice when it assumed a 
leadership role (PCPSR, 2008). Palestinian public administration has been involved in 
PNA politics - either between the PNA and the Israeli government or between the two 
biggest political factions of Hamas and Fatah - directly and severely to a degree it has 
affected its efficient performance and deviated its role of a transparent, accountable and 
objective servant to all citizens. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents findings from a survey of Palestinian community leaders 
working in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The questionnaire was designed to 
measure and describe respondents’ attitudes and opinions regarding the current local 
governance system in Palestine. The questions posed focused on several dimensions of 
local governance system. Previous chapters of this dissertation analyzed the effects of 
policies and practices of occupations powers on local government to produce a historical 
assessment that can be used to understand the current Palestinian local governance 
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system and its institutions. The survey data provides a perspective on the operations of 
the existing local governance system.  
The community leaders’ responses describe aspects of the operation of the current 
local governance system, its relationship to the current political environment, and its 
ability to meet citizens’ needs and expectations. The survey data permits a comparison of 
respondents’ views of what should exist or be accomplished with what is actually taking 
place. The responses can then be reviewed and analyzed in the context of the historical 
analysis presented.   
7.2 Methodological Issues 
All respondents were Palestinian community leaders working in the public, 
private, and nonprofit sectors in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While the local 
environment made it impossible to randomly select participants, the data does provide an 
assessment of the attitudes of respondents working in different sectors of Palestinian 
society. A total of 1,000 surveys were sent to individuals working for 80 different 
organizations that participated in the study. The selection of these organizations was 
based on their mission, goals, and the fact that each has connections with and works 
directly with the public sector. As a result, members of the selected institutions work 
daily with the established Palestinian local governments and are directly involved in 
different governance issues including efforts to eliminate corruption, the development of 
policies and practices to enhance the transparency of public servant recruitment, the 
public financing of government, and several other dimensions.  
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Conditions, discussed later in this section, made it difficult to randomly select 
respondents. Yet questionnaires were returned by a diverse group of community leaders 
between the ages of 30 and 60.8 From the 1,000 survey instruments distributed, 185 were 
returned yielding a response rate of 18.5 percent. This relatively low response rate was 
related to the difficult security situation in the West Bank and Gaza that requires special 
procedures to collect any type of survey data. 
Some of these difficulties result from the political confrontations between 
Palestinians and Israel. Others are related to the conflict between Fatah and Hamas. As a 
result, anyone doing research in Palestine is working in a very a tense environment which 
is also hostile to social science fieldwork and where mobility and access are limited. 
Respondents or anyone who works with those engaged in research has some fear that 
expression of one’s views could bring severe reactions. This effectively reduces the 
willingness of people to participate in research activities that could produce or yield 
findings critical of either of the Palestinian parties or their policies and governance 
systems. For example, the Gaza Strip is under a complete siege imposed by the Israeli 
authorities and Egypt (and supported by the United States and other Western 
governments) since Hamas won the legislative elections in 2006. In the West Bank, 
citizens cannot move from one city to another without having to pass through many 
Israeli checkpoints and that both consumes and reduces the time they have available to 
respond to surveys. There is also concern that telephone lines may not be secure and that 
responses given in either telephone interviews or in Internet-based surveys could be 
                                                 
8 The age of 60 is the retiring age for the Palestinian employees in the West Bank and Gaza. 
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intercepted and read. For that reason using either of those methods to collect survey 
responses was rejected for this dissertation.  
Another challenge for researchers is that they sometimes must apply for special 
permits granted by the Israeli authorities to access areas for which Israel remains in 
complete control.  The inability to receive a permit can affect who does and does not 
participate in any survey. Moreover, the wall built by Israel in the West Bank isolates 
many Palestinian villages from their urban areas and that creates additional obstacles for 
researchers trying to insure a valid sample of respondents is selected from an appropriate 
universe. 
These constraints suggested the value in experimenting with different survey 
procedures for this study. First, two research assistants, one in the Gaza Strip and the 
second in the West Bank, distributed the survey instrument to public, private and non-
governmental organizations in different Palestinian areas targeting staff members 
working on different local governance issues. The process of distributing the survey to 
the staff members was coordinated and organized with the directors of each organization. 
The research assistants explained the goal and content of the survey to respondents 
through telephone, email messages, and at a few workshops where they tried to answer 
all questions related to the survey process. To ensure confidentiality, the survey 
instrument begins with an informed consent signed by the researcher and acknowledged 
the participants. The consent confirms that no foreseeable risks are associated with 
participation in this project and all responses will be kept confidential. Moreover, 
respondents were assured that no information would be shared, published, or included in 
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the dissertation that does not group all responses together making it impossible to trace 
any single response to an individual. The Institutional Research Review Board at 
Cleveland State University approved the survey instrument. The survey instrument is 
attached in Appendix B.   
 Across a 60-day period the research assistants received the completed 
questionnaires and then returned them through mail and email (by those who were 
comfortable transmitting responses in the format).  Most respondents chose a response 
method designed for this study that gave greater protection to confidentiality. After 
completing the questionnaire respondents sealed their surveys in an attached blank 
envelope and placed it in small collection device or “mail box” that was provided to each 
participating agency. Their placement of the instrument in a sealed envelope into the box 
provided additional protection of their identity, and it would have even been possible for 
individuals to put a blank survey instrument into the box. The research assistants sent the 
completed surveys to me via international mail. The use of these procedures also means 
that a research method for data collection in a hostile political environment was part of 
this dissertation. The concluding chapter contains observations regarding the efficacy of 
this data collection method. 
The challenges associated with collecting data in the West Bank and Gaza 
produces several limitations that must be considered in the use of the findings. First, not 
all of the respondents had an opportunity to meet with the research assistants and have 
answered their questions about the survey. As a result, different interpretations could 
have been made for some questions leading to unclear or invalid responses. Second, it is 
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also possible that the security protections taken might not have been seen as sufficient 
and some individuals may have preferred not to participate providing a bias in the 
responses received. These limitations must be considered when interpreting the results. 
However, the receipt of responses from more than 180 individuals received under less 
than ideal circumstances provides invaluable insights into the operation of local 
governments in present-day Palestine. 
7.3 Independent and Dependent Variables 
Respondents were asked a series of questions designed to capture what they as 
community leaders think of the efficiency and the effectiveness9 of the current local 
governance system and what ought to be done to create an indigenous local governance 
system that can meet citizens’ needs and expectations. These were the dependent 
variables in the analysis. The selection of the dependent variables in this descriptive study 
was guided by other studies of governance. The questionnaire was divided into six 
sections. First, the main dependent variable was respondents’ perception of the effect of 
each occupation on the development of local governance institutions in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. The importance of understanding respondents’ views of the effects of 
different occupations is underscored by the work of Amro (1991), Al-Nammura (1994), 
Al-Abadi (1995), Mary and Usama (1996), and Jarbawi (1996).    
                                                 
9 Efficiency is a productivity metrics meaning how fast the local governance system can do 
something. Effectiveness is a quality metrics meaning how good this system is at testing. 
Respondents were permitted to place their own measure of effectiveness given their appreciation 
of what is possible under the difficult situations within which local government institutions must 
function in the West Bank and Gaza. 
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The second set of questions deals with the role of the central and local 
governments in administering local budgets, elections, police services, and in the 
formation of new local councils.  The selection of these dependent variables was guided 
by the work of Tiebout (1956), McClure (1990), Oates (1990), Bahl (1992) and Jarbawi 
(1996). Third, professionalism plays a very important role in any local governance 
system. Mosher (1981), Adams (1994), Lynn (1996), and Stivers (2000) are among the 
scholars who have focused on the issues of the professionalism of local governments. 
Based on their work questions were included in the survey to address the level of 
professionalism in Palestinian local government.    
Fourth, political conditions assume an important role in the design of any local 
governance system. The impact of politics on administrative systems has been 
extensively debated (Stivers, 2000; Rohr, 2001, Holden 1996, Lynn, 1996; Adams, 1994; 
Mosher, 1981; Caiden, 1971; Waldo, 1948; and Goodnow, 1900). Their work guided the 
formation of questions related to political influences on administrative structures. Fifth, 
any local governance system is supported and protected by a legal system (Rohr, 2001). 
Therefore, respondents’ perceptions of the effectiveness of legal protections and 
oversight of administrators were also addressed.  Finally, the issue of citizen participation 
is widely discussed in the public administration literature (Thomas, 1995; Simpson, 1995; 
Stivers, 1999; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000, and Bingham, Nabatch and O’Leary, 2005). 
In the last section of the questionnaire respondents were asked about citizen participation 
in local government. 
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The independent variables were respondents’ age, education, sector of 
employment and participation in local elections. These independent variables were 
selected to understand if there were significant differences in perceptions regarding the 
impact of the occupations on the formation of local governments and the current state of 
local government operations in the West Bank and Gaza.   
The independent and dependent variables are enumerated in Table 7-1.  
Table 7-1 
No. Dimensions Dependent Variables Independent Variables
1. Occupations’ 
Influence 
Dimension 
How would you rate the historic influences of each of these governments on the 
institutions that exist today in Palestine? 
 
What would you say is the influence of the following countries on local 
government as it operates today in the West Bank? 
 
What would you say is the influence of the following countries on local 
governments and governance in the Gaza Strip? 
 
Do you believe any technical assistance provided anywhere in Palestine is 
impacting the development of local government and governance systems? 
1. Respondents’ age 
2. Education 
3. Sector of 
employment 
4. Participation in 
local elections 
2.  National 
Government 
& Local 
Government 
Dimension 
As countries emerge the relative power of the national government to local 
governments must be established.  In some systems a national government can 
dissolve local governments and in others, such an action is simply prohibited.  
Should Palestine implement a system where local governments can be dissolved by 
the national government?   
 
Some countries give the central government the authority to postpone local 
elections.  Is that an authority that should be granted to the Palestinian national 
government?   
 
Should the national government of Palestine have the authority to approve and 
reject a local government budget? 
 
Should the national government has the responsibility for local police services and 
safety or should that be left as much as possible to local governments?   
 
Should the national government be responsible for the administration of all 
elections or should local governments oversee their own elections in accordance to 
laws and regulations approved by the national government? 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: residents in a local area 
should have the right to vote on the formation of new local governments?   
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The criteria in voting for 
the election municipal council is dominated by political factors rather than socio-
economic ones? 
1. Respondents’ age 
2. Education 
3. Sector of 
employment 
4. Participation in 
local elections 
3. Professional 
Dimension 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The appointment of mayors 
of municipality and local councils are dominated by politics. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The mayors have the 
necessary academic qualifications and the professional experiences to run their 
local governance. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The Appointed mayors are 
competent and responsible in organizing the issues of the municipalities. 
1. Respondents’ age 
2. Education 
3. Sector of 
employment 
4. Participation in 
local elections 
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Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Staffing of local 
governance institutions is based on academic merit and professional experience. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Decentralization 
policy should be implemented in order to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the administrative system. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities have the 
necessary manpower and technical and professional capabilities to pursue the 
authorities and fulfill responsibilities. 
4. Politics 
Dimension 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Electing an independent, 
well-qualified candidate is better than electing politically affiliated, well-qualified 
candidate. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: To achieve real reform and 
efficient performance, politics relations must be reorganized and reframed with the 
administrative system. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The selection and the 
appointment of mayors of local governance are based on political affiliations only. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities adopt and 
apply transparency policy in running the administrative system. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Political factions’ 
struggle is one of the major impediments for municipalities to be influential and 
efficient. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Local governance has a 
strategic mechanism of combating corruption. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I think that PNA wants 
seriously to implement the reform policy. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: PNA is imposing a 
centralized policy to control and dominate the local governance institutions. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities should 
have specific authorities and autonomy from the centralized government. 
1. Respondents’ age 
2. Education 
3. Sector of 
employment 
4. Participation in 
local elections 
5. Legal 
Dimension 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The PNA’s Local 
Governance Law contributes largely toward achieving an efficient and 
effective performance of the administrative system. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Palestinian 
Legislative Council, the Palestinian Parliament, needs to take further laws and 
procedures to reinforce the transparency and the accountability policy in the 
local governance. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Role of Law is weak 
to implement any legislation or laws approved by the Palestinian Legislative 
Council. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The national 
government interferes and influences the judicial system. 
1. Respondents’ age 
2. Education 
3. Sector of 
employment 
4. Participation in 
local elections  
 
6. Citizenry 
Dimension 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities and local 
councils address the indigenous needs and wants of citizens. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Citizens voice is heard in 
policies and regulations adopted by local governance institutions. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Local governance 
institutions have strong and efficient performance in achieving prosperity for 
citizens. 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Local governance 
institutions have representation of civil society representatives. 
1. Respondents’ age 
2. Education 
3. Sector of 
employment 
4. Participation in 
local elections 
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The completed surveys were coded and the responses analyzed using the SPSS 
program. Most the analyses performed were descriptive and where appropriate chi-square 
tests of significance were used. To examine the relationship between two qualitative 
variables the chi-square test is often used. Pearson’s chi-square is used to assess two 
types of comparison: tests of goodness of fit and tests of independence. A test of 
goodness of fit establishes whether or not an observed frequency distribution differs from 
a theoretical distribution (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). A test of independence 
assesses whether paired observations on two variables, expressed in a contingency table, 
are independent of each other – for example, whether people from different regions differ 
in their views. A probability of .05 or less is commonly used to reject the null hypothesis 
that there were no differences in respondents’ perceptions. The alternate hypothesis is not 
rejected when the variables have an associated relationship (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 
2002). 
The chi-square tests assume random selection from a known universe. However, 
it is possible to use the chi-square test even when a sample has potential biases or 
limitations (Osterlind, 1983) similar to those discussed earlier in this chapter. Shadish, 
Cook, & Campbell (2002) argue that it is impossible for any social science researcher to 
create a sample without potential bias. Maier (1999: 33) adds that social science 
researchers will never have complete data and “it would be a mistake to throw up our 
hands and reject all research using demographic statistics just because no data are perfect. 
Instead, controversies imply a constant struggle to understand the world.” In this study, 
the respondents who participated can be seen as being somewhat randomly selected as 
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the researcher did not select anyone nor choose participants based on their positions, age, 
sex, employment sector, geographical location, or specialty.  
7.4 Data Presentation and Analysis 
A Profile of the Respondents: The distribution of the respondents’ age, 
educational attainments, and employment sector is identified in Table 7-2 and 
summarized statistically below.  
Table 7-2: Profile of Respondents (Independent Variables) 
Summary Statistics of Respondents’ Agee 
AGE  Frequency Percent
From 51 to 60 95 51.4 
50 or Younger 90 48.6 
 
Summary Statistics of Respondents’ Educational Attainment 
EDUCATION  Frequency Percent
College Degree 11 5.9 
Graduate Degree 
 
174 
 
94.1 
 
Summary Statistics of Participation in Local Elections
Participation  Frequency Percent
Yes 119 64.3 
No 66 35.7 
Summary Statistics of Respondents’ Sector of Employment 
EMPLOYMENT 
SECTOR 
Frequency Percent
Public 99 53.0 
Private 36 19.5 
NGOs 50 27.6 
 
N = 185 
Occupations’ Influence Dimension: As explained earlier, local government 
institutions in Palestine have evolved through periods when the Ottoman Empire, Great 
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Britain, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel controlled elements of the political, social, and 
economic life in the Palestinian territories. Respondents believed the previous 
occupations’ did influence the local governance system. Even though the view that the 
Ottoman Empire’s influence on the local governance system in Palestine was seen as 
somewhat small (41.1 percent said no influence and 58.9 percent indicated little 
influence) the respondents noted that Great Britain had somewhat greater influence on 
local governance through its military laws and rules that became the core of the laws of 
other successive occupation forces in Palestine (54.1 percent indicated some influence on 
the Palestinian local governance). Egypt and Jordan as well as Israel adopted some of the 
British laws and regulations. Table 7-3 summarizes the statistics of both the Ottoman and 
the British impact on the local governance system in Palestine. 
More than half of the respondents, 59.5 percent, indicated that the Egyptians had a 
strong influence on laws and the formation of local governments in Gaza and that is 
sustained by the observations that many Egyptian laws and rules are indeed part of the 
PNA structure (see Table 7-3). Similarly, 54.6 percent said that the Jordanians had a 
strong influence on the design of the local governance system in the West Bank (see 
Table 7-3). It is also true that several Jordanian laws and rules are still valid under the 
PNA in the West Bank. However, the most dominant influence comes from Israel’s 
occupation as all respondents reported that Israel’s military rules and regulations are still 
applicable especially in the West Bank even after the Oslo Accord Agreement (see Table 
7-3). On the other hand, such rules and laws are no longer functioning in Gaza especially 
after the Israeli withdrawal in 2005. 
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Table 7-3: The Ottoman, British, Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli Impact  
Impact Level 
on Local 
Governance 
Country’s Influence  
 Ottoman Empire British Mandate Egypt on Gaza Jordan on West Bank Israel on WB and G 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
None 76 41.1         
Little 109 58.9 85 45.9       
Some   100 54.1 75 40.5 84 45.4   
Strong     110 59.5 101 54.6 185 100.0 
Total 185 100.0 185 100.0 185 100.0 185 100.0 185 100.0 
The descriptive statistics in Table 7-3 indicate that the Israeli occupation has had 
(and continues to have) a substantial effect on local government institutions in the 
Palestinian territories. This strong influence should perhaps be anticipated since 
respondents are more familiar with and have daily interactions with the Israeli occupation 
and its impact. In addition, the PNA and Israel have not reached any political settlement 
and that in turn affects the different social and economic aspects of the Palestinian life in 
the West Bank particularly and Gaza Strip generally.  
There were no statistically significant differences in respondents’ views of the 
relative importance or impact of each of the occupations on the development of local 
government institutions by age, participation in local elections, education or employment 
(see Table 7-4).  
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Table 7-4: The Occupation Influence  
Occupation Influence 
Independent 
Variables 
Ottoman British Egyptian Jordanian Israeli 
Age 
 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
1.58 1.60 2.97 3.20 4.59 4.60 4.52 4.58 5.00 5.00 
Participation Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
1.58 1.61 3.13 3.00 4.61 4.58 4.52 4.59 5.00 5.00 
Education 1.55 Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad 
1.09 1.62 3.09 3.08 4.64 4.59 4.55 4.55 5.00 5.00 
Sector Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. 
1.56 1.72 1.60 3.10 3.22 2.94 4.54 4.72 4.61 4.56 4.64 4.45 5.00 5.00 5.00 
Note:  No differences significant at the (0.05) level or less.  
Expatriates’ Impact on the Gaza Strip: The formation of local governments in 
some countries has sometimes been influenced by the experiences of residents who might 
have lived elsewhere. One-third of the respondents (33 percent) stated that expatriates 
who lived in Tunisia have had some influence on the current local governance system in 
Gaza. The majority of the Palestinian leaders lived for more than 12 years in Tunisia 
(Jarbawi, 1996) after being expelled from Lebanon (see Table 7-5). These leaders had 
military backgrounds in the Diaspora and their military rule (and philosophies) had a 
substantial impact on governing styles as demonstrated in Chapter VI.  
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Table 7-5: The Impact of Expatriates Who Lived In Tunisia, Egypt, and UK on 
Local Government Systems in Gaza 
Impact Level on 
Gaza Strip 
Impact of Expatriates’ Countries 
 Tunisia UK Egypt 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
None 44 23.7     
Little 80 43.2 54 29.2 4 2.2 
Some 61 33.0 119 64.3 112 60.5 
Strong   12 6.5 69 37.3 
Total 185 100.0 185 100.0 185 100.0 
Note: Groupings based on the countries from which expatriates had a significant impact. 
However, the expatriates who lived in the UK were viewed as having a clear 
influence on the current local governance system in Gaza as almost two-thirds (64 
percent) of the respondents indicated that the expatriates from the UK had some influence 
on the current local governance there and 6 percent reported that they had a strong 
influence (see Table 7-5). It is worth mentioning that the many Palestinian leaders who 
returned to Palestine received their education in the Arab countries and the UK (Jarbawi, 
1996). On the other hand, 60 percent of the respondents indicated that the expatriates who 
lived in Egypt had some influence and a smaller proportion (37 percent) noted that these 
expatriates had a strong influence on the current local governance in Gaza (see Table 7-
5). This shows that the expatriates who lived in Egypt have also had an impact on the 
development of local governance system in Gaza. 
Table 7-6 shows that the proportion of respondents regarding the current 
influence of the expatriates, who lived in other western countries - the USA and France - 
and other Arab countries including Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, on the local governance 
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system in Gaza is minimal. There were also no statistically significant differences in 
respondents’ views of the relative importance or impact of the expatriates’ countries on 
the development of the Gazan local government institutions by age, participation in local 
elections, education or employment. 
Table 7-6: The Impact of Expatriates of Lebanon, Syria, USA, France, and Jordan 
on Gaza 
Impact 
Level on 
Gaza 
Impact of Expatriates’ Countries 
 Jordan Syria USA France Lebanon 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
None 102 55.1 168 90.8 173 93.5 184 99.5 169 91.4 
Little 82 44.3 13 7.0 11 5.9   8 4.3 
Unsure   4 2.2 1 .5 1 .5 8 4.3 
Total 184 
Missing 1 
99.5 
.5 
185 100.0 185 100.0 185 100.0 185 100.0 
Independent 
Variables 
Impact of Expatriates’ Countries 
 Jordan Syria USA France Lebanon 
Age 
 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
1.39 1.51 1.12 1.11 1.07 1.07 1.02 1.00 1.12 1.14 
Participation Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
1.58 1.61 1.15 1.05 1.06 1.09 1.02 1.00 1.13 1.14 
Education Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad 
1.09 1.62 1.00 1.12 1.00 1.07 1.00 1.01 1.27 1.12 
Sector Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. 
1.47 1.42 1.42 1.13 1.08 1.10 1.05 1.03 1.14 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.03 1.25 
Note: Groupings based on the countries from which expatriates had a limited impact. 
Expatriates’ Impact on the West Bank:  Almost a majority of the respondents, 
46.5 percent, believed expatriates who had lived in Tunisia had influenced the current 
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local governance while 37 percent reported that these expatriates had only some influence 
(See Table 7-7). Therefore, 83.5 percent of the respondents see expatriates from Tunisia 
having an important impact on the shape of local governance in the West Bank while 
their influence in Gaza is seen as far less. This might be attributed to the fact that the 
majority of the Tunisian expatriates chose to relocate and live in the West Bank (World 
Bank, 2006). Almost three-quarters of the respondents (71.9 percent) reported that the 
expatriates from the UK had some influence on the current local governance in the West 
Bank (see Table 7-7). 
Table 7-7: The Impact of the Expatriates of Tunisia and UK on the West Bank 
Impact Level on West Bank Impact of Expatriates’ Countries 
 Tunisia UK 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
None 19 10.3   
Little 86 46.5 51 27.6 
Unsure 11 5.9 1 .5 
Some 69 37.3 133 71.9 
Total 185 100.0 185 100.0 
     Note: Groupings based on the countries from which expatriates had a significant impact. 
Respondents believed that expatriates from the USA and France and the other 
Arab countries of Lebanon and Syria had a limited impact on the local governance 
system in the West Bank (see Table 7-8). In addition, the table indicates that there were 
no statistically significant differences in respondents’ views of the relative importance or 
impact of the expatriates’ countries on the development of the West Bank local 
government institutions by age, participation in local elections, education or employment. 
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Table 7-8: The Impact of Expatriates from Lebanon, Syria, USA, and France on 
Local Government Systems in the West Bank 
Impact Level 
on West 
Bank 
Impact of Expatriates’ Countries 
 Lebanon Syria USA France 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
None 147 79.5 150 81.1 166 89.7 179 96.8 
Little 28 15.1 14 7.6 16 8.6 6 3.2 
Unsure 10 5.4 21 11.4 3 1.6 0 0 
Total 185 100.0 185 100.0 185 100.0 185 100.0 
Independent 
Variables 
Impact of Country on West Bank 
 Lebanon Syria USA France 
Age 
 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or Younger 
 1.23 1.29 1.29 1.31 1.11 1.13 1.02 1.04 
Participation Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
 1.24 1.29 1.34 1.23 1.12 1.12 1.03 1.03 
Education Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad 
 1.18 1.26 1.36 1.30 1.09 1.12 1.09 1.03 
Sector Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pr. NP. Pu. 
 1.29 1.19 1.25 1.24 1.42 1.33 1.11 1.11 1.14 1.06 1.00 1.00 
Note: Groupings based on the countries from which expatriates had a limited impact. 
However, two-thirds of the respondents (67 percent) noted that the expatriates 
who lived in Jordan greatly influenced current laws and regulations and more than a 
quarter (27 percent) indicated that they had some influence (see Table 7-9). It is obvious 
that expatriates who lived in Jordan are seen as assuming a vital role in shaping the local 
governance system in the West Bank. On the other hand, those who had lived in Egypt 
are seen as having had a less substantial impact. One in five respondents, 21 percent, 
believed that the expatriates of Egypt had a strong influence on the local governance 
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issues in the West Bank. There were no statistically significant differences in 
respondents’ views of the relative importance or impact of the expatriates’ countries on 
the development of the West Bank local government institutions by age, participation in 
local elections, education or employment. 
Table 7-9: The Impact of Jordan and Egypt on the West Bank 
Impact Level on 
West Bank 
Impact of Expatriates’ Countries 
 Jordan Egypt 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Little 8 4.3 54 29.2 
Some 51 27.6 91 49.2 
Strong 125 67.6 40 21.6 
Total Missing 
1 
185 
.5 
100.0 
185 
 
100.0 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Impact of Expatriates’ Countries 
 Jordan Egypt 
Age 
 
51 to 60 50 or Younger 51 to 60 50 or Younger 
4.99 4.62 3.89 3.89 
Participation Yes No Yes No 
4.97 4.53 3.89 3.39 
Education Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad 
4.55 4.83 2.82 3.68 
Sector 
Sector 
Public Private NPOs Public Private NPOs 
4.63 4.53 5.35 3.67 3.50 3.55 
Note: Groupings based countries from which expatriates had a significant impact. 
Influence of Technical Assistance: Technical assistance provided by different 
foreign governments can also help form local governance systems and institutions. The 
US provides the most support for technical assistance and has had the largest effect on 
the establishment of a modern local governance system. More than two-thirds of the 
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respondents, 66 percent, reported their sense of the US’s influence (see Table 7-10). The 
United State Agency for International Development (USAID) has been active in 
implementing many local governance projects in the Palestinian territories since 1994. In 
addition, many municipal working procedures were imported from the US through a 
series of short-term projects involving local governance, partnerships between the public 
sector and businesses, the support provided to enable free elections, town hall meetings 
discussing urban developmental plans, and other governance matters (World Bank, 
2006).  
Table (7-10) indicates that Japan and the United Nations (UN) are seen by 
respondents as having some influence on the reform of the local governance system in 
Palestine through their different projects. The UN has a permanent development program 
(UNDP) in the West Bank and Gaza and the Japanese government has a mission called 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) that coordinates the assistance issues for 
the Palestinians in different fields (World Bank, 2006). In addition, that data in Table 7-
10 illustrates that there were no statistically significant differences in respondents’ views 
of the relative importance or impact of the countries’ technical assistance on the 
development of the Palestinian local government institutions by age, participation in local 
elections, education or employment. Tables 7-11 shows that the majority of respondents 
believed the technical assistance provided by the UK, France, Germany, other European 
and Asian countries is somewhat limited in its impact.  
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Table 7-10: The Impact of UN’s, USA’s and Japan’s Technical Assistance 
Impact of 
Technical 
Assistance 
Entity’s Technical Assistance  
 UN USA Japan 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
None 24 13.0 24 13.0 37 20.0 
Little 67 36.2 37 20.0 45 24.3 
Unsure   1 .5 1 .5 
Some 94 50.8 123 66.5 102 55.1 
Total 185 100.0 185 100.0 185 100.0 
Independent 
Variables 
Entity’s Technical Assistance 
 UN USA Japan 
Age 
 
51 to 60 50 or Younger 51 to 60 50 or Younger 51 to 60 50 or Younger 
 2.86 2.92 3.34 3.07 2.90 2.90 
Participation Yes No Yes No Yes No 
 2.86 2.94 3.21 3.20 2.86 3.00 
Education Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad 
 3.27 2.86 3.82 3.17 3.82 2.85 
Sector Public Private NPOs Public Private NPOs Public Private NPOs 
 2.96 2.81 2.80 3.24 3.25 3.10 3.02 2.81 2.76 
Table 7-11: The Impact of British, French, German, other European and 
Asian Technical Assistance 
Impact of 
Technical 
Assistance 
Country 
 UK France Germany Other European 
Countries 
Other Asian 
Countries 
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
None 158 85.4 162 87.6 68 36.8 166 89.7 176 95.1 
Little 27 14.6 20 10.8 106 57.3 17 9.2 6 3.2 
Unsure   3 1.6   2 1.1 3 1.6 
Some     11 5.9     
Total 185 100.0 185 100.0 185 100.0 185 100.0 185 100.0 
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Influence of Local Culture: The institutions of local governments are also 
influenced by the local culture of residents.  One-quarter of the respondents noted that 
local culture has had some impact while 70 percent stated it has not much of an impact.  
National Government and Local Government Dimension: As countries 
emerge the relative power of the national government and its local governments must be 
established. In some unitary systems a national government can dissolve local 
governments and in others, such an action is simply prohibited. Should Palestine 
implement a system where local governments can be dissolved by the national 
government?  Almost two-thirds of the respondents (61 percent) indicated that laws 
must prohibit the national government from dissolving local governments.  
Some countries give the central government the authority to postpone local 
elections.  Slightly more than one-fifth of the respondents, 22 percent, believed the 
national government should have this sort of authority. Almost two-thirds, 63 percent, 
believed the national government must not have the power to postpone local elections. 
The PNA had postponed local elections several times in many cities and villages. In 
addition, a clear majority of respondents, 59 percent, indicated that the national 
government should not be given the right to approve or deny any local government 
budget. However, almost two-fifths (38 percent) indicated that the national government 
should be responsible for the administration of all elections in accordance with approved 
laws and regulations. 
A majority of the respondents (52 percent) indicated that local government should 
be responsible for local police services and safety rather than the national government. 
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Such support might be attributed to the concerns that the police are too focused on the 
political interests of certain political factions (World Bank, 2006). A majority of 
respondents also believed that local residents must have, in a local area, the right to vote 
on the formation of new local governments. However, there is a high response proportion 
of (54 percent) that the criteria of electing municipal councils are dominated by political 
factors on the account of socio-economic ones. Table 7-12 also illustrates that there were 
no statistically significant differences in respondents’ views of the role of the central 
government and local ones in the development and the administration of the Palestinian 
local government institutions by age, participation in local elections, education or 
employment. 
Table 7-12: Central Verses Local Governments 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
 Central government 
Dissolves local ones 
Central government 
postpones local elections 
Central government rejects 
local budgets 
Central government 
administers local police 
Central government 
administers local 
elections 
Age 
 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
1.13 1.24 1.14 1.20 1.19 1.14 2.23 2.19 2.18 2.17 
Participation Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
1.17 1.21 1.18 1.15 1.20 1.11 2.22 2.20 2.21 2.11 
Education 1.55 Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad 
1.36 1.17 1.00 1.18 1.09 1.17 2.09 2.22 1.91 2.19 
Sector Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. 
1.19 1.17 1.18 1.15 1.11 1.24 1.13 1.14 1.25 2.20 2.31 2.16 2.16 2.11 2.24 
Professional Dimension: More than a majority of the respondents, 59 percent, 
reported that the appointment of municipal and local council mayors is dominated by 
politics rather than the potential and professional qualities of candidates. More than a 
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third of the respondents (38 percent) believed that mayors do not have the needed 
qualifications and professional experiences to run local governments. The issue of 
accountability has been raised in the Palestinian society since the establishment of the 
PNA in 1994. Many international governments and entities including the World Bank 
and the reports of the UN organizations raised many questions about the transparency and 
the accountability mechanism that has been applied by the PNA. Almost a majority of the 
respondents (48 percent) disagreed with the statement that the appointed mayors are 
competent. 
The results indicate that respondents believe that the staffing of the public sector 
is based on favoritism. More than two-thirds of the respondents (68 percent) noted that 
the staffing of local government institutions is not based on academic merit or 
professional experience. The suggestion that a more decentralized policy and approach 
should be implemented to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the administrative 
system was supported by 61 percent of the respondents. A majority (52 percent) indicated 
that municipalities do not have the necessary manpower and technical and professional 
capabilities to fulfill their responsibilities. Table 7-13 shows that there were no 
statistically significant differences in respondents’ views of the professional role in the 
development of the Palestinian local government institutions by age, participation in local 
elections, education or employment. 
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Table 7-13: Professional Dimension 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
 The mayors’ appointment 
are dominated by politics 
Mayors have necessary 
qualifications and 
experiences 
Mayors are competent and 
responsible for their 
performance 
Local staffing is based on 
academic and 
professional experience 
Municipalities have the 
necessary technical and 
professional manpower 
Age 
 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 2.84 2.22 2.21 2.11 2.19 2.08 2.10 2.08 2.06 
Participation Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
2.80 2.86 2.21 2.23 2.15 2.14 2.08 2.12 2.09 2.03 
Education Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad 
2.91 2.82 2.09 2.22 2.09 2.15 2.00 2.10 2.00 2.07 
Sector Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. 
2.81 2.86 2.82 2.20 2.25 2.22 2.15 2.14 2.14 2.10 2.06 2.10 2.08 2.03 2.08 
Politics Dimension: The assumption of electing an independent, well-qualified 
candidate is better than electing politically affiliated, well-qualified candidate was 
supported by (53 percent) response proportion. The results indicate that a majority of 
respondents (72 percent) believed that to achieve real reform and efficient performance 
politics relations must be reorganized and reframed with the administrative system. This 
is because the selection and the appointment of mayors of local governance are based on 
political affiliations according to almost three-quarters of the respondents (73 percent). 
Almost four-fifths of the respondents (78 percent) indicated the struggle between the 
political factions is one of the major impediments to the creation of efficient 
municipalities. To know the relationship between the variable of voting for electing 
municipal local councils and the variable of politics’ role, it seems that there is a high 
internal consistency of responses (84.9 percent). 
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Almost three-quarters of the respondents, 72 percent, do not believe that local 
governments throughout Palestine have a mechanism in-place to reduce corruption. A 
majority of respondents (63 percent) agreed that the PNA wants to implement policy 
reforms. Almost than two-thirds, 62 percent, believe the PNA is imposing centralization 
policies to control and dominate local governments. To counter this policy bias a large 
proportion of respondents support the creation of specific authorities and the granting of 
autonomy to local governments (72 percent). Table 7-14 shows that there were no 
statistically significant differences in respondents’ views of the role of politics and its 
impact on the development of the Palestinian local government institutions by age, 
participation in local elections, education or employment. 
Table 7-14: Politics Dimension 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
 Politics relations must be 
reorganized with 
administrative system 
Mayors’ selection is 
based on political 
affiliation 
Municipalities apply 
transparency policy 
Political factions’ struggle 
is one of the major 
impediments for 
municipalities 
Central Government 
imposes a centralized 
policy to dominate local 
governments 
Age 
 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
2.94 2.98 2.87 2.79 2.13 2.08 2.97 2.97 2.91 2.92 
Participation Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
2.96 2.95 2.81 2.88 2.10 2.11 2.97 2.97 2.92 2.89 
Education Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad 
3.00 2.95 2.82 2.83 2.18 2.10 3.00 2.97 2.91 2.91 
Sector Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. 
2.96 2.89 3.00 2.82 2.94 2.78 2.09 2.17 2.08 2.96 2.97 2.98 2.92 2.89 2.92 
Legal Dimension: A majority of the respondents (58 percent) believed that the 
PNA’s Local Governance Law has not contributed to the development of an efficient and 
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effective administrative system. All issues were decided and judged by the MoLG in 
coordination with the national government. More than two-third of respondents (73 
percent) responded that the Palestinian Legislative Council (the Palestinian Parliament) 
needs to pass and enforce additional laws and procedures to reinforce the transparency 
and the accountability policy in the local governance.  
However, this cannot resolve all the problems of the local governance because the 
majority of respondents (67 percent) believe that role of law is weak and the legal system 
cannot implement any legislation or laws approved by the Palestinian Legislative 
Council. A response proportion of 66 percent believed that the national government 
interferes and influences the performance and the functions of the judicial system.  
Table 7-15 shows that there were no statistically significant differences in 
respondents’ views of the role of law and its impact on the development of the 
Palestinian local government institutions by age, participation in local elections, 
education or employment.  
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Table 7-15: Legal Dimension 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
 Governance law 
contributes largely toward 
efficient and effective 
administrative 
performance 
Parliament needs to take 
further laws to reinforce 
transparency and 
accountability in local 
governments 
Role of law is weak to 
implement any laws 
approved by the parliament 
National government 
interferes and influences 
judicial system 
Age 
 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
2.15 2.12 2.95 2.96 2.95 2.92 2.94 2.91 
Participation Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
2.14 2.12 2.95 2.95 2.92 2.95 2.92 2.92 
Education Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad 
2.00 2.14 3.00 2.95 2.82 2.94 2.91 2.93 
Sector Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. 
2.16 2.11 2.10 2.94 2.92 3.00 2.89 2.97 3.00 2.94 2.92 2.90 
Citizen Participation: More than three-quarters of the respondents (77 
percent) believed that municipalities and local councils do not address the indigenous 
needs of citizens. Moreover, two-thirds reported (66 percent) that citizens have no 
real voice in the policy development process or in the formulation of regulations 
adopted by local governance institutions. Two-thirds also indicated (67 percent) that 
local governance institutions do not perform well in trying to achieve prosperity for 
citizens. Less than half of respondents (45 percent) indicated that local governance 
institutions have representation of civil society. Table 7-16 shows that there were no 
statistically significant differences in respondents’ views of the citizen participation 
and its impact on the development of the Palestinian local government institutions by 
age, participation in local elections, education or employment. 
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Table 7-16: Citizenry Dimension 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
 Municipalities address the 
indigenous needs of 
citizens 
Citizens’ voice is heard in 
policies and regulations 
adopted by local 
governments 
Local governments have 
strong and efficient 
performance in achieving 
prosperity for citizens 
Local governments have 
representations of civil 
society representatives 
Age 
 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
51 to 60 50 or 
Younger 
2.15 2.07 2.14 2.08 2.15 2.16 2.13 2.10 
Participation Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
2.30 2.35 2.95 2.90 2.954 2.47 2.32 2.24 
Education Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad Undergrad Grad 
2.09 2.11 2.09 2.11 2.09 2.16 2.09 2.11 
Sector Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. Pu. Pr. NP. 
2.14 2.11 2.04 2.11 2.14 2.08 2.21 2.14 2.04 2.07 2.14 2.18 
Summary and Conclusions: 
Local government institutions in Palestine have evolved through periods when the 
Ottoman Empire, Great Britain, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel controlled elements of the 
political, social, and economic life in the Palestinian territories. The respondents noted 
that Great Britain had somewhat greater influence on local governance through its 
military laws and rules that became the core of the laws of other successive occupation 
forces in Palestine. Egypt and Jordan as well as Israel adopted some of the British laws 
and regulations. However, the most dominant influence comes from Israel’s occupation 
as all respondents reported that Israel’s military rules and regulations are still applicable 
especially in the West Bank even after the Oslo Accord Agreement between the PNA and 
Israel.  
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The respondents agreed on the fact that the leading expatriates from Tunisia, 
Jordan, Egypt and UK played an influential role on shaping the local governance system 
in the West Bank and Gaza. On the other hand, the technical assistance provided by the 
US, Japan, and the UN has had the largest effect on the establishment of a modern local 
governance system.  
The majority of survey respondents agreed on the need of reorganizing the 
relations between the central government and local ones emphasizing on giving more 
specific authorities and autonomy to local governments and adopting more decentralized 
policies in order to achieve more efficient services. To achieve real reform and efficient 
performance respondents indicated that politics relations must be reorganized and 
reframed within the administrative system to promote accountability and transparency 
and to combat corruption and favoritism in the public sector. Moreover, with the 
assistance of the legislative system the survey respondents believe that the legal system 
must be reinforced to protect and supervise the performance of the local governments. 
Finally, the attitudes of respondents believe that such procedures and steps can contribute 
towards addressing the indigenous needs, wants, and voices of citizens. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
The formation of local government institutions for an emerging state of Palestine 
must recognize that for several hundred years structures of government and governance 
have been imposed by occupying empires and states. To assist the emerging Palestinian 
state in the process of building institutions with the potential to meet indigenous needs 
and fit within the actual culture this dissertation sought to address three separate but 
related research questions: 
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(1) How have non-indigenous local government institutions in Palestine interfered 
with the political maturation of administrative systems? 
(2) What differences, if any, in changes imposed on Palestine’s institutions are 
related to the two periods of civilian-imposed external systems (Ottoman 
Empire and Jordanian/Egyptian rule) and the military occupation rules (the 
British Mandate period and the Israeli occupation)? 
(3) How has the PNA’s politics shaped and formulated local government systems 
to serve limited political factions’ interests ignoring the establishment of 
indigenous local government institutions? 
In developing answers to each of these questions the work was firmly rooted in 
the classical literature of public administration and governance that has guided the 
development of local government and administrative systems in emerging nations. 
Careful consideration was also been directed towards the issue of changing institutions 
from a reliance on clan-based patronage systems – a prominent characteristic of 
Palestinian society – to meritocracies. The study also discussed how Palestinian local 
governments were initially designed to be politically affiliated and familial-based systems 
to support the interests of occupying powers. Their transformation to institutions that rely 
on professions and principles of modern public administration was also addressed. The 
study examined and assessed the impact of the successive occupying powers on the 
structures and institutions of local government systems beginning with the Ottoman 
Empire and then continuing through the British mandate, the period of conjoint 
Egyptian/Jordanian Administration of the two parts of Palestine, and then Israel’s 
military occupation of Gaza and the West Bank.  
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In addition, the study assessed the historical development of local governance 
since the establishment of the PNA. This part of the history describes how the new local 
governance system deals with political factions, an inevitable task in all emerging states, 
and the effects and the experiences of Palestine’s diaspora on the evolution of local 
government systems. When the PNA was created numerous leaders returned from long 
periods of exile in other Middle Eastern and Western states. They brought with them 
ideas and influences, and these were then grafted into the structures that had devolved 
under occupation. Finally, the results of a survey of Palestinian leaders from the public, 
private, and nonprofit sectors are presented to more fully appreciate the realities of the 
current local governance systems at work under the PNA’s leadership.  
The review of the historical assessment of the Palestinian administrative system 
and the analysis of the survey results assisted in answering the research questions and in 
framing the recommendations based on theory and practice. In addition, the historical 
assessment and the survey analysis insured that what was proposed is rooted in what has 
developed and can be strengthened while also illustrating what changes are required and 
what structures may need to be completed altered. 
8.2 Historical Assessment 
The historical assessment of the creation of local governance institutions by 
various occupying forces demonstrated that the existing local government system evolved 
with substantial effects or contributions from the Ottoman Empire, the British Mandate, 
Egyptian/Jordanian Administration, and the Israeli military occupation. The existing 
operating systems are rife with non-indigenous roots and seek to centralize authority and 
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minimize local control. An objective of the successive central authorities of these 
occupations was to constrain the development of local governance and to local institutions 
organic extensions of their central authority. The goal of these systems was to control 
residents and insure support for the occupying forces as opposed to development of the 
region or expanding the civil rights and opportunities for local residents. The indigenous 
people were forced to adapt to and live within a foreign context of legal, economic, 
political and social systems designed to constrain development and rights. Their own 
language was relegated to an unofficial status. Thus the PNA inherited a multi-dimensional 
and complicated local governance system consisting of laws and legislation of the frequent 
occupying powers that did not reflect the indigenous needs and rights of the people on the 
ground. It is not evident, however, that the PNA is dissatisfied with a high level of central 
control. There is also evidence to suggest that for the short run future, at least, plans to 
decentralize authority are not a priority. 
It is quite evident that the various occupying powers maintained policies and 
practices to further their political self-interests and that focused on (1) centralized control 
and (2) the suppression of local initiative, development, and identity. The first of the major 
laws to define local governance in Palestine was the Ottoman Empire’s 1877 
Municipalities Law. Under this law cities and towns in Palestine were given limited 
authority to oversee local construction, urban planning, commercial markets, public health, 
education, and land use through different regional governmental bureaus headed by 
Ottoman officials. At one level then it appeared that powers were decentralized but in 
reality that occupation was articulated by the power vested in the officials chosen by the 
Ottoman Empire. Local governance took place only to the point that it agreed with the 
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views of the Ottoman Empire’s representative and fulfilled the Empire’s objectives and 
needs. Individual action or initiative was not permitted.   
The Ottoman regime drafted all laws, rules and regulations in Istanbul and 
maintained their existing administrative divisions for decades. This concentrated regional 
authority in areas outside of Palestine. The Ottoman Empire considered Palestine as a part 
of the Islamic state and imposed on it the same policies followed in other occupied 
countries (Amro, 1991). The Ottoman laws created a centralized government that 
negatively influenced local Palestinian autonomy. The governance system implemented 
was designed to insure that influential and wealthy families who supported the Empire had 
formal control and the ability to suppress any ideas, policies, or practices that contradicted 
the preferences of the Ottoman Empire (Maoz, 1984). Only people approved by the 
Empire’s authorities could hold municipal government positions and leaders were required 
to speak Turkish and hold citizenship in the Empire. If these requirements were not 
sufficient to insure that acceptable people were selected to lead the cities, the Ottoman 
government could interfere in the appointment of any individual through the chairman of 
the municipality (Al-Nammura, 1994). 
The British also viewed local governments as tools to advance the goals of their 
occupation and to maintain security. The 1921 Law of Local Councils gave the British 
High Commissioner the authority to change the administration of any large village or the 
membership and operations of any local council. The law also specified the form of the 
council, its functions, and authorities. The British High Commissioner had the authority to 
create a local council in any suburb of a city or to dismiss one that had been previously 
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created (Articles 1-20 of the law). When local elections were held in the major cities the 
voting was so restricted that only six percent of the indigenous inhabitants of municipalities 
actually voted (Maoz, 1984). Because of continuing Palestinian-Jewish conflict the British 
were not able to reform the local governance system. Based on the security situation the 
British cancelled elections in 1930 and it was not until four years later, following the 
passage of the Municipal Corporations Law that elections for mayors and municipal 
councils were held.  
Reinforcing the centralization of authority, the British relied upon the municipal 
councils established by the Ottoman Empire through rules established and detailed in the 
Mandate’s 1930 Local Municipalities Law. Paving the way for establishing a national 
homeland for the Jews in Palestine, the British actually implemented and managed two 
different local governance policies, one for the Jewish residents and the other for 
Palestine’s Muslims and Christians (Amro, 1991). As a result the Palestinian administrative 
councils were not able to implement policies and practices that were needed by residents 
unless those also served the interests of the British forces and were approved by them 
(Jarbawi, 1996).  
Moreover, the 1934 Law did not provide a strong legal foundation for the 
advancement of local rule in Palestine but primarily served British interests rather than 
those of the indigenous population (Asuf, 1985). The British High commissioner gave the 
military commander the authority to appoint and dismiss both the mayor and the deputy-
mayor of any of the municipal councils. The high commissioner could similarly dismiss a 
council, call for elections, approve bylaws or reject them, impose sanctions, and disapprove 
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of financial transactions (Asuf, 1985). In a 1938 supplement to the Ordinance of 1934, the 
High Commissioner was granted the authority to appoint “any person” to fill a council 
vacancy without any participation of an indigenous official or body. The high 
commissioner’s will was both encompassing and absolute. In addition, there was no legal 
way to appeal decisions and the only limits to the wide-ranging administrative prerogatives 
lied with the British authorities in London (Peretz, 1986).  
The majority of the public officers were British and they all aspects of local 
administration, the legal system, the police, public works, the railways, the secretariat, 
government printing, social welfare, surveys, and city planning. This implied that the 
policies, decisions, rules and regulations were dominated by British views rather than the 
views and hopes of the Palestinian people. Local administrative units suffered from internal 
divisions between Jews and Arabs, the British and the Palestinians, and the British and the 
Jews. There was also a general lack of public participation and periodic violent 
confrontations between Jews and Arabs (Peretz, 1986). Consequently, with this weak 
foundation for autonomous local action and a narrow electoral base, any potential to form a 
government characterized by professional public administration and a representative 
government was very limited during the years of the British Mandate. 
The British laws remained in control until 1948 when the State of Israel was 
established.  After the war between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries Jordan 
annexed the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip was annexed by 
Egypt. Between 1948 and 1967 the Egyptian administration maintained the British mandate 
laws and regulations without any important changes or amendments (Jarbawi, 1996). The 
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Egyptian administration appointed municipal committees and councils in an effort to 
control the activities and missions of local government in the Gaza Strip. Thus, councils 
operated under strict and tight control by Egypt’s central authorities. In the case of 
changing or imposing any amendments, an Egyptian legislator, not a Palestinian, was the 
final decision maker (Jarbawi, 1996).  
Jordan had authority for the West Bank from 1948 until 1967. Laws passed in 
1951 and 1952 stated that all the articles from the British law of 1934 law would be 
changed to comply with laws and statutes of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, its 
Cabinet, the Interior Minister, and the regional governor. The Jordanian laws were 
designed to extend their dominance of the political, social, and economic aspects of life in 
the West Bank (Al-Nammura, 1994). In time an indigenous movement for self-governance 
arose, and activities of the municipal and village councils were affected by the competitive 
struggle between Jordan and the PLO.  
Jordan’s Minister of the Interior controlled all procedures for the election of local 
officials and local autonomy was severely limited. That minister was also given the 
authority to establish or cancel any municipal body, to change the boundaries of the 
municipal areas (Articles 2-5, 1952 Law), to determine the number of the municipal 
council members through the approval of the Cabinet, to determine the dates of municipal 
elections (Article 58), to divide any municipal area to elective constituencies (Article 12), 
and to define regulations concerning the methods of nomination and election (Article 20). 
All municipal budgets were also under the supervision and administration of the Interior 
Minister (Articles 70-71), and the municipal councils were not allowed to make any 
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payments unless part of a previously approved budget (Article 61). Moreover, governors 
and rulers, under the 1957 Law of Administrative Divisions, were given the power to 
control and supervise all municipal affairs in the West Bank. 
The second military occupation after the British Mandate began during the Israeli 
era with its efforts to dominate the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Following the 1967 war with 
Jordan and Egypt, Israel occupied the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and reinforced 
existing laws unless they conflicted with military procedures and needs. The occupying 
authorities amended their laws and regulation to meet their own self-interest, rather than 
the interests of the Palestinian people (Jarbawi, 1996). The military orders were designed to 
control local governance and to dominate and control planning, land use, and economic 
development.  
Israel sought to reinforce its dominance in the occupied territories through 
municipal elections that sought local Palestinians who would have some loyalty to Israel. 
Israel’s goal was to supplant the PLO that was interested in securing its role as a 
government-in-exile and the sole representatives of the Palestinian people (Jarbawi, 1996). 
The Israeli military authority did not help in the financial affairs of any of the Palestinian 
administrative units. This prompted many Palestinian mayors to seek assistance from Arab 
countries (Gazit, 2003). No urban and economic infrastructure was established in the West 
Bank and Gaza under the Israeli occupation so that Palestinians could not have any real 
level of economic independence from Israel. Israeli military orders remained in force until 
the 1994 Oslo Agreement. On November 20th, 1994, the former President Yasser Arafat 
issued the Presidential Decision No. 1, which confirmed that the rules, regulations, and 
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orders in place in June 1967 would remain valid until further amendments or changes could 
be considered and implemented (Amro, 1991). 
Each of the occupying regimes focused on control of cities and local government 
institutions largely because those institutions were the bridges that could be used to 
penetrate all communities (Jarbawi, 1996). Central governments controlled and dominated 
local institutions through appointments of loyalists and the review of all local initiatives, 
decisions, or programs. Mary Rock (1996) argued that through imposed or amended laws 
the external authorities consolidated their domination over local government institutions 
while also ignoring calls for more local representation of indigenous citizens. For example, 
local governments were allowed limited authority to provide some services including 
public education (but the curriculum had to be centrally approved) and public health. Local 
institutions did not enjoy any substantial autonomy or an independence from the central 
authorities with regard to their mission, objectives, activities and rigorous representation of 
citizens. Local institutions and their leaders were not permitted to engage in local economic 
development efforts (Jarbawi, 1996). 
The Oslo Accords actually permitted Palestinian local governments to exist for 
the first time. This created an opportunity to initiate a process that would lead to the 
development of indigenous institutions. Yet, the material reviewed suggests that the 
political appointees of governors and general managers by the PNA were based on their 
political affiliations and family connections. The PNA tried to centralize power and 
insure loyalty to one particular party.  Those goals were more important than the 
appointment of people based on their professional skills, bureaucratic experience, and 
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8.3 Analysis of Survey Results 
Respondents noted that Great Britain had a somewhat greater influence (than the 
Ottoman Empire) on the current structures of local governance. Egypt and Jordan as well 
as Israel adopted some of the British laws and regulations. However, the most dominant 
influence has come from Israel’s military occupation, a function of its longevity and the 
responses to attacks that have led to domination of decision making and the review of all 
policies and practices.  
The respondents indicated that expatriates from Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt and UK 
played an influential role in efforts to reform local governance system in the West Bank 
and Gaza. Expatriates affiliated with Fatah have had a pronounced impact on the design 
and operations of local governments for many years through its domination and control 
on the PNA. Fatah’s leaders were determined to place into positions of leadership only 
individuals loyal to the party and to Yasser Arafat (Work team, 1999). As a result Fatah 
members dominated the entire administrative apparatus of the PNA including the PLO, 
the Palestinian Legislative Council (Parliament), Palestinian security bodies, and the 
general public administrative system. With political control the key factor driving 
appointments, the best individuals were not always chosen for some positions. With its 
members firmly in control the PNA centralized all administrative and political power in 
the hands of its ministers, ministry senior employees, governors of governorates/districts, 
and mayors. For example, many of the individuals selected as local governors in 
Palestine had had military careers or were returning members of the Palestinian diaspora 
who were loyal Fatah members.  
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On the other hand, the technical assistance provided by the US, Japan, and the UN 
has had the largest effect on efforts to help advance the establishment of a modern local 
governance system. The size of the public sector and its payroll has been increasing as a 
result of the reduced opportunities for Palestinians to work in Israel and the weak 
economy in Palestine that reduced the number of private sector jobs (World Bank, 2007). 
Without an expanding public sector the unemployment level – already high – would be 
even worse. Donor countries have paid the salaries of more than half of the public 
servants. As a result of all of these factors the quality of leadership and 
professionalization in local and even national governance suffered from nepotism, 
favoritism, and the need to keep as many people employed as possible. According to the 
World Bank (2007), even though international donor countries provided essential 
assistance to local governments through money, training, and equipment they have failed 
to force the PNA to establish a real mechanism that can vigorously combat the corruption 
of fiscal policy and recruitment policies that contributed to the continued growth of the 
public sector’s budget (and budget deficits). Different positions were filled with under-
qualified personnel, often through patronage appointments that rewarded political loyalty 
(World Bank, 2007). These trends of corruption and lack of professionalism and the 
negative role played by politics were confirmed by the respondents of the survey. 
The majority of survey respondents agreed on the need for reorganizing the 
relations between the central and local governments and the transfer of more specific 
authority and autonomy to local officials. To achieve real reform and efficient 
performance respondents believed that the central government must minimize the 
interferences with elections and other matters. Greater efforts to eliminate corruption are 
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also needed. Moreover, with the assistance of the legislative system the survey 
respondents believe that the role of the legal system must regulate, monitor and supervise 
the performance and the functions of the local governments and without any interference 
of the central government. 
The research performed indicates there is a need to reframe and reorganize the 
relationship between politics and administration in the Palestinian context. The word 
“Politics” is divided into two categories; internal and external. Internal politics refers 
to the Palestinian politics that governs and controls relations and interactions between 
the different factions. Internal politics also refers to the need to reorganize the 
relationships within the central government and competing ministries and local 
governments. On the other hand, external politics refers to the relations between the 
PNA and the Israeli government in the West Bank and the need to reach a final 
political settlement as the local administrative system has been influenced by the 
partial political agreements of the Oslo Accord between the two parties.  
External politics impacts local government administration in several ways. For 
example, Israelis have classified all Palestinian land into three categories. Those 
designated as C areas are under the complete authority of the Israeli military. This 
fragmentation of Palestinian controlled territories also has had a negative impact on 
the process of developing local governments and systems of governance (Al-A’raj 
1996). The smaller and isolated municipalities are very weak economically and 
politically and often do not have sufficient resources to pay staff salaries. The 
geographic fragmentations of areas in the West Bank created by this system impose 
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real challenges on the local governments to achieve solid or permanent economic 
prosperity and stability and to provide decent services to its residents (ARD, 2000). 
The geographic isolation strangles economic and political development in the West 
Bank (World Bank, 2007). In brief, both the Israeli military occupation and the 
centralized structure of the PNA including its chaotic relationship between internal 
politics and the administrative system have contributed to the weak structures of local 
governments in the West Bank.  
8.4 Methodological Contributions 
The data collected for this dissertation involved a survey of community leaders. 
All researchers interested in gathering information about conditions in the West Bank and 
Gaza face extraordinary challenges. These obstacles are the result of military checkpoints 
and feelings of insecurity that could make people unwilling to participate in any study. 
Indeed given the state of political affairs it would be reasonable for respondents to be 
afraid to disclose their views and perspectives. This made the survey administration 
procedures used to collect data an experiment itself.  
Security conditions made it difficult to randomly select respondents. Some of 
these difficulties resulted from the political confrontations between Palestinians and 
Israel. Others are related to the conflict between Fatah and Hamas. As a result, any one 
doing research in Palestine is working in a very a tense environment which is also hostile 
to social science fieldwork and where mobility and access are limited. Respondents or 
anyone who works with those engaged in research has some fear that expression of one’s 
views could bring severe reactions. This effectively reduces the willingness of people to 
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participate in research activities that could produce or yield findings critical of either of 
the Palestinian parties or their policies and governance systems.  
Moreover, free mobility is very limited as the Gaza Strip has been under a 
complete siege imposed by the Israeli authorities and Egypt since Hamas won the 
legislative elections in 2006. In the West Bank, citizens cannot move from one city to 
another without having to pass through many Israeli checkpoints that consumes and 
reduces the time they have available to respond to surveys. Another challenge for 
researchers is that they sometimes must apply for special permits granted by the Israeli 
authorities to access areas for which Israel remains in complete control. The inability to 
receive a permit affected who did and did not participate in any survey. Moreover, the 
wall built by Israel in the West Bank isolated many Palestinian villages from their urban 
areas and that created additional obstacles for researchers trying to insure a valid sample 
of respondents is selected from an appropriate universe. 
In spite of all these challenges, questionnaires were returned by a diverse group of 
185 community leaders working for 80 different organizations. The selection of these 
organizations was based on their mission, goals, and the fact that each has connections 
with and works directly with the public sector. Two research assistants, one in the Gaza 
Strip and the second in the West Bank, distributed the survey instrument to public, 
private and non-governmental organizations. The research assistants explained the goal 
and content of the survey to respondents through telephone, email messages, and at a few 
workshops where they tried to answer all questions related to the survey process. To 
ensure confidentiality, respondents were assured that no information would be shared, 
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published, or included in the dissertation that does not group all responses together 
making it impossible to trace any single response to an individual. For example, the 
survey instrument began with an informed consent signed by the researcher and 
acknowledged the participants. The Institutional Research Review Board at Cleveland 
State University approved the survey instrument. 
In addition, respondents were given the choice of returning their filled surveys 
through mail and email (by those who were comfortable transmitting responses in the 
format). Most respondents chose a response method designed for this study that gave 
greater protection to confidentiality. After completing the questionnaire respondents 
sealed their surveys in an attached blank envelope and placed it in small collection device 
or “mail box” that was provided to each participating agency. Their placement of the 
instrument in a sealed envelope into the box provided additional protection of their 
identity, and it would have even been possible for individuals to put a blank survey 
instrument into the box. The research assistants sent the completed surveys to me via 
international mail. The use of these procedures also means that a research method for 
data collection in a hostile political environment was part of this dissertation.   
The challenges associated with collecting data in the West Bank and Gaza 
produces several limitations that were considered in the use of the findings. For example, 
not all of the respondents had an opportunity to meet with the research assistants and 
have answered their questions about the survey. As a result, different interpretations 
could have been made for some questions leading to unclear or invalid responses. It is 
also possible that the security protections taken might not have been seen as sufficient 
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and some individuals may have preferred not to participate providing a bias in the 
responses received. These limitations were considered when interpreting the results. 
However, across a 60-day period the receipt of responses from more than 180 individuals 
received under less than ideal circumstances provides invaluable insights into the 
operation of local governments in present-day Palestine. 
8.5 Recommendations 
Before presenting the main recommendations to enhance local governance in 
Palestine, it must be remembered that each suggestion is based on two main sources 
of data. First some of the recommendations are based on the responses of the 
Palestinian community leaders. Second, other recommendations are generated from 
the researcher’s assessment of the historical analysis of the Palestinian administrative 
system. Two sets of recommendations some for the short-term and some for long-
term, were developed.  
8.5.1 Short-Term Recommendations 
1. The historical assessment and the respondents’ perspectives indicated that the 
appointment of local government staff and mayors is dominated by politics. There 
appears to be little emphasis on the professional qualities of candidates.  As a 
result, respondents reported that staff and mayors do not have the required 
qualifications or professional experiences to manage local governments. 
Professional standards need to be established for all positions and these need to 
guide the appointment of administrators.   
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2. Almost four-fifths of the survey respondents indicated the struggle between the 
political factions is one of the major impediments to the creation of efficient 
municipalities. Hence, the administrative system should be removed from the 
political struggle and competition between the Palestinian political parties, 
factions and groups. For example, hiring, firing and promotion in the 
administrative system must be controlled by legal and professional criteria.  
3. Survey respondents do not believe that local governments have a mechanism in-
place to reduce corruption. To be sure, with no professionally trained 
administrative class the expertise needed was in short supply and the resulting 
systems had substantial and often insurmountable challenges in eliminating 
corrupt practices (World Bank, 2007). Global surveys also indicated a widespread 
impression that the Palestinian government lacks integrity and is not strongly 
committed to stopping corruption. Palestinian business leaders noted that 
corruption is the second greatest impediment to the development of public and 
private sector activity and it came after the political instability and uncertainty. 
Corruption cases should be investigated, scrutinized and decided upon in a legal 
and transparent way by an independent ministry whose staff and leadership are 
appointed through a process that insures these individuals have the skills 
recognized by the international community. The government’s security forces 
must also protect this ministry and its staff and its recommendations must have 
the force of law.  
4. To reinforce transparency policies in the administrative system whistleblowers 
and members of the media should be protected from any governmental abuse by 
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laws to encourage the transparency policies in all local affairs. Laws like this exist 
in many other countries included the US. 
5. A majority of the survey respondents indicated that laws must prohibit the 
national government from dissolving local governments or postponing any local 
elections or approving/denying any local budgets. The respondents also believed 
local governments should be responsible for local police services and safety 
rather than the national government. Such support might be attributed to the 
concerns that the police are too focused on the political interests of certain 
political factions (World Bank, 2006). 
6. The historical assessment of the Palestinian administrative system 
demonstrated that there were few if any opportunities for citizen participation. 
Local governments need to begin training residents and public officials in 
methods of participation to increase the connection between residents and 
local governments through organizing workshops, seminars, and training 
sessions.  
7. Joint service delivery between governments and macro regional planning should 
be reinforced and supported.  
8. The MoLG established more than 300 new municipalities during 1996 (MoLG, 
2004). Such a high number of municipalities may fractionate governance in a 
small geographic area with less than 4 million people. Jenin with less than 
200,000 residents might not need 12 local city councils. In Tulkerm, a city with 
125,000 residents has 11 local city councils and there is also a Tulkerm 
metropolitan municipality. There may well be too many units of government 
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creating inefficiencies. There should be reduction in the number of councils and 
governments and substantial authority vested in those that remain.  
8.5.2 Longer Term Recommendations 
To make the Palestinian administrative system successful, the national government 
should begin to develop a decentralization policy designed to transfer responsibilities to 
local governments and grant them the independence to perform their work. The national 
government must formulate new strategies, laws, regulations, plans and programs for 
developing the municipalities taking into consideration the following long-term 
recommendations:  
1. The judicial system should be the safety net against the central government abuse 
and corruption. The judiciary branch is the cornerstone of any healthy democratic 
system. Therefore, judicial review and oversight are essential in building a viable 
and effective public service. To enhance and improve the role of the municipal 
courts, new legislations, laws and rules should be approved by the Parliament and 
must be implemented by the national government. These laws should prevent the 
interference of the central government in the judicial system and reinforce 
accountability.  
2. Annual budgets and audits must become public documents.  
3. The “third sector” has proved to be invaluable in meeting people’s demands for 
services in cases when governments have failed. A healthy cooperative 
relationship should be maintained between the official government bureaucracy 
and the non-government sector and there should be clear policy directives 
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regarding the role of non-governmental organizations in the delivery of needed 
services.   
8.6 Study Shortcomings 
Under a more secure environment, the research could have selected a wider and 
more random sample of respondents from the different areas of the West Bank and Gaza 
to understand impressions and needs. Also in a more secure environment, researchers 
could have met with all respondents and responded to any questions regarding the intent 
of the survey to avoid misinterpretations or misunderstandings. This sort of an 
environment did not exist for this study limiting the generalizations that can be inferred. 
This dissertation can only initiate the assessment of adapting local government systems 
imbued with policies and practices from foreign occupations and years of internal 
political strife to ones that are based on indigenous cultures.  
Further research, supported by the national government, is needed to evaluate the 
role and the performance of local administrative system in Palestine. The next generation 
of studies must focus on existing laws and the relationships between (1) the central 
government and its competing ministries, (2) the relations between the national and local 
governments, and (3) the relationships between units of local governments.  In addition, 
research is needed to review the relationships between the Palestinian domestic politics 
and the administrative system so that clear procedures that emphasize professional 
standards are implemented. 
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8.7 Conclusion 
Based on the historical assessments of the different occupying powers, the survey 
results and its descriptive statistics, the study found that indigenous local governance 
systems do not exist in Palestine. As a new state emerges the Palestinian national 
government has the task of building an administrative system that requires a clear 
understanding of indigenous systems and institutions. The institutions that now exist are 
the product of (1) externally imposed systems, (2) ideas from returning expatriates, and 
(3) modern management science and accepted principles of civil service. Unifying and 
untangling these threads explains the difficulty the emerging new Palestinian state will 
face as the Palestinian people demand and seek stable and modern governments in spaces 
contested by strong political factions.   
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APPENDIX A 
                                                     DEFINITIONS 
1. Instrumental Rationality: It is an important element to define modernity. 
Instrumental rationality is portrayed as a technical “way of thinking and living 
that emphasizes the scientific-analytical mind-set and the belief in technological 
process.” 
2. Central government (national government): It is the government at the level of the 
nation state. Maintaining national security and exercising international diplomacy 
(including the right to sign binding treaties) are usually the responsibilities of this 
level of government. Basically, the central government has the power to make 
laws for the whole country. 
3. Governance: It makes decisions that define expectations, grant power, or verify 
performance. It consists either of a separate process or of a specific part of 
management or leadership processes. Sometimes people set up a government to 
administer these processes and systems. 
4. JSC:  Joint Service Council. 
5. Local governments: They are administrative offices that are smaller than a state. 
The term is used to contrast with offices at nation-state level, which are referred 
to as the central government, national government, or (where appropriate) federal 
government. In modern nations, local governments usually have fewer powers 
than national governments do. They usually have some power to raise taxes, 
though these may be limited by central legislation. In some countries local 
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government is partly or wholly funded by subventions from central government 
taxation. The question of municipal autonomy - which powers the local 
government has, or should have, and why - is a key question of public 
administration and governance. The institutions of local government vary greatly 
between countries, and even where similar arrangements exist, the terminology 
often varies. Common names for local government entities include state, 
province, region, department, county, district, city, town, municipality, and 
village.  
6. LGL:        Local Government Law 
7. LGUs:      Local Government Units  
8. Modernity: Modernity in a way that characterizes the world by “secularization, 
the universalistic claims of instrumental rationality, the differentiation of the 
various spheres of the life-world, [and] the bureaucratization of economics.” 
9. MoF:       Ministry of Finance 
10. MoLG:    Ministry of Local Government  
11. MoI:        Ministry of Interior 
12. Oslo Accord: agreement which held in 1993 in Oslo, the capital of Norway 
between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the government of Israel and 
established the PNA and it intended to establish peace between Palestinian and 
the government of Israel  
13. PLC: Palestinian legislative council (Palestinian Parliament) 
14. PNA: The Palestinian National Authority established after the Declaration of 
principle between the Palestinian Liberation Organization and Government of 
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Israel in Oslo in 1993. The PNA ruled over West Bank and Gaza strip and it is not 
state but near to self autonomy concept.   
15. Questionnaire: A questionnaire is a group or sequence of questions designed to 
elicit information from an informant or respondent when asked by an interviewer 
or completed unaided by the respondent.   
16. Survey: The word “survey” is used most often to describe a method of gathering 
information from a sample of individuals. This “sample” is usually just a fraction 
of the population being studied.  
17. The Council: The Council of the Local committee: This includes the Municipality 
Council, Local Council, Village Council, administrative Committee, 
Development Committee or any other committee formed according to the law. 
18. The Law of Local Council election 1996: law which organizes the election 
process in West Bank and Gaza strip in the local level. This law issued in 1996 by 
the Palestinian legislative council and approved by Chairman Arafat.  
19. The Law of Local Councils 1997: The law that organizes and determines the 
mission of local councils and municipalities in West Bank and Gaza strip .This 
law issued in 1996 by the Palestinian Legislative Council and approved by 
President Arafat. 
20. WB:    World Bank 
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APPENDIX B 
Questionnaire 
Community Leaders’ Views of the Development of Local Governance Structures in 
Palestine. 
Informed Consent 
 
Dear Respondent, 
  
I am inviting you to participate in a research project studying the evolution and 
development of local governance structures in Palestine.  Part of the information needed 
can only be obtained through an understanding of the views of community leaders on the 
roots and evolution of existing structures. The results from this survey will be used in my 
dissertation that will help me fulfill the requirements for my doctoral degree from 
Cleveland State University. Along with this letter is a short questionnaire that includes a 
number of questions. Your participation is important to me, but if you feel uncomfortable 
in any way you should respectfully decline to answer the questions.   
 
My study is looking at the strengths and the weaknesses of existing local 
governances system and to assess its indigenous roots. The survey aims to investigate if 
administrative systems have been a product of Palestinian society or if these systems 
emerged as a result of the occupation of foreign governments.  My hope is that this 
research can contribute to the design of systems that are based on Palestinian society.  
 
There are no foreseeable risks associated with participation in this project. All 
responses will be kept confidential.  As I do not ask for your names there is no way for 
any response to be associated with any individual. No information will be shared that 
does not group all responses together making it impossible to trace any single response to 
an individual.   
 
After completing your survey you can email it to w.alhabil@csuohio.edu or 
simply seal it in the attached blank envelope and place it in the box provided.  Your 
placement of the instrument in a sealed envelope into the box provides additional 
protection of your identity.  You can also mail the survey instrument to:  
 
Mr. I. Habil, 
Field Personnel Officer, UNRWA - GFO 
P.O. Box 781, 
Ashkelon, Israel 
  
 The survey should take you about 20 minutes to complete.  I hope you will take 
the time to complete this questionnaire and return it. Your participation is voluntary and 
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there is no penalty if you do not participate.  Regardless of whether you choose to 
participate or not, please let me know if you would like a summary of my findings. To 
receive a summary, you can email me on w.alhabil@csuohio.edu.  
 
This project has been approved by the IRB Review Board at Cleveland State 
University. For further information about this study, you can contact the Principal 
Investigator Dr. Mark Rosentraub at 001 (216) 687 6927 or by e-mail at 
m.rosentraub@csuohio.edu, and the Co-Principal Investigator/Student, Wasim Al-Habil 
at 001 (216) 376 6608 or by e-email at w.alhabil@csuohio.edu. Please understand that if 
you have any questions about your rights as a research participant you can contact the 
Cleveland State University Institutional Review Board at 001 (216) 687-3630 or by e-
mail at irb@csuohio.edu. After signing two copies of this letter, please keep one copy for 
your records and return the other one. Thank you so much for your cooperation and 
support.  
 
 
Sincerely.  
 
   
Wasim I. Al-Habil,  
PhD Candidate, 
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs, 
Cleveland State University. 
 
I have read and understood this consent form and I agree to participate in this study. 
 
Signature: ------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Name: ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Date: ------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Introduction: 
As new countries emerge opportunities exist to mold institutions of local 
governance and government to fit the unique needs of citizens.  This survey is designed 
to understand your perspectives on how existing local government systems evolved and 
the short and longer-term changes possible to insure systems reflect the culture of the 
Palestinian people.  No questions are asked that seek to identify you, and answering these 
questions will only take a few minutes to complete the survey.  All information we will 
grouped- together so that no individual’s responses can ever be identified. 
 
Occupations’ Influence Dimension: 
1.  Local government institutions in Palestine have evolved through periods where the 
Ottoman Empire, the British Government, Jordan, Egypt, and Israel have controlled 
elements of the political, social, and economic life of Palestinians.  If a 5 indicated “A 
Very Strong Impact” on the definition of local governments and governance in Palestine, 
and 1 indicated “No Impact,” how would you rate the historic influences of each of these 
governments on the institutions that exist today in Palestine? 
 
Government Impact on Local Governments in Palestine Today 
 Very Strong     Some            Unsure         Little                      None  
 5 4 3 2 1 
Ottoman Empire      
British Empire      
Jordan      
Egypt      
Israel      
 
2.  The formation of local governments in many countries has sometimes been influenced 
by the experiences of residents who might have lived elsewhere.  Using the same scale 
where 5 is a “very strong impact” and a l means “no impact,” what would you say is the 
influence of the following countries on local government as it operates today in the West 
Bank?   
 
Government Impact on Palestine Today 
 Very Strong     Some            Unsure         Little                      None  
 5 4 3 2 1 
Tunisia      
Lebanon      
Syria      
United States      
Great Britain      
France      
Egypt      
Jordan      
Other European      
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3.  Now, thinking about Gaza, what would you say is the influence of the following 
countries on local governments and governance there?   
 
 
Government Impact on Palestine Today 
 Very Strong     Some            Unsure         Little                      None  
 5 4 3 2 1 
Tunisia      
Lebanon      
Syria      
United States      
Great Britain      
France      
Egypt      
Jordan      
Other European      
 
 
4.  Technical assistance provided by different foreign governments can also help to form 
local governance systems and institutions.  Do you believe any technical assistance 
provided anywhere in Palestine is impacting the development of local government and 
governance systems? 
 
 
Country/ 
Institution 
Impact on Palestine Today 
Very Strong     Some            Unsure         Little                      None  
 5 4 3 2 1 
Great Britain      
France      
Japan      
United Nations      
Germany      
United States      
Other European      
Other Asian      
Religious Groups      
 
5.  The institutions of local government are also influenced by the local culture of 
residents.  When you think about the local governments and the governance systems in-
place right now, would you say the local culture has had: 
 
(5) a very strong impact 
(4) some impact 
(3) not sure 
(2) not much of an impact 
(1) no impact at all 
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National Government and Local Governments Dimension: 
6.  As countries emerge the relative power of the national government to local 
governments must be established.  In some systems a national government can dissolve 
local governments and in others, such an action is simply prohibited.  Should Palestine 
implement a system where local governments can be dissolved by the national 
government?   
 
(3) Yes   
(2) Unsure  
(1) No 
 
7.  Some countries give the central government the authority to postpone local elections.  
Is that an authority that should be granted to the Palestinian national government?   
 
(3) Yes  
(2) Unsure  
(1) No 
 
8.  Should the national government of Palestine have the authority to approve and reject a 
local government budget?   
 
(3) Yes  (2) Unsure  (1) No 
 
9.  Should the national government has the responsibility for local police services and 
safety or should that be left as much as possible to local governments?   
 
(3) National Government Responsibility  
(2) Local Government Responsibility   
(1) Unsure  
 
10.  Should the national government be responsible for the administration of all elections 
or should local governments oversee their own elections in accordance to laws and 
regulations approved by the national government?  
 
(3) National Government Responsibility  
(2) Local Government Responsibility  
(1) Unsure 
 
11.  Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: residents in a local area 
should have the right to vote on the formation of new local governments?   
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
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12. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The criteria in voting for the 
election municipal council is dominated by political factors rather than socio-economic 
ones. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
Professional Dimension: 
13. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The appointment of mayors of 
municipality and local councils are dominated by politics. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure  
 
 14. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The mayors have the 
necessary academic qualifications and the professional experiences to run their local 
governance. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
15. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The Appointed mayors are 
competent and responsible in organizing the issues of the municipalities. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
16. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Staffing of local governance 
institutions is based on academic merit and professional experience. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
17. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Decentralization policy 
should be implemented in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
administrative system. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
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18. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities have the 
necessary manpower and technical and professional capabilities to pursue the authorities 
and fulfill responsibilities. 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
Politics Dimension: 
19. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Electing an independent, 
well-qualified candidate is better than electing politically affiliated, well-qualified 
candidate. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
20. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: To achieve real reform and 
efficient performance, politics relations must be reorganized and reframed with the 
administrative system. 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
21. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The selection and the 
appointment of mayors of local governance are based on political affiliations only. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
22. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities adopt and 
apply transparency policy in running the administrative system. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
23. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Political factions’ struggle is 
one of the major impediments for municipalities to be influential and efficient. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
 
 
 
 225
24. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Local governance has a 
strategic mechanism of combating corruption. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
25. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I think that PNA wants 
seriously to implement the reform policy. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
26. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: PNA is imposing a 
centralized policy to control and dominate the local governance institutions.  
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
27. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities should have 
specific authorities and autonomy from the centralized government. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
                     Legal Dimension: 
28. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The PNA’s Local 
Governance Law contributes largely toward achieving an efficient and effective 
performance of the administrative system. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
29. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Palestinian Legislative 
Council, the Palestinian Parliament, needs to take further laws and procedures to 
reinforce the transparency and the accountability policy in the local governance. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
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30. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Role of Law is weak to 
implement any legislation or laws approved by the Palestinian Legislative Council. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
31. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The national 
government interferes and influences the judicial system. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
               Citizenry Dimension: 
32. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Municipalities and local 
councils address the indigenous needs and wants of citizens. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
33. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Citizens voice is 
heard in policies and regulations adopted by local governance institutions. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
34. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Local governance 
institutions have strong and efficient performance in achieving prosperity for citizens. 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
35. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: Local governance 
institutions have representation of civil society representatives. 
 
(3) Agree   
(2) Disagree  
(1) Unsure   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 227
General data: 
 
♦ Age: _____ 
♦ Highest educational attainment: 
Elementary 
Secondary 
Diploma 
Bachelor 
Master 
PhD 
 
♦ Have you lived outside of the Middle East?   1. Yes  2. No 
♦ If yes, where have you lived? ____________ 
♦ Where did you get your degree? ____________ 
♦ Occupation: ____________ 
♦ Sector:  
 1. Public    2. Private   3. Others 
♦ Did you participate in the presidential election?  1. Yes  2. No 
♦ Did you participate in the local governance election? 1. Yes  2. No  
♦ Have you heard about the code of the local government and municipalities? 
1. Yes  2. No, not concerned 3. No, but I am concerned 4. No opinion 
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